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ABSTRACT
The constitutional right to privacy has, gradually and
precariously, become ingrained in the American legal land
scape.

Recognized as a fundamental individual right, the

right to privacy naturally coincides with the political
philosophy of Western democracy.

Owing to men like Thomas

Hobbes and John Locke, the basis of power in society was
conceptually converted to the people; specifically, to the
individual.

The Founding Fathers, in laying down the foun

dations of American society, pursued the political philoso
phy of the predominance of the individual in society.
Herein lies the legal justification of the right to privacy
as a constitutional guarantee.
Although the right to privacy is not actually enumer
ated in the Constitution, over a century of common law
precedent and judicial interpretation has authorized certain
personal activities as being outside the scope of governmen
tal regulation.

The constitutional defense of such freedoms

have been regarded as Fourteenth Amendment due process
guarantees to life, liberty, and property.

It was not until

1965 that the 'right to privacy' invalidated an intrusive
state stutute on its own merit.
ii

In Griswold v. Connecticut,

the Supreme Court ruled that proscribing the use of contra
ceptives to married couples was unduly burdensome.

As

interpreted, contraceptive regulation violated personal
privacy protected by certain express guarantees within the
Bill of Rights including the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth,
and Ninth Amendments.

These constitutional protections

create 'zones of privacy' through association and emanation.
The judicial acknowledgment of the right to privacy invited
further challenges which involved intensely personal situa
tions and choices, the most controversial of which is the
right to choose abortion.

Roe v. Wade was the precedent

setting case which granted women the right to choose abor
tion based on Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process.

A

succession of subsequent cases made their way to the Supreme
Court which clarified the degree of state regulation and in
the process expanded the right to privacy and reproductive
choice.

The most recent cases, however, changed that trend

allowing states greater latitude in regulating abortion.
Hence, is the volatile nature of the constitutional right to
privacy.
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THE UNKNOWN CITIZEN
(To JS/07/M/378)
This Marble Monument is Erected by the State
He was found by the Bureau of Statistics to be
One against whom there was no official complaint,
And all the reports on his conduct agree
That, in the modern sense of an old-fashioned word, he was a saint,
For in everything he did he served the Greater Community.
Except for the War till the day he retired
He worked in a factory and never got fired,
But satisfied his employers, Fudge Motors Inc.
Yet he wasn't a scab or odd in his views,
For his Union reports that he paid his dues,
(Our report on his Union shows it was sound)
And our Social Psychology workers found
That he was popular with his mates and liked a drink.
The press are convinced that he bought a paper every day
And that his reactions to advertisements were normal in every way.
Policies taken out in his name prove that he was fully insured,
And his Health-card shows that he was once in the hospital but left
it cured.
Both Producers Research and High-Grade Living declare
He was fully sensible to the advantages of the Installment Plan
And had everything necessary to the Modern Man,
A phonograph, a radio, a car and a frigidaire.
Our researchers into Public Opinion are content
That he held the proper opinions for the time of year;
When there was peace, he was for peace;
when there was war, he
went.
He was married and added five children to the population,
Which our Eugenist says was the right number for a parent of his
generation,
And our teachers report that he never interfered with their
education.
Was he free? Was he happy? The question is absurd;
Had anything been wrong, we should certainly have heard.
W.H. Auden
March 1939

INTRODUCTION
We live in a continual competition with
society over the ownership of ourselves.
Arnold Simmel,
"Privacy Is Not an Isolated Freedom"
Society is a guardian and is responsible for fostering
the general moral, intellectual and emotional framework of
its citizens.1

In order to endure, the government must be

able to indoctrinate a political covenant among its members.
Thus, licensed obstetricians welcome us into state regulated
hospitals;

we are fed FDA approved baby food so that we may

grow up and mandatorily attend an educational institution
which is run by local authorities in accordance with state
programs following provisions suggested by the federal
Department of Education.

In effect, the government sys

tematizes nearly every aspect of our lives.

This is the

^ee, for example, Plato's Republic, trans. G.M.A. Grube
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1974), in which Socrates
promoted strict discipline and education of youth through compre
hensive state-run instructional programs to make the young good
citizens.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau also advanced the notion of
societally-sponsored education, because all citizens "have equally
a need for guidance.
[They] must be taught what it is they will.
From this increase of public knowledge would result . . . harmony
. . . and the highest power of the whole."
See, Rousseau, The
Social Contract, trans. Charles Frankel
(New York:
Mafner
Publishing Co., 1947), 35.
1

2

function of all governments: to maintain an operative,
peaceful, cohesive and lasting society.

We, in turn, live

in an environment which is most conducive to our individual
survival, providing security, private property and com
panionship .2
So where do we, as individuals, find the latitude to
just be ourselves?

To establish and maintain intimate

relationships, to think and create and develop our intellec
tual and spiritual natures requires a sphere of privacy
apart from society, even though we are products of society.
While "no man is an island unto himself," neither is he an
open book for all the world to see.

Society must allow its

members repose from the demands and challenges of being a
public person.

However, society often exceeds its sphere of

propriety, for not only are human beings persistently in
quisitive

(and intrusive) creatures, but what is more impos

ing, the government, and its attendant surveillance squads,
assumes it has a vested interest in the private activities

2John Locke reasoned that security and private property are
the only reasons why mankind joins into a political society:
".
. . though men when they enter into society give up the equality,
liberty and executive power they had in the state of nature into
the hands of the society, to be so far disposed of by the legis
lative as the good of the society shall require; yet it being only
with an intention in every one the better to preserve himself, his
liberty and property . . . "
See, Locke, Treatise of Civil
Government: An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End
of Civil Government, ed. Charles L. Sherman (New York: AppletonCentury-Crofts, Inc., 1937), 85.

of its citizens —

sometimes justifiably so; sometimes

not.3
For example, do the state and local governments that
legally prohibit consensual homosexual relations have a
vested interest in the sex lives of these individuals?
Homosexuality is culturally taboo, and therefore unaccept
able in the eyes of most legislators.

Isn't the federal

Constitution designed to protect the individual rights of
unpopular or misunderstood social minorities?

Many would

argue that the AIDS epidemic has changed the private nature
of sexual relations, both homosexual and heterosexual, and
therefore regulation is not overly intrusive.4
Americans love their liberties, but those liberties are
not absolute.

Even in a society which boasts individual

freedom above all else, such freedom must maintain a sense
of social responsibility.

While

[i]nsufficient freedom will subdue the spirit of
enterprise and resolution on which so much of civilized
progress depends . . . unbridled freedom will clash
inexorably with the life of others.5
3For example, see Morton H. Halperin and Daniel N. Hoffman,
Freedom v. National Security; Secrecy and Surveillance (New York:
Chelsea House Publishers, 1977),
Senator Edward V. Long, The
Intruders: The Invasion of Privacy by Government and Industry (New
York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1967), Myron Brenton, The
Privacy Invaders (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1964), and Edward
A. Shils The Torment of Secrecy (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press,
1956) .
4See, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), discussed below
in Chapter Four.
5John B. Young, "Introduction: A Look at Privacy," in Privacy,
ed. John B. Young (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Ltd., 1978,), 1.

inexorably with the life of others.5
The debate over the right to privacy is one of individ
ual rights versus societal order, and is particularly con
troversial in democratic America.

Because our society is

comprised of a melting pot of staunchly held opinions and
beliefs, our political and legal representatives are often
embroiled in debate over the unbalanceable scales of in
dividual and societal interests.

Unfortunately,

in most

circumstances one interest must be sacrificed for the exist
ence of the other;

individual privacy and public policy are

often at odds.
History has shown that an excessive zeal for a par
ticular ideology or institution causes a despotic and
uncompromising mentality which could result in economic and
social stagnation,6 fascism,7 and in the most extreme cir

5John B. Young, "Introduction: A Look at Privacy," in Privacy,
ed. John B. Young (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Ltd., 1978,), 1.
6Maria Hirszowicz writes that "most observers of Communist
societies believe that the economic development of these countries
is seriously impaired by the dictatorial forms of their governments
"
See, Hirszowicz, Coercion and Control in Communist
Society: The Visible Hand in a Command Economy (New York: St.
Martins Press, 1986), 1.
See also, Hirszowicz, The Bureaucratic
Leviathan (New York: New York University Press, 1980) .
7Italian fascist, Alfredo Rocco exhorts that fascist dogma
does not "accept a bill of rights which tends to make the in
dividual superior to the state and to empower him to act in
opposition to society.
Our concept of liberty is that the
individual must be allowed to develop his personality in behalf of
the state. . . " Rocco, "The Political Doctrine of Fascism," in
Readings on Fascism and National Socialism (Denver, Colorado: Alan
Swallow Paperbacks, no date), 36.

5

cumstances, genocide.8

History has also shown that the ab

sence of governmental regulation, and a lack of communal
cohesiveness likewise subjugates individual liberty.

Too

much freedom incites the masses into a state of chaos and
private warfare: "wherein men live without other security,
than what their own strength, and their own invention shall
furnish them withal."9

One could argue, as Thomas Hobbes

did, that the life of man is no better when the government
is oppressive, than when there is no government, or when the
governing body is ineffective.
Proponents of the right to privacy would argue that if
the intruder is the government, then oppression has the
stamp of legitimacy which few people, if any, could fight
back and win.

A government with unlimited sovereignty, the

acquiescence of a passive or intimidated people, and the use
of coercion, is far more a threat to individual liberties
than the madman with an ax.

Censorship of thought and

action and too rigid a surveillance of individual beliefs
and conduct, moreover, invites underground conspiratorial
attitudes and a deep mistrust of government.

The spirit of

a people cannot be repressed for too long without eventual
resistance to the government and subsequently, as Arnold
aArendt Hannah recounts the principles and consequences of
fascism and the reign of terror which resulted from the racist
philosophy of "total domination," in The Origin of Totalitarianism
(Cleveland, Ohio: The World Publishing Co., 1966).
9Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. and intro, by Michael Oakeshott
(Oxford, Great Britain: A.R. Mowbray & Co. Limited, 1955), 82.

6

Simmel points out, towards each other.
Opposition to freedom raises the issue of freedom.
If there were no opposition to freedom, it would
have to be invented. . . A vital society continues
to question it, and to keep it in flux. But with
out it, there would not be a society, no basis for
any claims, no freedom, no privacy, no boundaries,
no individuals — but only the war of each against
all.10
A good example of the internal conflict caused in a
society when the government disregards individual rights to
free thought and beliefs is the Red Scare led by Senator
Joseph McCarthy during the 1950s.

The exaggerated specter

of communism had neighbor spying on neighbor and browbeating
Congressmen leading legislative inquests against blameless
citizens.11

Those who subscribed to a leftist philosophy,

belonged to a labor union, or associated with suspected
communists were liable to be blackballed from their chosen
professions and even to serve prison sentences.12

In hind

10Arnold Simmel, "Privacy Is Not an Isolated Freedom," in
Privacy: Nomos XIII. eds. J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman
(New York: Atherton Press, 1971,), 87.
n The United States Supreme Court eventually declared this to
be an unconstitutional infringement of individual rights. See, for
example, Watkins v. Unitfed States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957), overturned
a "contempt of Congress" conviction as "necessarily invalid under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment." See also, Sweezv
v. New Hampshire. 354 U.S. 234 (1957), where the Court invalidated
state legislative contempt convictions based on the due process
clause of the 14th Amendment.
lzFor example, see Thomas C. Reeves, ed., McCarthvism (Malabar,
Florida: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1989), Peter L.
Steinberg, The Great "Red Menace": United States Prosecution of
American Communists. 1947 - 1952 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood
Press, 1984), and Kenneth O'Reilly, Hoover and the Un-Americans:
The FBI, HUAC, and the Red Menace (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania:
Temple University Press, 1983).

sight, was the government justified in employing "Big
Brother" tactics against its people?
cause?

Did it serve a greater

If not, then, perhaps with some foresight, the

greater Leviathan will learn to respect the private acts and
beliefs of its members unless there is imminent danger that
the whole or any of its parts will in any way be harmed.13
This thesis represents an effort to vindicate a right
to privacy for the American people.

It attempts to explain

why privacy needs are a significant component of Western
democratic ideals and expectations.

Chapter One looks at

both the personal and societal importance of privacy, and
how it is consistent with the American concept of ordered
liberty deeply entrenched in the history of our nation.
Chapter Two examines the actual constitutional framework of
a right to privacy.

From its roots as a tort remedy in

trespass and defamation cases, to search and seizure and
self-incrimination considerations, to the very controversial
rights to autonomy, there is no doubt that privacy protec
tions have come a very long way.

The discussion in Chapter

Three will narrow the general focus of privacy to the con
stitutionally protected areas of reproduction, contracep13See, John Stuart Mill, On Liberty. Representative Government.
The Subjection of Women. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1933),
14-15.
In On Liberty. Mill explains the "Harm Principle" in
representative democracies, that is, "the sole end for which
mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering
with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self
protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightful
ly exercised over any member of a civilized community against his
will, is to prevent harm to others."

tion, and abortion, in a case-by-case analysis of Supreme
Court decisions.

Finally, Chapter Four will consider the

future of a right to privacy in light of recent Supreme
Court decisions limiting the constitutional safeguards of
certain types of privacy decisions.

CHAPTER ONE

EXPLORING THE CONCEPT OF PRIVACY
An American has no sense of privacy.
He
does not know what it means. There is
no such thing in the country.
George Bernard Shaw
This chapter will examine different aspects and inter
pretations of the concept of privacy, and why it plays a
significant role in the lives of human beings.

There have

been psychological examinations for why the individual
psyche needs its space/1 moral considerations,2 cultural
variations,3 social explanations4 and political5 and legal
^ o r example, Roger Ingham, "Privacy and Psychology," in
Privacy, ed. John B. Young (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Ltd.,
1978), 35-55.
2For example, Charles Fried, "Privacy," in Law, Reason, and
Justice: Essays in Legal Philosophy, ed. Graham Hughes (New York:
New York University Press, 1969), 45-69.
3For example, Alan Westin,
Atheneum Publishers, 1967).

Privacy

and Freedom

(New York,

4For example, Stephen T. Margulis, "Conceptions of Privacy:
Current Status and Next Steps," in Journal of Social Issues 33, no.
3 (1977): 5-21.
5For example, Carl J. Friedrich, "Secrecy versus Privacy: The
Democratic Dilemma," in Privacy: Nomos XIII, eds. J. Roland Pennock
and John W. Chapman (New York: Atherton Press, 1971), 105-120.
9
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justifications6 are all comprised within this seemingly
familiar affair.

Thus, we begin with the definition of the

very word itself.
Defining Privacy
Privacy/ (prl - vs - se) 1 a: the quality or state
of being apart from company or observation: SECLU
SION b: freedom from unauthorized intrusion (one's
right to -) 2 archaic: a place of seclusion 3:
SECRECY.7
Privacy, as defined by Webster's New Collegiate Dic
tionary, is described in three relatively simple concepts:
seclusion, freedom and secrecy.

Yet, one scholar describes

privacy as "a confusing and complicated idea."8

Another

asserts that there is no definable way to describe privacy
". . . perhaps, because it is undefinable.

Like the grand

concepts of liberty and equality, privacy may be too large
to be clearly identified."9 Perhaps a better understanding
of the right to privacy is possible if the definitions of
privacy, as put forth by Webster, are examined separately.
6For example, Edward J. Bloustein, "Privacy as an aspect of
human dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser,"
in Philosophical
Dimensions of Privacy, ed. Ferdinand D. Schoeman (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1984), 156-202.
7Webster's
"privacy."

New

Collegiate

Dictionary,

197 9

ed.,

s.v.

aForeword by C. Herman Pritchett in David M. O'Brien Privacy,
Law, and Public Policy (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979), vii.
9Philip Kurland, "The Private I: Some Reflections on Privacy
and the Constitution," in Taking the Constitution Seriously:
Essays on the Constitution and Constitutional Law, ed. Gary L.
McDowell (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1981),
294.

11

The ensuing analysis proposes to clarify that the concept of
freedom is what is meant by the right to privacy.

Seclusion
I never said, "I want to be alone."
I only said, "I want to be left alone."
Greta Garbo
Definitions la and 2 describe privacy as a being-apartfrom others, and thus akin to loneliness, alienation, isola
tion and ostracism.

Is this what is meant when one speaks

of the right to privacy, that is, the right to be lonely?
Privacy is not a negative state-of-being, says Michael
Weinstein, who asserts that several variables must exist for
someone to be in the state of privacy.
[PJrivacy appears in consciousness as a condition of
voluntary limitation of communication to or from cer
tain others in a situation, with respect to specified
information, for the purpose of conducting an activity
in pursuit of a perceived good. The variables of
choice, limited communication, relevant others, a
situational context, activity, and a good to be at
tained must all be present in the full construction of
privacy.10
Privacy is not loneliness since loneliness is an un
wanted condition which is thrust upon an individual who in
fact seeks social contact or affection.

Privacy is not

alienation since alienation is a state of unrelatedness from

10Michael A. Weinstein, "The Uses of Privacy in the Good Life, "
in Privacy: Nomos XIII, 94.

12

one's social context or oneself.

Isolation is not privacy

since isolation is a term which refers to complete aloneness
while privacy permits one to enjoy the company of relevant
others in a more intimate context.

Finally, privacy is not

ostracism since the latter is a condition of involuntary
banishment and the former is always voluntary withdrawal.
Privacy is, in short, a positive human condition.
While some forms of being-apart-from-others can be negative
ly construed, privacy is desirable.
freedom and self-determination.

It is an affirmation of

It allows people to assem

ble and share ideas and affords to individuals the freedom
they need to achieve goals and flourish as human beings.11
Secrecy
Definition 3 asserts that privacy is a synonym for
secrecy.

While both secrecy and privacy involve the with

holding of information, secrecy is more compelling and more
orchestrated, or as sociologist Edward Shils declares,
SECRECY IS PRIVACY made compulsory. With more severe
sanctions for the disclosure of information, more
emphatic demands for its withholding from persons
authorized to receive it, secrecy appears to be an
11Westin affirms that privacy is a basic human need:
"Anthropological studies have shown that the individual in
virtually every society engages in a continuing personal process by
which he seeks privacy at some times and disclosure and companion
ship at other times. . . The reason for the universality of this
process is that individuals have conflicting roles to play in any
society; to play these different roles with different persons, the
individual must present a different "self" at various times.
Restricting information about himself and his emotions is a crucial
way of protecting the individual in the stresses and strains of
this social interaction." Westin, Privacy and Freedom. 13.

13

extension of privacy.
It is privacy with higher more
impassable barriers.
Yet secrecy is the enemy of
privacy.12
Secrecy is used against individual privacy.

It is a

tool employed to manipulate and control information, while
privacy is protective and selective over the disclosure of
information.

Secrecy denotes sneakiness, deviousness, or

underhandedness; when someone has to do something on the
sly, then that person is secretive.

Privacy, on the other

hand, refers to autonomy or the freedom to choose to do
something without that action becoming public.
When a government quashes the right of people to act
privately, then the defiant citizenry must act secretly.
For example, in the Soviet Union, people who wanted to
worship had to do so secretly.

However, with the allowance

of glasnost and the more tolerant attitude toward religious
beliefs, individuals are now allowed to worship private
ly.13

"Privacy is the voluntary withholding of information

reinforced by a willing indifference," explains Shils.
"Secrecy is the compulsory withholding of knowledge, rein

12Shils, The Torment of Secrecy, above, 201.
13In the Soviet Union, prior to "glasnost," religion existed
by implication, says Alec Nove.
However, in 1988, religious
attitudes began to change. Glasnost began to bring the church into
the more open society. For example, "the word 'God' couldnot, for
decades, be spelt with an initial capital letter.
Only in most
recent years has this become possible, and it is now commonplace.
. . Recordings of church choirs have now become available. . . [A]
televised discussion
[was] held in March 1988 on different
[religious] world views. . . " See, Nove, Glasnost' in Action
(Boston, Massachusetts: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 118-119.

14

forced by a prospect of sanctions for disclosure."1'1
When secrecy is associated with the function of govern
ments, it is granted more legitimacy than when an individual
or a private group acts secretly.

Much to the dismay of

First Amendment advocates who see freedom of the press as a
means to keep the American government and its representa
tives from acting secretly, the Supreme Court has found a
sound constitutional basis for governmental secrecy.

In

United States v. Nixon.15 the Court found executive privi
lege to be functionally licensed in the operation of govern
ment.

Some find it ironic, however, that the President of a

democracy is rendered the constitutional justification to
act secretly, while a general right of privacy is considered
a substantive and precarious constitutional right.

Philip

Kurland asserts:
[l]f the Supreme Court can find a constitutional basis,
made up of whole cloth, for executive privilege, which
is a secrecy proposition, it should more readily find
in the Constitution the basis for an expansive privacy
doctrine. The latter — individual privacy — is
consistent with the Constitution's primary function of
limitation of arbitrary governmental power.
The former
— government secrecy — is not; indeed, it is incon
sistent with it.16
14Shils, The Torment of Secrecy. 26.
15United States v. Nixon. 418 US 683 (1974) . The Supreme Court
ruled that executive privilege (i.e., the right to withhold
information, documents, or testimony from congress or the courts)
does have limited constitutional basis. The Chief Executive must
reasonably show that disclosure of information could imperil the
national interest.
16Philip Kurland, "The Private I: Some Reflections on Privacy
and the Constitution," 297.

15

Furthermore, a more sophisticated international mili
tary network tacitly requires that the national government
become all the more impenetrable at the expense of individ
ual liberties.

Official secrets and industrial activity, in

accordance with the nuclear arms race, are becoming uncom
fortably close.

The price of system maintenance and nation

al security is the lessening of individual privacy, notes
-a,''’ Carl Friedrich.
The need for official secrecy has, under the heading of
security, been extended at the expense of private
secrecy (privacy) as investigatory activities, prying
into the private lives of individuals, have become ever
more aggressive."17
If individual privacy becomes too endangered by govern
mental secrecy, then, as in totalitarian regimes such as
Nazi Germany, individuals will resort to secrecy.

The

difference between privacy and secrecy, therefore, is the
extent to which external constraints force their will upon
independent human beings.
Freedom
I think I am free when I can do what I
want; this tiny protoplasmal center of
radiant energy demands that alien im
pacts shall not thwart its insistences
and self-assertions.
Judge Learned Hand
When one speaks of the right to privacy, then defini
tion lb is the corresponding interpretation, that is, free17Carl J. Friedrich,
Dilemma," 112.
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dora from unauthorized intrusion.

Generally, four variables

are present when defining an individual's right to privacy:
(1) the individual elects to limit access to his thoughts,
actions, and so forth.

This suggests an individual is free

to make rational choices;

(2) the individual temporarily

chooses to sever communication and information from certain
others or society;
desired purpose;

(3) the individual's privacy serves a
(4) privacy is an individual prerogative

and an inherent human liberty.18

These variables are sig

nificant characteristics to the American love of liberty and
freedom.

It is, thus, surprising that a constitutional

right to privacy has fared as dubiously as it has in the
United States.
connotations,

It is, perhaps, because of the negative
just discussed, that accompany the right to

privacy; it engenders fears of an unmanageable and alienated
America.

The right to privacy is significant in still other

ways, as the next section will examine.
Evaluating Privacy
The Social-Psychological Significance of Privacy
We are, in a sense, always alone, in a world of fleet
ing events and images.

Not meant despairingly, yet realist

ically, each of us moves on to meet new companions, new
challenges, and new ideas in a way unique to ourselves.
Contrary to the ancient Greek philosophy which maintained
18David M. O'Brien, Privacy. Law, and Public Policy, 4.
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that the individual is teleologically a part of the larger
whole,19 natural rights philosophers, such as Thomas Hobbes
and John Locke, approached the theory of the individual in
society as "all being free, equal and independent."20

It

is therefore necessary that the individual be prepared for
the vicissitudes that life offers, for only within the
individual mind are the resolutions accommodating life to be
made.

Sociologists and psychologists agree that privacy

allows the individual the time and space required to recruit
and redefine himself and his social situation.

Privacy, in

a world of social tensions and high expectations,
outlet in the pressure cooker of life.

is the

Individuals instinc

tively create "self-boundaries," within which "our own
interests are sovereign, all initiative is ours, we are free
to do our thing, insulated against outside influence and
observation. "21
Being human means spontaneity, originality, and at
times, even irrationality.

Being a member of society means

19For example, Aristotle professed that "the polis is prior in
the order of nature to the family and the individual.
The reason
for this is that the whole is necessarily prior [in nature] to the
part." See, The Politics of Aristotle, ed. and trans. Ernest Barker
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 6.
20John Locke, Treatise of Civil Government: An Essay Concerning
the True Original. Extent and End of Civil Government, above, 63.
21Arnold Simmel argues that the desire for privacy is different
in different cultures. Because the individual is the central value
in the United States, the felt need for privacy is greater here
than in other societies. See, Simmel, "Privacy Is Not an Isolated
Freedom," above, 72.
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standards of conformity and contempt for noncompliance.
Privacy acts as the resolution between these opposing
forces.

It allows individuals their mortal indiscretions

without being branded as iconoclasts, perverts, or eccen
trics by their peers.

The dichotomy of existence is the

public face and the private I.

The separation between

actual self and social self is functional, notes Michael
Weinstein,
because the person can invisibly transgress social
norms and thereby keep up appearances in his social
relations, undertake consumption which is disapproved,
enact unorthodox postures, and, most important, relax
after encounters with unbearable people with whom
relations are necessary.22
The ability to act privately, therefore, is the power
to be master of the identity that one creates in the world.
This gives the individual in society the sense that he is
not an impotent entity in an impersonal universe.

It allows

people some modicum of control over their immediate environ
ment; an environment that includes body, mind and heart.
The inner sense of privacy, and mutual respect for it,
may be a mechanism that helps to secure the conditions
for living fraternally in a world where men are not
gods, where to know all is not to understand and for
give all.23
Critics of the right to privacy allege that all the ado
over the claims for personal autonomy is degenerating the

22Michael A. Weinstein, "The Uses of Privacy in the Good Life, "
23Paul A. Freund, "Privacy: One Concept or Many," in Privacy:
Nomos XIII. 195-196.

19

need for law and order within society.

They suggest that by

promoting the individual above all else, the foundation of
community fellowship is being sacrificed, and that anti
social behavior is being fostered.24

Because of the "ME"

attitude, individuals are losing touch with society, and
values, and the general feeling of self-worth that comes
with a healthy affiliation with others.

Hence, privacy,

argue the critics, is the psychosis of the post-modern,
liberal era.25
The Moral Significance of Privacy
When critics argue that privacy is producing the de
cline of values within society, it is important to appre
ciate what these values are.

If people in the United States

24A vociferous attack on privacy was made by H.W. Arndt: "The
cult of privacy rests on an individualist conception of society,
not merely in the innocent and beneficial sense of a society in
which the welfare of individual is conceived as the end of all
social organization, but in the more specific sense of 'each for
himself and the devil take the hindmost' . . . An individualist of
this sort sees 'the Government' where we might see 'the public
interest.'"
See, Arndt,
"The Cult of Privacy," Australian
Quarterly XXI, no., 3 (September 1949): 69, 70-71.
25The modern era advanced the predominance of the individual
over society.
The classical liberal philosophy will be explained
in greater detail later in Chapter 1.
One philosopher, Richard
Wasserstrom, argues that cultural hang-ups and taboos are what
cause the individual to go into hiding. It is societal qualms that
are inducing the 'cult of privacy.'
"We have made ourselves
excessively vulnerable . . . because we have accepted the idea that
many things are shameful unless done in private. . . Indeed our
culture would be healthier and happier if we diminished substan
tially the kinds of actions that we now feel comfortable doing only
in private, or the kinds of thoughts we now feel comfortable
disclosing only to those with whom we have special relationships."
See, Wasserstrom,
"Privacy: Some arguments and assumptions,"
Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy, 330-331.

were asked what they value most, a plethora of different
answers would be given.

Some value family, marriage, love,

money, education, freedom, and so on.

These values are

present in varying degrees of intensity, among different age
groups and ethnic groups, and within the disparate expanse
of the country.

If an individual prefers a private life of

education and religious meditation, would it be right to
accuse that individual of being a decadent factor in the
decline of the institution of marriage and family?
Throughout history individual values have been debated,
weighed, fought over, and even killed for, and no one single
value has infinitely prevailed.26

There is one constant

regarding values and morality, however, and that is toler
ance and understanding.

As Charles Fried discerned it,

the principle of morality, far from representing a
complete system of values, establishes only the equal
liberty of each person to define and pursue his values
free from the undesired impingement of others.27
Equal deference to individual values is important because it
is telling the person that he has worth as a freethinking,
rational, and intelligent human being.

26Such historical events inspired Thomas Jefferson to comment
that " [mjillions of innocent men, women, and children, since the
introduction of Christianity, have been burnt, tortured, fined,
imprisoned; yet we have not advanced one inch towards uniformity.
What has been the effect of coercion? To make one half of the world
fools, and the other half hypocrites."
See, Jefferson, "Query
XVII," in Writings (New York: Literary Classics of the United
States, 1984), 286.
27Charles Fried, "Privacy," 50.
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The philosophy of paternalism, on the other hand, says
that authority, governmental or religious, is charged with
guiding the morality and mentality of the people, since "the
people" are generally unable to act morally on their own.28
For most legal scholars, and Americans in general, this
proposition amounts to blasphemy.

H.L.A. Hart explains why

freedom is the primary value:
The unimpeded exercise by individuals of free choice
may be held as a value in itself with which it is
'prima facie' wrong to interfere; or it may be thought
valuable because it enables individuals to experiment
— even with living — and to discover things valuable
both to themselves and to others. But interference
with individual liberty may be thought an evil requir
ing justification for simpler, utilitarian reasons; for
it is itself the infliction of a special form of suf
fering — often very acute — on those whose desires
are frustrated by the fear of punishment.29
Experimenting with life and its consequences has been
the moral lesson.

Many times the voice of authority was

wrong; not infrequently, it was ethically outrageous and
morally bankrupt, designed to serve one purpose which was to
promote and maintain the power of the man or institution.
28Some legal paternalists include Lord Devlin, James Fitzjames
Stephen and Edmund Burke.
They exhort the necessary existence of
a stringently enforced moral code among all members of society,
regardless of whether their offense is detrimental to society. A
paternalist, for example, would contend that an individual must be
protected from himself, and that this a necessary role of law. See,
for e.g., Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals
(Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1959), Stephen, Liberty. Equality. Fraternity
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1967), and Burke, Reflec
tions on the Revolution in France (New York: Arlington House,
1955) .
Z9H .L .A.
Hart,
Law.
Liberty,
and
Morality
California: Stanford University Press, 1963), 21-22.

(Stanford,
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There are no absolutes, as many people have discovered,
thus, the iniquities of life are the restrictions and op
pressions falsely established.

If privacy is necessary to

psychologically or physically free the individual from
culturally imposed restraints, then it is hard to see how
the right to privacy destroys the values of a nation; par
ticularly a country so fervent about individual freedoms.
The Political Justification for the Right to Privacy
American political culture is premised on the words of
Thomas Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence:
We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all
Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among
these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness.That to secure these Rights, Governments are institu
ted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the
Consent of the Governed.According to the dictates of reason, and to the docu
ment that set us free as a nation, no one may be a master
over others unless it is by consent.

The American form of

limited sovereignty declares that "the people" created a
government to protect individual liberties against encroach
ment from men in general, and from the government in partic
ular.

The governed are subject to the laws of government,

not subjugated to the whims of authority.

Freedom, equal

ity, and independence are entitlements endowed upon human
beings prior to the creation of government.

Conditionally,

however, individuals must refrain from certain actions which
would enslave free men.

"He who may intrude upon another at
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will is the master of the other and, in fact, intrusion is a
primary weapon of the tyrant."30
The American political system can be described as a
series of fortresses;

walls exist everywhere separating

church and state, the three branches of government, the two
houses of Congress, federal and state government, individual
liberties from arbitrary governmental encroachment and,
finally, criminal and civil laws separating one citizen from
the other.

This was designed not only to counteract a

concentration of power, but also to preserve a large measure
of autonomy whereby institutions and individuals could carry
out their affairs.31

If, for instance, the President could

interfere with the duties of the legislative or judicial
branches, then we could reasonably expect to live in fear of
despotism.

Or, if popular religion were to infiltrate our

governmental institutions, we could hardly expect freedom of
conscience and belief to endure.32

And, if the private

domain were to be permeated by intruders at random, then we

30Edward J. Bloustein, "Privacy as an aspect of human dignity:
an answer to Dean Prosser," 165.
31See, for example, James Madison who, expounding on the ideas
of Charles-Louis de Montesquieu,
advanced the principle of
separation-of-powers.' Madison stated "that where the whole power
of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the
whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a
free education are subverted."
Madison, "Essay #47," in James
Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, The Federalist Papers
(New York: New American Library, 1961), 304.
32See, John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, ed. Charles
L. Sherman (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1937) .
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are by no means equal.
Francis Bacon aptly asserted that "knowledge . . .
power."33

is

Hence, ill-begotten information about ourselves,

our thoughts and our actions arms the possessor of such
information with the power to discredit our names and repu
tations and to deprive us of a future of freedom and auton
omy.

Information about private conduct can be distorted and

disclosed, misinterpreted out of context and used against us
making us slaves to the past and prisoners of the pres
ent.34

Certainly, this was not intended for a politically

free people, or meant by a political philosophy which, above
all else, exalts the individual.
The individual in Western democracies plays an impor
tant role in the political system by holding representatives
accountable.

The ballot is the means whereby citizens have

their say in government; they state their choice by marking
the box next to the politician or proposition.

The privacy

of their choice is the one way that the voter is assured
that he could be true to his personal and political convic
tions.

Community pressures and other intimidations cannot

33Sir Frances Bacon, Religious Meditations: Of Heresies, in The
Works of Francis Bacon, eds. James Spedding, Robert Ellis and
Douglas Heath, vol. 14 (Boston, Massachusetts: Brown and Taggard,
1969), 95.
34Data banks are primarily responsible for invading individual
privacy.
Hyman Gross asserts that data Banks are an "offense to
self-determination.
We are subject to being acted on by others
because of conclusions about us which we do not know and whose
effect we have no opportunity to counteract." See, Gross, "Privacy
and Autonomy," in Privacy: Nomos XIII, 174.
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reach the privacy of the ballot box.35
Freedom of convictions in a democratic society keeps
the system dynamic and the political process open and com
petitive :
Only an individual free to shape his own life and that
of his immediate human relations is capable of fulfil
ling the vital function of a citizen in a democratic
community, and thus privacy becomes the corollary of
democracy.36
If there were no individual privacy, if we lived in an open
communal society, differences of opinion would eventually
languish away under the weight of public opinion, fear of
ostracism, or loss of esteem.

If there were no variety of

views or differences of opinion there would be no need for
democracy.

The tyranny of popular morality and opinion was

a quandary that our Founding Fathers sought to avoid through
various channels designed to protect the rights of minor
ities.37

Though these impediments

(e.g., passing laws only

with the consent of both houses of Congress, the Senate
filibuster, judicial review, etc.) may make our political

35See Carl J. Friedrich,
cratic Dilemma," 115.

"Secrecy versus Privacy:
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36Ibid.. 116.
37James Madison, for example, strove to remedy the problem of
the tyranny of the majority in "Essay #51" of the Federalist
Papers, 324. "Whilst all authority in it [the federal republic of
the United States] will be derived from and dependent on the
society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts,
interests and classes of citizens,
the rights of individuals, or
of the minority, will be in little danger from interested com
binations of the majority. In a free government the security for
civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights."
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system complex, slow, and at times counterproductive, it is
a system aimed at compromise and it necessitates tolerance.
Because we are able to bend with the diversities of in
terests and opinion, our government will not break as a
result of being unable to adjust to the changes which will
eventually confront all societies.
The most powerful argument for the right to privacy in
Western democracies is, thus, the right of every individual
to self-determination.

It is every citizen's right to vote

his conscience, or belong to a political organization, if he
in fact chooses to be political at all.

It is every citi

zen's right to choose between Protestantism, Catholicism,
Buddhism, atheism, ad infinitum, as his belief system.
Individual self-determination must not be laid in the lap of
a disinterested bureaucracy whose records care nothing about
justice or circumstance; nor must it be manipulated by a
malicious political foe whose warped sensibilities seek only
the downfall of his opponent; nor should one's decisions be
sacrificed to self-righteous religious groups whose secular
odyssey tolerates only one course of conduct.

Contrary to

totalitarianism where the individual is thought to exist for
the institutions and where individual values are determined
by the institutional superstructure, liberal democratic
thought credits its citizens with the rationality to create,
maintain, amend, and advance the political and economic
society in which they live.
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Ideological Origins of
the Right to Privacy
As with all laws and political principles, the right to
privacy evolved as a result of historical, philosophical,
and political circumstance.

The intellectual ferment which

preceded and influenced the men who framed our system of
government advanced a revolutionary form of governing based
on a new way of understanding mankind.

No longer was man

considered a mere pawn of kings, enthroned by "blue blood"
and "divine right."

The Enlightenment revealed to thinkers

that vassalage was exploitive and erroneous; reason showed
philosophers that life could be more free, equal, and
productive.
The time was the Seventeenth Century;
cal change.

an era of radi

Continental tradition was being challenged by

the inevitability of science, industrialization, and capi
talism.

Feudalism was undermined because of the mass migra

tion of serfs into urban areas.

A large concentration of

wage laborers in cities such as London, and poor purchasing
power because of high prices manifested themselves in scores
of people living at or under the poverty line.38

Such an

assemblage of unpropertied indigents posed a potential
threat to the propertied class.

The English Civil War was

38Christopher Hill writes "that in this period England was
'relatively' overpopulated - that the population was greater than
the economy as then organised could absorb." See Hill, The Century
of Revolution, 1603 - 1714 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company,
1980), 18.
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imminent.39
The face of religion was changing as well.

While the

conservative Church of England (Episcopalian) frowned upon
the profit-making incentive of the marketplace, the up-andcoming prominence of the theological left

(including Pres-

byterianism, Puritanism, and Calvinism) was encouraging a
much more liberating ideology.

They urged that to work

assiduously, and to make the best use of one's talents, was
to earn God's favor.

Their promotion of effort, industry,

study, and a sense of purpose, also led to the scientific
quest.
The diligence with which men were now applying their
labor and conscience fostered a new skepticism.

Instead of

accepting the heavens as taught in the church, men were
inspired to study the heavens for themselves and, therein,
find the laws of the universe.

With each new discovery, a

previously held belief was shattered.

The scientific method

thus caused the deterioration of authority in the Seven
teenth Century.

From the Pope of Rome to the astronomer

Ptolemy, authorities once taken at their word were ques
tioned and frequently rejected.

Historian Christopher Hill

writes:
The initial challenge to authority came from the
Protestant appeal to the individual conscience. . .
39The Civil War was to last from 1642-1649. It was also called
the "Puritan Revolution" because of the social consequences of
Puritan
thought,
for
example,
individualism,
materialistic
initiative, etc.
Ibid., 63ff.
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Economic individualism in society (the breakdown of
village community and gild, the rise of capitalism)
combined with individualism in religion to produce
quite a new authority, that contained within each man's
breast.40
Europe was in a state of flux.

Its intellectual,

moral, and economic composition was being torn down in order
to rebuild, and men, as dynamic as the times, were there to
record their empirical observations.

Scientific, religious,

and political revelations began to emerge, most of which
concentrated on the individual human being and his environ
ment . . . and then came Thomas Hobbes.
Thomas Hobbes
Wisdom is acquired not by reading of
books, but of men.
Leviathan
Why would a man of learning and privilege, a man bred
to walk with the aristocracy and the intellectual elite
conclude that "the life of man,
brutish, and short?"41

[is] solitary, poor, nasty,

Hobbes' incisive observations in

variably led him to his cynicism, for what he saw were
paupers fighting to survive, a middle class

(yeomen, in

dustrialists, etc.) laboring to advance their lot and an
aristocracy manipulating to keep and further their fortune.
And in all of these affairs of men, from prince to pauper,
Hobbes saw that men were equally capable of each others'

40Ibid., 78.
41Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, above, 82.
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undoing.

This, alas, was the problem.

Man's relative equality of body and mind, as well as
his infinite appetites and aversions, consequently, make
foes of mankind.

In a pre-governmental state, or a state of

nature where everything is for the taking, our neighbors are
but bothersome hindrances, frustrating our personal goals
and desires.

There is no private property or industry, for

one's ability to protect the fruits of his labor and his
possessions is uncertain.

Man in this type of society is

doomed to a life of struggle and competition, endeavoring
"to destroy or subdue one another."42
Hobbes then took a fundamental understanding of human
nature, that is, that man is primarily self-interested, and
asked why men would want or need a government when, without
government, man is in his most sovereign state.

In the

state of nature, man has unfettered liberty to do what is
necessary to preserve and improve his condition; that is to
say, he has 'natural rights.'43
However, reason, and again self-interest, urge mankind
to abide by natural laws in order to secure his state and
estate in a ruthlessly competitive world.

If mankind in

general agrees to "do not that to another, which thou would42Ibid.. 80-84.
43Natural rights or 'jus naturale' is "the liberty each man
hath to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation
of his own nature . . . and consequently, of doing anything, which
in his own judgement and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest
means thereunto."
Ibid.. 84.
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est not have done to thyself," then men are appealing to the
'law of nature.'44

Three fundamental precepts, according

to Hobbes and the natural law, will abet peace among men:
first,

"that every man ought to endeavour peace, as far as

he has hope of attaining it, "45;

second,

willing, when others are so too . . .

"that a man be

to lay down this right

to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against
other men, as he would allow other men against himself, "46;
and third,

"that men perform their covenants made."47

Hereafter, man, who before the covenant had complete
liberty, relinquishes his natural rights to a sovereign, one
or an assembly possessing absolute power, created to keep
the peace and to execute the law for that purpose.

After-

all, "covenants without the sword, are but words, and of no
strength to secure a man at all."48

Free men authorize the

sovereign who will thereafter subject them to his omnipotent
rule.
Hobbes' influence on the right to privacy seems pre
carious enough, since he was a political positivist in the
44Natural law or 'lex naturalis' is a "precept or general rule,
found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that, which
is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving
the same; and to omit that, by which he thinketh it may be best
preserved." Ibid.
45Ibid., 85.
46Ibid.
41Ibid., 93.
48Ibid., 109.
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most literal sense of the word; his theory of the state was
based wholly on the command theory of law.

However, it is

important to consider that Hobbes required popular consent
to legitimate the authority of the sovereign.

The indi

vidual had to be a responsible moral agent, at one point,
for it is individually that men reason and covenant the
state into existence.

Thus, the public sphere was derived

from the private sphere.
noticed by Hobbes.

The private man did not go un

After the covenant, private interaction

is regulated.49
Moreover, Hobbes wrote during a time which regarded
natural law precepts, or the rules for ethical behavior, and
man's natural rights, as the same thing.

Philosophers

throughout the Middle Ages believed that natural rights were
derived exclusively from natural law —

the moral law.50

By distinguishing the two, Hobbes conceptually relieved the

49"In this way Hobbes is able to identify natural man with
private man, and so present a view of society as based on and
reducible to relationships between private individuals as part of
the natural order of things." Ian Shapiro, The Evolution of Rights
in Liberal Theory (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1986),
60.
50For example,
St. Thomas Aquinas professed the divine
dispensation of the law.
Natural law was an objective plan
realized by divine revelation; man was to adjust his life to the
tenets thereby laid down.
See, Aquinas, Summa Theologica, vol. 1
(New York: Benziger Brothers, Inc., 1947), 993-1119.
Other
philosophers who united natural law and natural right were William
Ockham and Jean Gerson. For further discussion, see Richard Tuck,
Natural rights theories: Their origin and development (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1979) .
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individual from the restraints of the church.51

The fact

that Hobbes attributed to human beings natural rights with
out the traditional moral overtones seems to indicate that
he believed individuals are capable of, and indeed at times
require, the freedom to act autonomously.
"The greatest liberty of subjects," asserts Hobbes,
"dependeth on the silence of the law."52

This is Hobbes'

concession of negative liberties, after the covenant, as a
further source of autonomous action.

Negative freedoms are

those unrestricted activities which have been pretermitted
by the sovereign, and involve most day-to-day social and
economic action, including
the liberty to buy and sell, and otherwise contract
with one another; to choose their own abode, their own
diet, their own trade of life, and institute their
children as they themselves think fit; and the like.53
‘ A consequence of negative libertarianism is that it
requires mutual tolerance among the members of society for
those activities for which the law does not speak.

For

instance, if there is no law determining the volume at which
one may play a musical instrument, he may play very loud.
51"The exact moral status of these natural laws is complex and
elusive, but in one important respect, Hobbes stands traditional
natural law arguments on their heads...all recognized the existence
of some relationship between natural right and law, such that
natural rights were either derived from natural law or at least
limited by it." See, Shapiro, The Evolution of Rights in Liberal
Theory, 42.
52Hobbes, Leviathan. 143.
53Ibid., 139.
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In the state of nature, his neighbor might be disposed to
destroy the trumpet and/or trumpeter.

However, in the

state, the law forbids assault, murder, and the destruction
of private property.

Thus, everyone subject to the law must

acquire tolerance.
The sovereign is established to regulate and protect
individual interaction as they privately pursue personal
goals.

As each individual subjectively, though legally,

endeavors to advance his lot, typical of human nature, the
larger social sphere likewise benefits.

Hobbes' laissez-

faire attitude toward economic, familial, and religious life
contributed to the classical liberalist approach to soci
ety .54
John Locke
[I]t will be very difficult to persuade
men of sense that he who with dry eyes
and satisfaction of mind can deliver his
brother unto the executioner to be burnt
alive, does sincerely and heartily con
cern himself to save that brother from
the flames of hell in the world to come.
A Letter Concerning Toleration
Locke, like Hobbes, professed that men existed, equal-

54Shapiro, The Evolution of Rights in Liberal Theory, 62.
Frank M. Coleman asserts that Hobbes is the father of American
constitutionalism: "In Hobbes's philosophy the only possible source
of public authority is the private need of independently-situated
political actors, each of whom is vested with a prior, if not
necessarily superior, right to act according to self-defined
standards of conscience and interest. Public order is, by nature,
artificial."
See Coleman, "The Hobbesian Basis of American
Constitutionalism," Polity VII (Fall 1974): 65.
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ly, in a state of nature before the creation of government.
He also theorized that the creation of government was engen
dered as a result of self-interest; the protection of pri
vate property was Locke's primary purpose of the state.
However, Locke diverged from Hobbes in several important
respects.
For Hobbes, once the people accepted natural law pre
cepts as the most rational way to coexist, mankind renounced
their natural rights to an absolute sovereign until that
sovereign was no longer able to keep the covenant.

Accord

ing to Locke, there are three fundamental flaws with this
statement:

first, that natural laws and rights exist con

currently and continually before and after the creation of
civil society;

second, that mankind cannot consent to a

government more power than they themselves possess, for this
is contrary to the laws of nature;

and third, that the

government is accountable to the people, who may alter or
abolish the commonwealth when it acts contrary to their
natural rights.
True to the Cartesian passion of his day, Locke as
serted that all knowledge, including moral knowledge, begins
within the confines of the human mind.

Man is instilled

with reason and the ability to act freely upon his environ
ment with the use of his labor and his intelligence.

Even

in the state of nature, man is capable of employing his
moral intuition in his daily, unfettered

existence.

As
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Locke averred,
[t]he state of nature has a law of nature to govern it,
which obliges everyone; and reason, which is that law,
teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that being
all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another
in his life, health, liberty or possessions.55
Transgressors of the law of nature are defectors of the
universal order and deserve just punishment for their
crimes; thus, "every man hath a right to punish the offend
er, and to be executioner of the law of nature."56

What

mankind is in need of, being in the state of nature, is a
common judge to adjudicate without the subjective passion
characteristic of an injured party.

For this reason, and

for codification and protection of the law, men join to
gether into civil society.

Herein, men consent and sanction

representatives of the people and of the natural law.
Locke denounces absolute sovereignty, for this arbi
trarily puts a single individual in a favorable position to
transgress the laws of nature.57

Natural rights are in

trinsic to mankind and are inherently safeguarded by its
possessor; hence, according to Locke, the Hobbesean sover
eign is a potential defector of the law of nature.

Locke

55John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government (An Essay
Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil Government).
6.
56Ibid.. 8.
57"This were to put themselves into a worse condition than the
state of nature, wherein they had the liberty to defend their right
against the injuries of others, and were upon equal terms of force
to maintain it, whether invaded by a single man or many in a
combination."
Ibid., 92.
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endorses separating the powers of sovereignty (executive,
legislative,
people.

judicial) and making them accountable to the

While Hobbes legitimated the sovereign with just

the initial covenant, Locke maintained that consent is a
continual and never-ending process.

The legislation of

representatives must win the consent of the majority of the
commonwealth before it is legitimate.

Legislation is ille

gitimate when it fails to do what it was created to do/ that
is, to protect the natural rights of the people and to
protect the people from the self-interest and passions of
all the members of society, and, in particular, to preserve
private property.
Whensoever, therefore, the legislative shall transgress
this fundamental rule of society, and either by ambi
tion, fear, folly, or corruption, endeavour to grasp
themselves or put into the hands of any other of an
absolute power over the lives, liberties, and estates
of the people, by this breach of trust they forfeit the
power the people had put into their hands . . . and it
devolves to the people, who have the right to resume
their original liberty. . . 58
The basis for all rights is private property.

Property

is appropriated by man through his industry and labor.
Man's ability to shape something out of nature into a crea
tion of his own is a gift granted by God, says Locke, and
thus can never be expropriated legitimately without man's
consent.

Property resides in one's talents and reason, in

one's labor and strength, and allows man to be master of
himself and of all he could dominate from his earth.
58Ibid.. 148.

Pro-
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tection of property is what brings men together into the
commonwealth.59
The right to privacy essentially grew out of Locke's
conception of private property.

It was thinkers such as

Locke who fostered the legitimacy of society on natural
rights instead of Machiavellian might.

Appropriating prop

erty is the basic autonomous action bestowed upon man by
God; henceforth, an individual's estate is inviolable.
Another guarded sphere of autonomy for Locke was in
dividual conscience.

Reason unfolds the divinity of God and

the natural law, therefore the relationship of man to his
God, if he has one, is entirely exclusive.

Intolerance of

one's religious beliefs is insupportable, particularly if it
is governmental in nature.60
[T]he care of souls is not committed to the civil
magistrate, any more than to other men . . . because it
appears not that God has ever given any such authority
to one man over another, as to compel any one to his
religion.61
To Locke, and many others of his generation, the most
fundamental actions and assets of mankind are those veiled
59"The great and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting into
commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the
preservation of their property. . . "
Ibid., 82.
60In the seventeenth century, religious institutions played a
burdensome role in individual lives.
Church attendance was
mandatory —
absences were punishable
by law. Payment
of tithes,
one-tenth of an individual's produce or payment, was given to a
clergyman at random. Church courts were common, as were charges of
heresy, sexual misconduct, etc.
See, Hill, The Century of
Revolution, 1603-1714. 63ff.
61John Locke,

A Letter Concerning Toleration, 172.
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by the need for autonomy.

Both Hobbes and Locke believed

that the individual is the basis for all legitimate rights.
However, Locke instilled these rights with a more lasting
effect, once the government had been established, than did
Hobbes.

Locke asserts that natural law can determine the

negative freedoms of citizens by limiting government, where
as with Hobbes, individual freedoms are those disregarded by
the sovereign.

Locke was less suspicious of the motives of

mankind and urged greater tolerance and acceptance of the
great bounty of human reason. Because of his approach, and
respect for reason and liberty, Locke has been considered
the inspiration of contractarian political theory.62

More

over, when Locke placed moral and civil limitations on
governments as a consequence of the axiomatic principles of
natural law, he also enlivened the quest for creating the
ideal limited government, which lay in wait a continent
away.
The Influence of Classical Liberalism
on the American Social Contract
It is clear that John Locke, among other modern politi
cal theorists,63 provided the men undertaking the great
“ "Contractarian theory is a natural way to express the
underlying political conception of the moral sovereignty of the
people, which links democratic theory with a larger moral concep
tion of respect for persons." David A.J. Richards, Toleration and
the Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1986),
101.
63For example, Francis Hutcheson, Immanuel Kant, Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, and of course, Thomas Hobbes, et a l .
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American experiment with substantive normative background
principles.64

For example, Thomas Jefferson included Locke

as among "the three greatest men that have lived, without
any exception, and as having laid the foundation of those
superstructures which have been raised in the Physical and
Moral sciences..."65

Indeed, Jefferson's Declaration of

Independence was criticized as being an emulation of Locke's
treatise of civil government.66

Although Jefferson denied

the charge, he did admit to attempting to incorporate
Locke's views of epistemology and government with those of
his own and of other political theorists.67

In an extract

64See, John Dunn, "The Politics of Locke in England and America
in the eighteenth century," Political Obligation in its Historical
Context (Cambridge, Great Britain: Cambridge University Press,
1980). Dunn recounts:
"The Adamses and Jefferson, Dickinson and
Franklin, Otis and Madison, had come to read the Two Treatises with
gradually consolidated political intentions and they come to it to
gather moral support for these intentions," 75.

65The other two men Jefferson referred to were Francis Bacon
and Isaac Newton, in a letter "To John Trumbull, Paris, Feb. 15,
1789, on Bacon, Locke, and Newton," Writings, 940.
66Morton White relates how Richard Henry Lee,
one of
Jefferson's contemporaries, charged that Jefferson "copied from
Locke's treatise on government," in The Philosophy of the American
Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 64.
67Writing about the Declaration of Independence. Jefferson
stated: "Neither aiming at originality of principle or sentiment,
nor yet copied from any previous writing, it was intended to be an
expression of the American mind. . . All its authority rests then
on the harmonizing sentiments of the day, whether expressed in
conversation, in letters, printed essays, or in the elementary
books of public right, as Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, Sidney, &c."
In a letter "To Henry Lee, Monticello, May 8, 1825, on the object
of the declaration of independence," Writings, 1501.
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on a recommendation for instruction at the University of
Virginia, moreover, Jefferson declared:
Resolved, that it is the opinion of this Board that
as to the general principles of liberty and the rights
of man, in nature and in society, the doctrines of
Locke, in his "Essay concerning the true original
extent and end of civil government," and of Sidney in
his "Discourses on government," may be considered as
those generally approved by our fellow citizens. . .68
One need only look at the similarities between Locke's
treatise on government and the Declaration of Independence
to understand how Richard Henry Lee came to the conclusion
that the declaration was copied.

As a "self-evident" prin

ciple, as Jefferson asserts, or one otherwise based on
reason, it is understood that "all men are created equal;
that they are endowed by their creator with inherent and
inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, &
the pursuit of happiness."69

This concurs almost identi

cally with Locke's epistemology:
Man being born, as has been proved, with a title to
perfect freedom, and an uncontrolled enjoyment of all
the rights and privileges of the law of nature equally
with any other man . . . hath by nature a power . . .
to preserve his property — that is his life, liberty,
and estate. . . 70
While the terminology may be different, for example,

68"Report to the President and Directors of the Literary Fund,"
March 4, 1825, ibid., at 479.
69The original draft of Jefferson's Declaration of Independence
included the words that are underlined. Ibid., 19-24.
70Locke, The Second Treatise of Government. 56.

42

between 'the pursuit of happiness' and 'estate', it is clear
that the significance of human life, for both, is to possess
the means through which man has and may further prolong his
life and livelihood, and this no one may rightfully take
from him.

Those who violate this fundamental rule of soci

ety, particularly if it is the government, warrant admonish
ment, for "there remains still in the people a supreme power
to remove or alter the legislature"71 exceeding its author
ity, " . . .

and to institute a new Government . . .",72

conducive to their natural rights.
When James Madison proposed his amendments to the
Constitution to protect individual liberties and to alle
viate fears of those who would support the Constitution with
further guarantees of their civil rights against the federal
government, he too followed a natural rights based philos
ophy.

In his speech to the House of Representatives of June

8, 1789, Madison declared that first and foremost, an amend
ment guaranteeing that "all power is originally vested in,
and consequently derived from, the people," be prefixed to
the Constitution.

He argued,

That Government is instituted and ought to be exer
cised for the benefit of the people; which consists in
the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right of
acquiring and using property, and generally of pursuing
71For Locke, the legislature was the branch of government
primarily responsible for enacting the laws necessary for the
preservation of property and the peaceable coexistence of the
people. Ibid.. 100.
72Quoted from Jefferson's Declaration of Independence.
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and obtaining happiness and safety.
That the people have an indubitable, unalienable,
and indefeasible right to reform or change their
Government, whenever it be found adverse or inadequate
to the purposes of its institution.73
Locke and the Founding Fathers believed in inherent
natural rights, evident to those who possess the reason by
which to discover the rules of the universe.

A written

Constitution assumes that there is a system of fundamental
laws and principles that can prescribe the functions and
limitations of a government.74

Thomas Jefferson, James

Madison, et al. believed, along with Locke, that individuals
must be fundamentally free to worship and believe.

Thus,

the First Amendment to the Constitution was established,
securing a separation between church and state, freedom of
religion, speech, press, and assembly.

The Framers reasoned

that an individual's property was inviolable and enacted the
Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.75
Most importantly, through generations of observation and

73Marvin Meyers, ed., The Mind of the Founder: Sources of the
Political Thought of James Madison (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill
Company, Inc., 1973), 215.
74This was the argument of Alexander Hamilton, James Madison,
Thomas Jefferson and countless statesmen and philosophers urging
limited government
including Locke,
Montesquieu,
Alexis de
Tocqueville, John Stuart Mill, et al.
75James Madison introduced a bill of rights to the Constitution
to appease the states who feared that the federal government would
assume the powers of a monarchy.
Of the twelve amendments that
were proposed by Madison, ten were ratified by the states which
went into effect in 1791. These amendments, thus, were enacted to
protect individual rights from usurpations of power only by the
federal government.
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experience, they realized that power corrupts and needs to
be limited.

Thus, the Framers created a system where the

people are an everpresent reminder that statesmen are dis
pensable, and split up governmental power, with a built in
checks and balances, to insure against the natural progres
sion towards tyranny.76
The principle of a right to privacy shares similar
characteristics with the principles of liberty and freedom.
First, it is a means to individual happiness since it allows
one to choose and act upon situations in his life.

Second,

it encourages private property by setting proper boundaries
between 'yours' and 'mine'.

Third, it fosters the general

well-being of the community by providing the space which
individuals require to reflect upon daily life.

Like lib

erty and freedom, the qualities of privacy cannot be cap
tured in one contained definition.

Nevertheless, the

76Thus, the Constitution created three branches of government.
"Article 1" provides for a Legislature to be split into two houses:
the House of Representatives provides representation by population,
representatives are elected by the people every two years, and they
control appropriations; the Senate accomodates equal representation
among the states, senators are elected by the people (courtesy of
the Seventeenth Amendment of the Constitution) every six years, and
they control revenue.
Both houses must concurrently pass laws.
"Article 2" provides for a separate Executive, the President,
elected by the people every four years, and is responsible for
executing the laws enacted by the Legislative branch. He may check
the congress through his power of the veto (which the congress may
override). "Article 3" created the Judiciary, the mediating branch
of government, which is responsible for interpreting the laws of
the congress, and thereby safeguarding the Law of the Land.
They
serve for terms of good behavior, are appointed by the President
and confirmed by the Senate. Hence, are just few of the examples
of the self-imposed limitations of the United States government as
established by the Constitution.
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Supreme Court has tried to fit privacy rights into a coher
ent Constitutional context.

Chapter Two will recount the

history of the Constitutional justification for a right to
privacy in the United States.

CHAPTER TWO

THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The right to be let alone
beginning of all freedom.

is indeed the

Justice William 0. Douglas
The right to privacy as a legal concept arose out of
the common law's commitment to individual property rights.
Prior to 1890, before Warren and Brandeis wrote their semi
nal article, "The Right to Privacy,111 a viable legal ra
tionale

fortheright to privacy

was virtually nonexistent.

Legal precedentsfor the right to privacy did

not begin to

appear until the Twentieth Century; before this, protection
of privacy was mentioned as a matter of political and judi
cial philosophy and authoritative pronouncements.2 Warren
and Brandeis were, however, able to

extract existing Eng

lish and American tort law, classified under property, con
tract, or implied trust, and to compose a new tort infringe^amuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right
Privacy," Harvard Law Review IV (15 December 1890): 193-220.

to

20'Brien, Privacy, Law, and Public Policy, above, 5.
See,
generally, Edward Shils, "Privacy: Its Constitution and Vicis
situdes," Law and Contemporary Problems 31 (1966): 281-306. Shils
traces the social and political evolution of privacy in the United
States from the end of the nineteenth century. See, specifically,
William M. Beaney, "The Right to Privacy and American Law," ibid.,
253-271.
46

47

ment, that is, the violation of the right to privacy —

the

right to be let alone.3
Reportedly, Warren and Brandeis wrote their article out
of sheer frustration with the intrusive journalistic tactics
of their day.

A prominent Boston family, the social ac

tivities of the Warren household were frequently depicted by
the press.

Freedom of the press being a fundamental Ameri

can value, Warren and Brandeis had to show why the right to
be let alone was as legally valuable, and as philosophically
indispensable, as the First Amendment guarantee.

Hence,

they cited case law which had established that one's image,
thoughts, actions and possessions belonged exclusively to
the possessor to disclose or not to disclose.
For example, in Prince Albert v. Strange.4 the private
etchings of public figures Queen Victoria and Prince Albert
were acquired by defendant Strange who attempted to obtain a
profit from the plaintiff's artwork. Both the public figure
issue and the property issue (copyrights) came before the
equity court.

Concerning the first matter the Vice Chancel

lor Knight Bruce stated:
[t]he author of manuscripts, whether he is famous or
obscure, low or high, has a right to say of them, if
innocent, that whether interesting or dull, light or
heavy, saleable or unsaleable, they shall not, without
3Judge Thomas Cooley was the first to introduce the legal
concept of privacy, as well as the phrase the "right to be let
alone," in Torts 2d. ed. (1888), at 91.
‘‘Prince Albert v. Strange, 2 DeGex & Sm. 652, 694, cited in
Warren and Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," 202-205.
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his consent, be published.5
The property issue was also decided in favor of the
plaintiff.

Copyright statutes protect all of the author's

profit arising from publication.

Common-law protects the

author against the appropriation of his work for publication
against his will.

Thus, the Vice Chancellor asserted that

[u]pon the principle . . . of protecting property, it
is the common law, in cases not aided or prejudiced by
statute, shelters the privacy and seclusion of thought
and sentiments committed to writing, and desired by the
author to remain not generally known.6
The inviolability of private property was applied to
intangible possessions of thoughts, sentiments, and emo
tions.

The Strange case also protected the right of the

author against vivid published descriptions of his artwork.
The Vice Chancellor ruled that a detailed account of an
artist's work had the same effect as appropriation or repro
duction, and violated the artist's right to property both in
terms of tangible profit, and in his right to privacy.7
Two other cases cited by Warren and Brandeis establish-

5Ibid., note 6, at 199.
6Ibid.. note 3, at 200.
7"A copy or impression of the etchings would only be a means
of communicating knowledge and information of the original, and
does not a list and description of the same? The means are
different, but the object and effect are similar; for in both, the
object and effect is to make known to the public more or less of
the unpublished work and composition of the author, which he is
entitled to keep wholly for his private use and pleasure, and to
withhold altogether, or so far as he may please, from the knowledge
of others." Lord Cottenham in Prince Albert v. Strange. 1 McN. &
G. 23, 43 (1849), quoted in Warren and Brandeis, note 1, 202.

ed that breach of contract or confidence was likewise a
violation of private property.

Yovatt v. Winvard8 and

Abernathy v. Hutchinson9 are two early nineteenth century
cases where the court found for the plaintiffs' right to
property in their ideas and compositions.

Neither case

involved a public personage whereby the defendant could
claim a compelling social interest defense.

In Yovatt. the

court found that Yovatt's medical formula, the recipe of
which had been obtained by a former employee and later
competitor, was protected under Yovatt's right to property
in compositions or ideas.

An additional legal precedent had

been established by the court in regard to breach of trust
or confidence between employer and employee —

a contractual

obligation not to be violated by the indiscretion of the
latter.

In Abernathy, it was held that an instructor's

medical lectures remained his property despite an eager
student's attempt to copy down and publish them.
Tuck v. Priester10 and Pollard v. Photographic Co.11

BYovatt v. Winvard. 1 J. & W. 394 (1820) , cited in Warren and
Brandeis, at 212.
9Abernathv v. Hutchinson. 3 L. J. Ch.
Warren and Brandeis, at 207.

209

(1825),

cited in

10Tuck v. Priester. 19 Q.B.D. 639 (1887), cited in Warren and
Brandeis, at 208. Plaintiff's property, a picture, was reproduced
by the defendant with the instructions to make only a specified
number of copies.
The defendant exceeded the allowed quota and
sold them for a lesser price than the plaintiffs.
The Lord
Justices unanimously ruled that the plaintiffs were entitled to an
injunction, and damages for breach of contract.
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are private property cases in which decisions protecting an
individual's name or likeness were rendered by the court.
The basis for these claims actually relied on maintenance of
trusts and contracts, but they did serve as precedents in
forging a new perspective on the right to privacy.

Shortly

after Warren and Brandeis published their article, two
noteworthy cases involving the appropriation of an indi
vidual's name or likeness were decided which focused on the
right to privacy by means of property rights.12
Warren and Brandeis argue that not only are property
rights infringed upon in cases where one's thoughts, ac
tions, and likeness are being unwillingly exposed, but more
importantly, the inviolate personality.

The individual has

an inherent right not to have to suffer humiliation, fear,
or the loss of property, both tangible and intangible, at

nPollard v. Photographic Co., 40 Ch. Div 345 (1888) , ibid.
A woman's photograph was enjoined from being sold commercially by
the photographer who took the photograph.
The court ruled that
this was a breach of contract since the plaintiff did not permit
nor anticipate that her photograph, taken under ordinary cir
cumstances, would become the object of a commercial venture.
12Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.. 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E.
442 (1902). The picture of a particularly pulchritudinous woman was
taken of her without her consent, and was later distributed on a
circular by the milling company with her picture under the
advertisement.
While the New York Court of Appeals rejected the
privacy claim (for lacking a common-law history),
the state
legislature passed an act prohibiting appropriation of name or
likeness, for commercial purposes, without consent. In Pavesich v.
New England Life Insurance Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905), the
Georgia Supreme Court found in favor of the plaintiff whose picture
was used in an ad without his consent, on the basis of violating
one's right to privacy.
Thus, this was the first court to
recognize the right to privacy.
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the mercy of unscrupulous swindlers.

Thus, the counselors'

legal opinion is also a moral conclusion as they attest
that the rights, so protected, whatever their exact
nature, are not rights arising from contract or from
special trust, but are rights against the world. . .
the principle which protects personal writings and any
other productions of the intellect or of the emotions,
is the right to privacy, and the law has no new prin
ciple to formulate when it extends this protection to
the personal appearance, sayings, acts, and to personal
relation, domestic or otherwise.13
Warren and Brandeis claim that any and all uninvited
and unwanted intrusions on one's person should have a legal
remedy covered under one tort —
to privacy.

the protection of the right

However, William Prosser contends that this

very abstract appeal is the very reason that the legal right
to privacy is likened to "that of a haystack in a hurri
cane."14

In an analytical attempt to clarify the right to

privacy, Prosser maintains that rather than just one tort,
there are four distinct torts dealing with violations of
personal privacy.
The four privacy interests that Prosser distinguishes
13Warren and Brandeis, 213.
The 'judicial contructionist'
debate over the right to privacy was alive at its conception.
Warren and Brandeis insisted that "[t]he application of an existing
principle to a new state of facts is not judicial legislation. To
call it such is to assert that the existing body of law consists
practically of the statutes and decided cases, and to deny that the
principles (of which these cases are ordinarily said to be
evidence) exist at all.
It is not the application of an existing
principle to new cases, but the introduction of" a new principle,
which is properly termed judicial legislation." Ibid., note 1.
14Prosser quoting Judge Bigg describing privacy in Ettore v.
Philco Television Broadcasting Co.. 229 F. 2nd 481 (3rd Circuit
Court, 1956), in "Privacy [A legal analysis]," Philosophical
Dimensions of Privacy, above, 117.
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are:
1.

Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or soli

tude, or into his private affairs.

Intrusions of this sort

must be shown to have caused mental distress.

Included are

trespass,15 eavesdropping or wiretapping,16 and nui
sance17.

In all circumstances, the intrusion must be upon

something that is private in nature.
2.

Public disclosure of private facts.

The disclosure

must be made public, and not mere gossip among a small group
of individuals.

Moreover, the facts disclosed must be

offensive and injurious to the ordinary person of reasonable
sensibilities.18
3.

Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false

light in the public eve.

Violations of this kind include

publicity attributing to the plaintiff an opinion or ut-

15For example, DeMav v. Roberts. 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146
(1881).
The defendant intruded upon the plaintiff during child
birth.
The court granted recovery to the plaintiff, but did not
specify the ground (which was either trespass or battery).
16The gravamen in this circumstance is
infliction of mental distress." Prosser, 108.

the

"intentional

17For an intrusion to qualify as a nuisance, the offense must
be overt, and not just minor disturbance in a quiet place.
The
nuisance must be "offensive and objectionable to a reasonable man."
Ibid.
18The commanding case here is Melvin v. Reid. 112 Cal. App.
285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931).
The plaintiff, at one time a prostitute
and a defendant in a popular murder trial, attained a life of
respectable obscurity.
Years later, her original name and her
story would be used in a motion picture.
The court held in favor
of the plaintiff based on the violation of her right to privacy.
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terance not made,19 or use of the plaintiff's picture in an
article, book, etc., with which he has no consensual connec
tion.20

The false light need not be a defamatory one, but

it must be objectionable to a man of ordinary sensibilities.
The interest protected is reputation, and the rewards are
based on degrees of mental distress.
4.

Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of

the plaintiff's name or likeness.

The appropriation must

actually identify the plaintiff (as opposed, for example, to
the use of a mere name like John Smith), and it must be
shown that the defendant profited from the appropriation
(usually a pecuniary advantage).

The interest protected is

a proprietary one (i.e., the exclusive use of one's name or
likeness), and not one based on mental distress.
Prosser's legal analysis was hailed by many who thought
the right to privacy was a vague and subjective legal con
cept.

Warren and Brandeis' conception of privacy as a legal

entity in itself was virtually analyzed out of judicial
existence by Prosser.

Edward Bloustein, however, waged a

sharp rebuttal on Ptosser's narrow legal and philosophical

19For example, in Lord Byron v. Johnston, 2 Mer. 29, 35 Eng.
Rep. 851 (1816), the plaintiff succeeded in enjoining the circula
tion of a poem, which he thought was inferior, from being at
tributed as his work.
20For example, Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co.
text at note 12 above.

See

insight.21

Bloustein's attack focused on Prosser's inabil

ity or unwillingness to accept the general principle of
privacy upon which Warren and Brandeis relied, but were
unable to state in concrete legal terms during the latter
part of the nineteenth century.

The principle, as Bloustein

understands it, is that individuals are legally protected
against intrusions which are "affronts to personal dignity."
Freedom, in the traditional sense of Western culture, means
personal control over the external circumstances affecting
daily life.

Bloustein's intention, as he himself states, is

"to propose a general theory of individual privacy which
will reconcile the divergent strands of legal development which will put the straws back into the haystack."22

His

refutation retraces Prosser's categorization of the four
distinct torts and attempts to demonstrate how the general
theory of privacy underlies each of Prosser's claims.
1.

The intrusion cases.

Prosser maintains that, as in

the case of DeMav v. Roberts.23 the gravamen of the wrong
was the infliction of mental distress.

Bloustein argues

that whether or not mental distress was inflicted, the
intrusion constituted the debasement of individuality.

The

Fourth Amendment of the Constitution was created to protect
21Edward J. Bloustein, "Privacy as an aspect of human dignity:
An answer to Dean Prosser," Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy.
156-202.
22Ibid., 156.
23The childbirth case.

See text at note 15 above.
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individual liberties, asserts Bloustein, without which
individual dignity would be unmercifully crushed under the
weight of intrusive government surveillance and/or public
opinion.24
2.

The public disclosure cases.

Prosser contends

that, if private facts, which are offensive to the reason
able man of ordinary sensibilities, are publicly exposed,
the interest which has been violated is that of reputation.
Bloustein, on the other hand, argues that, as was the case
in Melvin v. Reid,25 to disclose facts of an individual's
past life is an affront to the inviolate personality.

To

open up the private life to public scrutiny is to blatantly
disregard the limits of human decency, says Bloustein, and
violates the individual's expectation of privacy.26

Defa-

24The Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures emanates supplementary individual privacy
protections.
See, for example, Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949);
United
States v. Lefkowitz. 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Gouled v. United States,
225 U.S. 298 (1921); Bovd v. United States. 116 U.S. 616 (1886);
see also, Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United States. 277 U.S.
438 (1928) : "The makers of our Constitution . . . conferred as
against the government, the right to be let alone —
the most
comprehensive of all rights and the right most valued by civilized
men." Bloustein states, "these cases represent . . . a recognition
that unreasonable intrusion is a wrong because it involves a
violation of constitutionally protected liberty of the person."
Bloustein, 165.
25See text at note 18 above.
26See, for example, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967) . The Court ruled that the petitioner, Katz, had a reason
able expectation of privacy, even though he was placing a call in
a see-through glass public telephone booth. First, the Court said,
"the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," id., at 361.
Secondly, a person using a public telephone booth "is surely
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mation involves injury to reputation,and, as Warren and
Brandeis confirm, the laws of slander and libel offer suffi
cient protection in the spreading of falsehoods.27

The

right to privacy, however, "implies the right not merely to
prevent inaccurate portrayal of private life, but to prevent
its being depicted at all."28
3.

The use of name or likeness.

According to Prosser,

when a plaintiff's name or likeness is appropriated for the
defendant's advantage, the interest violated is a proprie
tary one.

Again, Bloustein proclaims that this is an af

front to human dignity for the same reasons the Georgia
Supreme Court held in Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance
Co. :
The knowledge that one's features and form are being
used for such a purpose and displayed in such places as
advertisements are often liable to be found brings not
only the person of an extremely sensitive nature, but
even the individual of ordinary sensibility, to a
realization that his liberty has been taken away from
him, and so long as the advertiser uses him for these
purposes, he cannot be otherwise than conscious of the
fact that he is, for the time being, under the control
of another, and that he is no longer free, and that he
is in reality a slave without hope of freedom, held to
service by a merciless master; and if a man of true
entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece
will not be broadcast to the world," id., at 352.
See also,
Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Silverman v. United States,
365 U.S. 505 (1961): "was not the wrong . . . done when the
intimacies of the home were tapped, recorded, or revealed?
The
depth of the penetration of the electronic devise —
even the
degree of remoteness from the inside of the house — is not the
measure of the injury." id., at 513.
27Warren and Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," 197-198.
28Ibid., 218.
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instincts, or even of ordinary sensibilities, no one
can be more conscious of his complete enthrallment than
he is.29
4.

The false light cases.

Bloustein agrees with

Prosser that by falsely attributing to the plaintiff an
opinion or utterance, one's reputation is thereby violated,
but adds that the "[s]lur on reputation is an aspect of the
violation of individual integrity."30

To attribute to an

individual a false endorsement or derogatory characteriza
tion, not only violates his freedom of choice, but also
casts him in an unfair light in the eyes of his peers the
society at large.

Not only is his reputation at stake, but

subsequently his right as an individual to present himself
to the world as he feels is proper has been infringed.
The inviolate personality is not a tabula rasa lying in
wait for unsympathetic publishers, et al. to indiscrimin
ately impose their impressions.

As Warren and Brandeis and

Bloustein attempted to convey, the right to privacy is a
fundamental human necessity.

The right to privacy facili

tates the concomitant ideals of liberty and freedom which
are the inheritance of a rich history of western political
29Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co.
12 above.

See text at note

30Bloustein, 179. See, for example, Gill v. Curtis
Publishing Company. 38 Cal. 2d 273, 239 P.2d 630 (1952).
A
photograph of a couple shown hugging in a public place was randomly
taken.
In a published article, their picture was displayed,
without consent, with a caption under the photo reading that this
was the "wrong kind of love." The court ruled that the use of a
photograph, taken in a public place, is not an offense in itself
unless a false or derogatory comment is attributed to it.
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theory.
Fourth Amendment Privacy Protection
Acknowledging the potential intrusiveness of the ways
of authority, the Framers, at the outset, restricted the
prerogative of government to exceed its boundaries:
AMENDMENT IV: The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and partic
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.31
The security of all Americans, according to the Fourth
Amendment, lies in their fundamental immunity from the whims
of their government and the frequent temerity of those in
positions of power.

Personal privacy probably gains the

range of its protection from the appreciation private prop
erty has been afforded throughout history, and in particu
lar, from the modern political philosophy of men such as
John Locke.

The sanctity of the home has long been recog

nized as more commanding than kings, as was expressed by
William Pitt, the Elder:32
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance
the force of the Crown.
It may be frail — its
may shake — the wind may blow through it — the
may enter — the rain may enter — but the King
England cannot enter — all his force dares not

to all
roof
storm
of
cross

31The United States Constitution. Fourth Amendment to the Bill
of Rights.
32William Pitt
Great Britain.

(1708-1778) was the first Earl of Chatham,

in

59

the threshold of the ruined tenement.33
Although the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution was
adopted in 1791, the Supreme Court did not link privacy and
the amendment until 188 6 in Bovd v. United States.311

In

this case, the first liberal reading of the Fourth Amendment
was given.

The Court held as unconstitutional a statute

allowing the government to mandate the accused to produce
shipping invoices of allegedly illegally imported goods.
Justice Joseph Bradley argued that such a statute violated
the Fourth and Fifth Amendment privacy rights of the peti
tioner; such rights are fundamental and should not be de
prived of their effects.
[C]onstitutional provisions for the security of person
and property should be liberally construed. A close
and literal construction deprives them of half of their
efficacy, and leads to gradual deprecation of the
right, as if it consisted more in sound than in sub•stance.35
As a result of Justice Bradley's ruling, the police
could only confiscate the actual contraband of a crime,
whereas before they could seize an individual's papers as
mere evidence of a crime.

The Bovd ruling assisted the

33Frank v. Maryland. 359 U.S.
Pitt's Speech on the Excise Bill.

360,

378-379

(1959).

Quoting

3llBovd v. United States. 116U.S. 616 (1886).
There was an
1877 case, Ex Parte Jackson. 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878), which held
that Congress could not authorize the postal service to invade the
privacy of mail. However, the first discussion of the relationship
took place in Bovd. See, O'Brien, Privacy, Law, and Public Policy,
41.
35Bovd v. United States, 116 U.S. at 630.
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concept of individual privacy as a right, backed by con
stitutional amendments, outweighing police procedure.
However, in Olmstead v. United States.36 a majority of
the Supreme Court held in favor of the government in a
Fourth Amendment challenge.

Chief Justice William Howard

Taft ruled that the Fourth Amendment's warrant clause ap
plied only to physical trespass and not to evidence obtained
through the use of a device (a wiretap) which traces com
munication conveyed to "telephone wires, reaching to the
whole world from the defendant's home or office."

Ignoring

Justice Bradley's advice in Bovd, the Court gave an unduly
literal reading to the Fourth Amendment, and held that the
evidence was admissable.37

Thus, Justice Brandeis was com

pelled to write one of the most famous dissents in Supreme
Court history.
Remaining true to his article, "The Right to Privacy,"
Brandeis declared his fealty to the inviolate personality.
He reminded the Court of the Framers' intention when draft
ing the Constitution, that is, to enhance the freedom and

3601mstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
The peti
tioner was convicted of importing and selling liquor in violation
of the National Prohibition Act.
The incriminating evidence was
seized as a result of a wiretap placed in the defendants' homes and
offices.
A U.S. Court of Appeals rejected petitioners' argument
that the evidence was a result of an illegal search and seizure.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
37In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Supreme
Court established the exclusionary rule, which dismisses illegally
obtained evidence from a criminal trial.
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happiness of individuals by limiting the power of govern
ment, even though the government is operating under the
auspices of law and order.
Experience should teach us to be on our guard to pro
tect liberty when the government's purposes are benefi
cent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel
invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers.
The
greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroach
ment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without under
standing.38
Brandeis feared that the advances in technology were
becoming an ever-present threat to the individual's 'right
to be let alone.'

He contended that the Court was contra

dicting the precedent laid down in Ex Parte Jackson.39
which proscribed authorities from tampering with mail cor
respondence, by condoning the intrusion of telephone conver
sations.

In fact, explained Brandeis,

[t]he evil incident to invasion of the telephone is far
greater than that involved in tampering with the mails.
Whenever a telephone line is tapped, the privacy of the
persons at both ends of the line is invaded.40
The psychological oppression which results from the legit
imacy of this sort of governmental action is simply not what
the makers of the Constitution had in mind:
They recognized the significance of man's spiritual
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect.
They
knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satis
factions of life are to be found in material things.
They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs,
their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.
3801mstead v.

United States. 277 U.S. at 479.

39See text at note 34 above.
4°01mstead v.

United States. 277 U.S. at 475-476.
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They conferred, as against the government, the right to
be let alone — the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men.41
Brandeis' influence on the right to privacy, and the
inviolate personality, was not recognized until several
Fourth Amendment cases later.42
States.43 the area

In Katz v. United

under electronic surveillance was not a

private home, hotel room, or office, but a public telephone
booth.

The evidence was obtained from the telephone booth,

through a wiretap.

The Government argued that since the

evidence was obtained from an area generally considered
'public', it was legally seized.

The Supreme Court ruled

that the evidence was inadmissible based on a new conception
of exactly what it is that the Fourth Amendment protects.
According to Justice Potter Stewart, writing for the major
ity,
the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What
a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his
own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amend
ment protection. . . [b]ut what he seeks to preserve as
41Id. at 478.
42See, Goldman v. United States. 316 U.S. 129 (1942). Incrimi
nating evidence, obtained by government agents placing a sensitive
microphone against the wall of an adjoining office, was upheld by
the Court as legally obtained under the language of the Fourth
Amendment.
In light of the Olmstead decision, it was clear that
the Court was allowing all evidence seized, short of an actual
physical trespass.
In Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505
(1961), the Court held evidence, obtained by installing a spike
microphone through the wall of the adjoining house, inadmissible
based on the trespass ground.
In a concurring opinion, Justice
Douglas demonstrated allegiance to the Brandeis conception of the
right to be let alone. See text at note 2 6 above.
43Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
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private, even in an area accessible to the public, may
be constitutionally protected.44
The Katz decision introduced a measuring stick for
deciding whether or not an individual's "reasonable expecta
tion of privacy" has been violated under the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.

Thus, it overturned the physical trespass

requirement in Olmstead and Goldman, thereby expanding the
concept of privacy.

However, Justice Stewart's analysis of

privacy has opened up a plethora of legal questions.

For

example, what are the circumstances under which the Fourth
Amendment protects people and their privacy?

How can it be

shown that an individual "justifiably relied" upon his
sphere of privacy? —

When the individual relied upon keep

ing incriminating evidence private?45

Furthermore, if ex

pectations of privacy are inordinately subjective then can a
legal framework be fashioned around the Katz ruling?

Sub

jective interpretation of expectations of privacy could
engender an abyss of determinations from individual, to
police and to the courts.
Justice Stewart has been criticized on many counts that
his reading of the Fourth Amendment has been too liberal.
Justice John Marshall Harlan's concurrence attempted to
clarify what the Court meant by "reasonable expectations of
44Id. at 351-352.
45See O'Brien, Privacy, Law, and Public Policy, 57-63.
See,
in particular, Note, "From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A
Post-Katz Study of Fourth Amendment Protection,"
New York
University Law Review 43 (1968): 968, 976-77.
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privacy" as a twofold requirement: "first that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,
second, that the expectation be one that society is expected
to recognize as 'reasonable.'"46

But, if an individual's

expectation of privacy is also in reference to his basic
social situation, the protection of the Fourth Amendment is
a relative concept, and therefore weakened, when interpreted
according to the Katz rule.

As Anthony Amsterdam discerned:

An actual, subjective expectation of privacy obviously
has no place in a statement of what Katz held or in a
theory of what the fourth amendment protects. It can
neither add to, nor can its absence detract from, an
individual's claim to fourth amendment protection. If
it could, the government could diminish each person's
subjective expectation of privacy merely by announcing
half hourly on television that 1984 was being advanced
by a decade and that we were all forthwith being placed
under comprehensive electronic surveillance.47
The Katz ruling attempted to secure the inviolate
personality, or the right to be let alone, when the Court
announced that the Fourth Amendment protects persons.

Like

Justice Brandeis, Justice Stewart wanted to encase the
individual in a personal sanctuary which intruders could not
penetrate without invitation or, at least, probable cause.
However, the legal principle proved to be too abstract in
actual practice and subsequent court cases relied primarily
upon a strict application of the Fourth Amendment to privacy

46Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. at 361.
47Anthony Amsterdam, "Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment,"
Minnesota Law Review 58 (1974): 349, 384. See also, O'Brien,
Privacy, Law, and Public Policy. 60-61.
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claims.48

The constitutional principle for a right to privacy has
relied not only on the Fourth Amendment's protections
against unreasonable searches and seizures, but also on the
Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination.
Many pro-privacy advocates have argued that the inclusion of
these constitutional provisions forcefully indicates that
the Founding Fathers wanted the individual to maintain a
sense of autonomy from government intrusion into the per
sonal lives of its citizens.49 Although, concurrently, the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments would seem to signify the right
to privacy in principle, the government has been able to
elude the full effect of these Amendments when taken sep
arately.

The next section demonstrates how the protection

against self-incrimination has been interpreted to overlook
48See, for
example, United States v. White. 401 U.S. 745
(1971). Incriminating evidence, obtained by a radio transmitter
placed on an informant, and overheard by government agents who had
to testify in lieu of the absent informant, was upheld by the
Supreme Court.
Justice Byron White pronounced: "Our problem, in
terms of the principles announced in Katz. is what expectations of
privacy are constitutionally ' justifiable' — what expectations the
Fourth Amendment will protect in the absence of a warrant. So far,
the law permits the frustration of actual expectations of privacy
by permitting authorities to use the testimony of those associates
who for one reason or another have determined to turn to the
police,
as wellas by authorizing the use of informants. . ." Id.
at 752.Accurate and probative evidence, espoused
Justice White,
should
not be ignored because of substantive
constitutional
barriers.
49See Justice Douglas's majority opinion in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), in which he explained how several
of the protections in the Bill of Rights create a zone of privacy,
discussed below.
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the privacy premise inherent in its goal.
Fifth Amendment Privacy Protection
The Fifth Amendment enumerates five procedural guaran
tees; the third guarantee protects the criminally accused
from incriminating himself during any part of his detainment
by the government
and trial).50

(from arrest and examination to indictment

Protection from self-incrimination, or nemo

tenetur seipsum prodere (no one is bound to accuse himself),
precedes English common-law,51 and is considered one of the
truisms of the law of nature.

For example, in the early

eighteenth century, Lord Chief Baron Geoffrey Gilbert wrote,
in his Law of Evidence, that, while the best evidence of
guilt is a confession,
this Confession must be voluntary and without Compul
sion; for our Law in this differs from the Civil Law,
• that it will not force any Man to accuse himself; and
in this we do certainly follow tht fsic) Law of Nature,
which commands every Man to endeavour his own Preserva
tion; and therefore Pain and Force may compel Men to
confess what is not the truth of Facts, and consequent50,,N o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of
a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in
any Criminal Case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."
(Emphasis added)
The United States Constitution.
Fifth Amendment to the Bill of Rights.
51Leonard Levy has traced the right not to accuse oneself to
ancient Jewish Talmudic Law, an encyclopedic compilation of laws
based on the five books of Moses. See, Levy, Origins of the Fifth
Amendment (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1986), 433-441.
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ly such extorted Confessions are not to be depended
o n .52
The right not to give evidence against oneself is
upheld as one of the primary constitutional guarantees of
the right to privacy; that is to say, it offers an indivi
dual the prerogative to withhold information about himself,
whether incriminating or not, from the government.

However,

the manner in which the Fifth Amendment has been interpreted
renders its privacy protection as superficial speculation.
In 1896, the Supreme Court ruled that grants of immunity
offset one's right not to testify about oneself in a court
of law, since the sole purpose of the amendment is to "se
cure the witness against criminal prosecution."53

The

Court's interpretation narrowly construed the Fifth Amend
ment's protection to merely self-incrimination; that is to
say, if there is no possibility of a legal prosecution,
regardless of whether information one is being compelled to
testify may jeopardize life, liberty, or property outside
the courtroom, the individual must relinquish his Fifth

52Levy, quoting Lord Chief Baron Geoffrey Gilbert, at 327.
53Brown v. Walker. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
Grants of immunity
were first upheld under the Federal Constitution, reasoning that
the Fifth Amendment could not be "construed literally as authoriz
ing the witness to refuse to disclose any fact which might tend to
incriminate, disgrace, or expose to unfavorable comment." .Id. at
596.
See also, Murphy v. Waterfront Commission,
378 U.S. 52
(1964), which reaffirmed Brown's immunity decision, but held that
immunity must provide protection against both state and federal
prosecution.
By 1956, the Court was declaring that grants of
immunity "[have]
become part of our constitutional fabric," in
Ullman v. United States. 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
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Amendment privilege.

Indeed, a refusal to testify, after

being granted immunity from prosecution, may result in a
contempt of court conviction.

Thus, the Fifth Amendment

guarantee against self-accusation, immunity, and privacy do
not legally mix.

According to Robert McKay:

Even though protection against certain harmful conse
quences is assured through a sufficient grant of im
munity, the privacy interest is relinquished upon
disclosure compelled in return for a grant of immunity.
Moreover, there is no way to protect against the re
lated damage to reputation.
It is not easy to square
the privacy interest (which arguably is) a prime pur
pose of the privilege with immunity statutes that
require surrender of privacy.54
To further weaken the privacy of individuals faced with
bearing information against themselves, the Supreme Court
upheld a policy distinction which maintains that the Fifth
Amendment protects testimonial evidence, but not physical
evidence.

For example, in Schmerber v. California.55 a

policeman ordered a physician to take a sample of blood from
the accused, over Mr. Schmerber's objections, in order to
secure evidence needed to secure a conviction of driving
while intoxicated.

Like Breithaupt v. Abram.56 but unlike

540'Brien, Privacy, Law, and Public Policy, quoting Robert
McKay, at 99. See also, Robert McKay, "Self-Incrimination and the
New Privacy," in Supreme Court Reporter, ed. Phillip Kurland
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1967), 209, 230.
55Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
56Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
Blood obtained
from an unconscious party in a fatal auto accident used to convict
the defendant was upheld by the Supreme Court since the means to
extract the blood was reasonable, that is, "under the protective
eye of the physician."
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Rochin v. California,57 Justice William Brennan asserted
that the privilege against self-incrimination, as binding on
the states,
protects the accused only from being compelled to
testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State
with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature,
and that the withdrawal of blood and use of the analy
sis in question did not involve compulsion to these
ends.58
The dissenting Justices (Black, Fortas, Douglas, and
Chief Justice Warren) objected on the grounds that compelled
blood samples violate the individual's right to privacy,
based on Justice Douglas' opinion in Griswold v. Connec
ticut .59

In a separate dissent, Justice Douglas contended:

"No clearer invasion of the right to privacy can be imagined
than forcible bloodletting of the kind involved here."60
While the Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted the
principle of the Fifth Amendment, Leonard Levy argues that
American law is ignoring the history of the amendment.
57Rochin v. California. 342 U.S. 165 (1952), the accused
swallowed pills, which the police officers saw near his person, to
be rid of the evidence.
Officers immediately took the accused to
a hospital where they ordered a physician to pump his stomach. The
Supreme Court rejected evidence being obtained this way, since
"[t]his is conduct that shocks the conscience."
58Schmerber v. California. 384 U.S. at 761. Similar analysis
was also rendered in United States v. Dionisio. 410 U.S. 1 (1973)
(voice samples); United States v. Wade. 388 U.S. 218 (1967)
(compelled police lineups); and, Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S.
263 (1967) (handwriting samples).
59The right to privacy is based upon emanations of certain
rights in the Bill of Rights, in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), discussed below.
60Schmerber v. California. 384 U.S. at 779.
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The right not to be a witness against oneself imports a
principle of wider reach, applicable, at least in
criminal cases, to the self-production of any adverse
evidence, including evidence that made one the herald
of his own infamy, thereby publicly disgracing him.
The clause extended, in other words, to all the in
jurious as well as incriminating consequences of dis
closure by witness or party. But this inference drawn
from the wording of the clause enjoys the support of no
proof based on American experience, as distinguished
from English, before the nineteenth century.
Clearly
. . . to speak merely of a right against self-incrim
ination stunts the wider right not to give evidence
against oneself.61

Privacy and the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment
The due process clause was established to secure citi
zens from arbitrary deprivation, by government, of life,
liberty, and property.

Due process established the prin

ciple, in the Fifth Amendment,62 and reestablished in the
Fourteenth Amendment,63 that both the federal and state
governments have limited and express powers.
kinds of due process.

There are two

Procedural due process, as defined by

Daniel Webster, is procedure "which hears before it con

61Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment. 427.
62The fourth provision of the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution commands: "No person shall...be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Applies
only to violations of procedure by the federal government.
“ Section 1 of the Fourteenth of the United States Constitution
protects "[a]11 persons born or naturalized of the United States,"
including citizens of the several states, to due process of law;
that is, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law."
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demns, which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment
only after trial."6,5

To be sure, a defendant's rights

have been violated when the legal treatment he received is
considered "shocking to the sense of justice of the civi
lized world."65;

substantive due process is used by the

Court to strike down arbitrary or unreasonable legislation
and executive acts, or acts and legislation that improperly
oversteps governmental authority.

In privacy cases, the

Court has exercised substantive due process.66
Traditionally, the Court has rendered legislation
arbitrary or unreasonable when it is considered to infringe
upon fundamental (natural law) values.

Such values are not

readily traceable to constitutional text or historical

“ Quoted in Jack C. Plano and Milton Greenberg, The American
Political Dictionary. 5th ed.
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1979), 66.
“ Justice Benjamin Cardozo set forth criteria for the Court to
determine whether a state has violated rights protected by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in Palko v. Connecticut.
302 U.S. 319 (1937).
In this case he ruled that the double
jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment did not apply to the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Rights so protected are
"essential to a fair and enlightened system of justice."
An
example of a violation of due process is Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S.
86 (1923), It was ruled that defendants could not receive a fair
trial because of mob influence over judge, jury, witnesses, and
defense counsel, and was thus determined violative of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
66In particular, decisional privacy cases.
That is, in
circumstances where private individuals must resolve to do
something fundamental in accordance to their own conscience and
well-being. As compared to, privacy involving the withholding of
information.

72

example.

In Mever v. Nebraska.67 the Supreme Court re

versed a conviction of a teacher for teaching German; he
violated a state law which prohibited the teaching of a
foreign language to young children.

The Court ruled that

this statute unduly infringed upon the parents' or guard
ians' right to oversee and cultivate the education of their
own children.

Justice James C. McReynolds laid the basis

for a broad reading of the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of
personal "liberty":
Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from
bodily restraint but also the right of the individual
to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations
of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, es
tablish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men.68
This decision advanced the impetus for granting per
sonal liberty under court-sponsored substantive due process.
Thus, the right to privacy was granted the germ of legal
validity; personal rights that can be deemed to be "funda
mental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"69
are included in the guarantee of personal privacy.70

Among

67Mever v. Nebraska. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
68Id. at 399.
69Palko v. Connecticut. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
64 above.
70Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113

(1973).

See text at note
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these rights are activities relating to marriage,71 contra
ception,72 procreation,73 family relationships,74 and
child rearing and education.75

Consequently, the right for

women to have an abortion was also deemed fundamental, based
on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.76
71Lovinq v. Virginia. 388 U.S. 1 (1967), the Court invalidated
a Virginia miscegenation statute on the basis of the Due process
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Chief
Justice Warren declared: "The freedom to marry has long been recog
nized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men." JEd. at 12.
72Eisenstadt v. Baird. 405 U.S. 438 (1972), struck down a
Massachusetts statute prohibiting the distribution of contraception
to unmarried individuals based on the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brennan, J.,: "If the
right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child." JEd. at 453.
73Skinner v. Oklahoma. 316 U.S. 535 (1942), invalidated
Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act, mandating compul
sory sterilization after a third conviction for a felony. A
precursor for special protection of some "fundamental interest"
under equal protection.

74Prince v. Massachusetts. 321 U.S. 158 (1944), the Court
upheld a statute making it a crime for a girl under eighteen years
to sell any newspapers, periodicals, or merchandise in public
places despite the fact that a child of the Jehovah's Witnesses
faith believed that it was her religious duty to do so.
75Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 268 U.S. 510 (1925),
in
validated an Oregon law requiring children to attend public
schools.
Under the view of protected rights stated in Meyer,
supra. Justice McReynolods held that the law interfered "with the
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control." .Id. at 534-535.
76Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113. The Supreme Court invalidated a
Texas statute making it a criminal offense to "procure an abortion"
except "by medical advice for saving the life of the mother."
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The problem with substantive due process is the absence
of textual authorization.

While an individual's right to

this or that may seem fundamental, reasonable, indeed even
compelling, many critics are not satisfied with a natural
rights justification.

It looks too much like judicial

legislation; substantive due process gives a majority of
Supreme Court justices, unelected and unaccountable, the
right to make social policy.

Justice Hugo Black denounced

such judicial policy making, stating,
[i]f these formulas based on "natural justice". . . are
to prevail, they require judges to determine what is or
is not constitutional on the basis of their own ap
praisal of what laws are unwise or unnecessary.
The
power to make such decisions is of course that of a
legislative body.77
Justices Byron White and William Rehnquist, similarly main
tain that if a statute or law seems fundamental, but is not
supported by constitutional text, than the political process
will, or at least should, rectify the inequity.78
Blackmun, J.,: "This right of privacy, whether founded in the
Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions
upon state action,
as we feel it is, or, as the District Court
determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the
people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy." Id. at 153.
77Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, at 511-512.
78Justices White and Rehnquist's dissenting sentiments are the
same both in Roe, supra, and in its companion case Doe v. Bolton.
410 U.S. 179 (1973). "I find nothing in the language or history of
the Constitution to support the Court's judgement. The Court simply
fashions and announces a new constitutional right for pregnant
mothers and, with scarcely any reason or authority for its action,
invests that right with sufficient substance to override most
existing state abortion statutes. . . In my view its judgement is
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Moreover, notes John Hart Ely, substantive due process
may be wrong when considered in light of vague constitution
al affinities, such as in the Lochner era,79 but it is
downright insidious the way it applied in Roe.

A woman's

sacred right to control the functions of her body looks
constitutional and sounds constitutional, but, says Ely, it
smells of something else.
The problem with Roe is not so much that it bungles the
questions it sets itself, but rather that it sets
itself a question a Constitution has not made the
Court's business.
It looks different from Lochner —
it has the shape if not the substance of a judgment
that is very much the Court's business, one vindicating
an interest the Constitution marks as special — and it
is for that reason perhaps more dangerous.80
Justice Douglas wanted to avoid the accusation that a
right to privacy had no constitutional foundation, by at
tempting to build an airtight structure encompassing many of
the provisions of the Bill of Rights.

Thomas Jefferson

said, in writing on the Bill of Rights, " [a] brace the more
will often keep up the building which would have fallen with

an improvident and extravagant exercise of the power of judicial
review that the Constitution extends to this Court." .Id- at 221222 .
79The Lochner era refers to a catalyst of cases involving
economic substantive due process. The Supreme Court invalidated a
series of state statutes instituting police powers of various sorts
(e.g., setting maximum working hours) only to be struck down by
judicial decisions upholding the liberty of contract between
employer and employee.
See for example, Lochner v. New York. 198
U.S. 45 (1905), Coppaqe v. Kansas. 236 U.S. 1 (1915), and Adair v.
United States. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
80John Hart Ely, "The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe
v . Wade," The Yale Law Journal 82 (1973): 943.
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that brace the less."81

For Douglas, the brace of certain

enumerated rights is the foundation for the palace of liber
ties .
Zones of Privacy
Justice Douglas reasoned in Griswold v. Connecticut82
that guarantees of personal privacy are emanations from
specific constitutional protections enumerated in the Bill
of Rights.

Penumbras83 of privacy exist, it was held, by

virtue of certain express guarantees.

For example, nowhere

in the First Amendment does it state "Congress shall make no
laws abridging the freedom of association," yet in NAACP v .
Alabama,84

the Court did recognize that the right to or

ganize and to join an organization for the advancement of
beliefs is a supplemental right to freedom of speech, of
peaceable assembly and petition, and to the free exercise of
religious beliefs.

Hence, the First Amendment creates a

"zone of privacy" under which people may interact, choose,
or believe.
Likewise, the Third Amendment, which prohibits the
81Writing to James Madison, March 15, 1789, on the conveniences
of a bill of rights, in Jefferson's Writings, above, 944.
82Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479 (1965), invalidated a
state statute criminalizing the use of, or assistance or counseling
for the use of contraceptives.
83Penumbra is defined as an "outlying, surrounding region;
periphery; fringe."
The American Heritage Dictionary of the
English Language. 1973 ed., s.v. "penumbra."
84NAACP v. Alabama. 357 U.S. 449

(1958).
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quartering of soldiers "in any house" during peacetime
without the consent of the owner, creates another zone of
privacy, which, along with the Fourth Amendment's guarantee
"to be secure in their persons, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures," allots citizens with a
citadel of privacy protections.85

The Fifth Amendment's

protection against self-incrimination is but another buffer
between the citizen and the government's attempt to confis
cate incriminating evidence against him, and thus, protects
the privacy of his knowledge and thoughts.

Finally, the

Ninth Amendment was cited by Douglas as proof that rights
not enumerated are not necessarily excluded, but are con
stitutionally retained by the people if it could be shown
that they are fundamental, or at least in the ambit of
constitutional protections.

Justice Douglas proposes, as

did Justice Bradley in Boyd, that constitutional provisions
should be given full effect, for a niggardly interpretation
would undermine centuries of revered mores.
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill
of Rights — older than our political parties, older
than our school system. Marriage is a coming together
for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and in
timate to the degree of being sacred.
It is an as
sociation that promotes a way of life, not causes; a
harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral
loyalty, not commercial or social projects.
Yet it is
85,lWould we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of
marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?"
asks Justice Douglas, indicating the Fourth Amendment privacy
protection.
"The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy
surrounding the marriage relationship." Griswold v. Connecticut.
381 U.S. at 485-486.
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an association for as noble a purpose as any involved
in our prior decisions.86
Justice Douglas' opinion in Griswold roused justifica
tion of a right to privacy per se.

Thus, while Douglas

asserted that he had constructed an unenumerated fundamental
right out enumerated fundamental rights, that is, the First,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments, the constitu
tional penumbra was again attacked as judicial legislation.
In his dissent in Griswold, Justice Black accused the Court
of adjudicating upon its own personal views of higher jus
tice and insisted
that no provision of the Constitution specifically
gives such blanket power to courts to exercise such a
supervisory veto over the wisdom and value of legis
lative policies and to hold unconstitutional those laws
which they believe unwise or dangerous.87
Robert Bork, the controversial scholar of original
intent, declared that Justice Douglas "performed a miracle

86Id. at 486.
87.Id,. at 512 (Black, J., dissenting).
However, see Robert
Dixon's rebuttal, accusing Justice Black of inconsistency. Dixon
argues that Black's insistence on the "clear meaning" of the
constitutional text does not coincide with some of his other
interpretations.
"It may not be too clear to some students of
constitutional law why, under Mr. Justice Black's 'clear meaning'
analysis, obscenity, group libel, and associational privacy are
constitutional absolutes along with simple free speech, while
marital privacy, in the Griswold context of access to birth control
information, is no part of the due-process liberty which the
fourteenth amendment applies to the states."
See, Dixon, "The
Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charter for an Expanded Law of
Privacy?" Michigan Law Review 64 (December 1965): 209-210.

79

of transubstantiation,1,88 that is, he modified substantive
due process into the language of legitimate constitutional
text.
al.

Privacy is too selective a right to be constitution
Contends Bork:
Griswold . . . is an unprincipled decision. . . We are
left with no idea of the sweep of the right to privacy
and hence no notion of the cases to which it may or may
not be applied in the future.89

Since privacy is essentially legally undefinable there will
be the further judicial bias of picking and choosing which
individuals or groups are constitutionally protected by the
right to privacy, and thereby allowing judges to impose
their own moral predilections.90
On the other hand, while Black, Bork, and others argue
against the right to privacy exclusively on the basis of its
omission from the Constitution, others suggest that the
Framers' constitutional philosophy should be the major con
sideration for judicial interpretation.

The historical

documents of the Framers indicate their concern for the
freedom and rights of the people, for religious toleration,
and juristic fairness.

Depending upon one's interpretation,

88Robert Bork, "Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems," Indiana Law Journal 47 (1971): 1-35. Reprinted in John
H. Garvey and T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Modern Constitutional
Theory: A Reader (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1989),
40-47.
89Ibid.. 45.
90Robert Bork, "Judicial Review And Democracy," Encyclopedia
of the American Constitution, vol. 3, ed. Leonard Levy, et al (New
York: Macmillan, 1986), 1061-64.
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the Ninth Amendment is the constitutional proof that fun
damental rights, such as that of privacy, are included in
the constitutional scheme of ordered liberty.

The Ninth Amendment
James Madison, the father of the Bill of Rights, feared
that by including a declaration of certain rights, other
equally fundamental rights would be repudiated.91

This

misgiving inspired him to create Resolution #4, as it was so
announced to the House of Representatives in 178 9:
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the Constitu
tion, made in favor of particular rights, shall not be
so construed as to diminish the just importance of
other rights retained by the people, or as to enlarge
the powers delegated by the Constitution. . . 92
This provision was subsequently shortened and became
the Ninth Amendment to the Bill of Rights:
The enumeration in the Constitution of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people.

91See, for example, his letter to Thomas Jefferson of October
17, 1788, in which Madison states: " . . . there is great reason to
fear that positive declaration of some of the most essential rights
could not be obtained in the requisite latitude." In, The Mind of
the Founder: Sources of the Political Thought of James Madison, ed.
Marvin Myers (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1973),
205-6.
Alexander Hamilton expressed similar thoughts in "Essay
#84," The Federalist Papers, above, that a bill of rights would be
dangerous.
92Speech to the House of Representatives, June 8, 1789. Here
he introduced all the other provisions of the Bill of Rights,
adding the fourth resolution to allay the fears of the delegates
over government license with other rights of the people not
specified.
Myers, ed., The Mind of the Founder. 217.

In Griswold, the Ninth Amendment was finally appealed
to at length.

Justice Douglas mentioned it as one of the

enumerated rights within the penumbra.

However, Justice

Arthur Goldberg, in his concurring opinion, upholds the
Ninth Amendment on its own merit.

An infinite number of

natural rights belong to the people, and the Framers knew
that not all of them could be immediately recognized during
the initial ratification of the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights.

Realization of fundamental rights, when challenged

by the legislative or executive acts, is thus left to the
interpretation of constitutional rights by the judiciary.93
In determining how judges are to undertake this momentous,
life-giving task, Goldberg asserts that judges must look to
the "traditions and [collective] conscience of our people"
and discern whether a principle is "so rooted [there]. . .
as to be ranked as fundamental," and "is of such a character
that it cannot be denied without violating those 'fundamen
tal principles of liberty which lie at the base of all our
civil and political institutions.'"94

Invading the con

fines of the marital bedroom, an institution supported by
93Thomas Jefferson, responding to Madison's letter of October
17, 1788, wrote: "In the arguments in favor of a declaration of
rights, you omit one which has great weight with me, the legal
check which it puts into the hands of the judiciary. This is a
body, which if rendered independent and kept strictly to their own
departments, merits great confidence for their learning and
integrity." Jefferson, Writings, 943-44.
94Justice Goldberg, quoting from Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97 (1934).
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 487
(Goldberg, J., concurring).
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the state, and then dictating the conditions by which mar
ried couples may interact, is a contradiction and a viola
tion of their fundamental rights.
Once again, the fundamental rights thesis for upholding
a right relating to privacy was criticized by those con
stitutional literalists

(Justice Black), die-hard democrats

(John Hart Ely), and original intent advocates

(Robert Bork)

as not based on the reality of constitutional law.

The

route to finding a constitutional basis for the right to
privacy has been anything but easy (and to Black, Ely and
Bork, legitimate).

The following chapter will examine what

the right to privacy protects, focusing on those issues
which constitutional literalists abhor most —

that is,

substantive rights to contraceptive and reproductive
autonomy.

CHAPTER THREE

PROTECTIONS AFFORDED BY THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
I am concerned here with privacy as a
constitutional right, recognized as
eligible for some protection against
official acts waving the banner of "pub
lic good."
Louis Henkin
"Privacy and Autonomy"
Privacy protections established by the various provi
sions in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment
(canvassed in Chapter Two) are not as firmly rooted in the
legal landscape as are, for example, the rights of free
speech and press.

Lacking clear constitutional text, rights

recognized as fundamental endure at the mercy of judicial
interpretation, for "whoever so shall giveth may also taketh
away."

Regardless of the amplitude at which some may argue

that the right to privacy exists in political principle,1
the judicial powers that be, at the final appeal, are the

:See, for example, Justice Douglas' majority opinion in
Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 480 (1965). "We deal with a right
of privacy older -than the Bill of Rights — older than our politi
cal parties, older than our school system . . . " _Id. at 486. Louis
Henkin argues that the Constitution, by its very political nature,
and the time of its conception (i.e., the Enlightenment), would
implicitly grant a right to privacy: "The Constitution does not
confer private rights; they are antecedent to and independent of
the Constitution." See, Henkin, "Privacy and Autonomy," Columbia
Law Review 74 (1974): 1412.
83
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ultimate decisive factors.2

Chapter Three will endeavor to

recount and review the Supreme Court's treatment of the most
precarious area within the right to privacy; that is, rights
to autonomy.3
Privacy and Reproductive Autonomy
There is not a more profound and intimate human affair
than the decision over whether, when, and how one's body
will bring into existence another human life.

Yet, state

legislatures throughout American history have persistently
attempted to regulate reproductive freedom based on their
responsibility to oversee the health, safety, welfare, and
morals of its citizenry.

Thus, for one reason or another,

laws determining an individual's reproductive destiny have
been a legitimate exercise of a state's police power.
However, because of the fundamentally intimate nature of
reproductive freedom, disputes over whether the state had
2Cf. the liberal Warren Court, the Court which per se recog
nized the right to privacy, with the conservative Rehnquist Court.
Only three members of the present Court, (Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun) consistently recognize that a right to privacy constitu
tionally exists. I will analyze the current Court in Chapter Four.
3Rights to autonomy include freedom to choose one's lifestyle,
and to decide, without government interference, upon intimate
matters concerning reproduction and sexuality.
Henkin notes that
". . . the Court has been vindicating not a right to freedom from
official intrusion [such as that in search and seizure cases], but
to freedom from official regulation [e.g., freedom from contracep
tion or abortion laws]."
Henkin, "Privacy and Autonomy," 14241425. Since the abortion decision is one that must be made with a
third-party, that is, a physician and possibly a hospital staff,
albeit confidentially, it has become more accurate to say that the
right to choose and procure an abortion is a right to autonomy
rather than a right to privacy.
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exceeded its bounds eventually made their way to the Supreme
Court.
In 1927, in the case of Buck v. Bell.4 the Court
upheld the state's power to sterilize an individual against
her objection to prevent the procreation of, in Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes' terminology, "imbeciles."5

Thus, so

long as the sterilization programs were conducted with
adequate procedural safeguards, the so-called mentally
deficient were harshly deprived of procreative rights on the
rationale that
[i]t is better for all the world, if instead of waiting
to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or let them
starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those
who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.6
The decision rendered in Buck incited criticism as
being fundamentally immoral, if not 'anti-constitutional'.
It was not until 1942 that the highest court in the land
recognized reproductive rights in Skinner v. Oklahoma.7
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, struck down a
“Buck v. Bell. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
sThe degree of feeble-mindedness which designated both Carrie
Buck and, later, her sister Doris for involuntary sterilization,
would not be "considered mentally deficient by today's standards."
See, S. J. Gould, The Mismeasure of Man (Norton paperback ed.
1981), 336, referred to in Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional
Law 2nd ed. (Mineola, New York: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1988),
note 15, at 1339.
6Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. at 207. This decision continued to be
employed for nearly fifty years. Over 7,500 involuntary steriliza
tions were performed in Virginia (where the case was challenged)
between 1924 and 1972. See, Gould, The Mismeasure of Man. 335.
7Skinner v. Oklahoma. 316 U.S. 535

(1942).
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state statute which mandated the sterilization of individ
uals convicted at least three times of "felonies involving
moral turpitude."

The Court based its decision on the equal

protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment, since
white collar criminals fared substantially better at sen
tencing.8

However, the language of Justice Douglas' opin

ion resounded of substantive due process, emphasizing the
violation of a fundamental human right:
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one
of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and pro
creation are fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the race . . . There is no redemption for
the individual whom the law touches. Any experiment
which the State conducts is to his irreparable injury.
He is forever deprived of his basic liberty.9
Justice Douglas acknowledged that one's reproductive
destiny ought to remain exclusively and autonomously with
oneself.

While Justice Douglas ruled in behalf of the

petitioner on Equal Protection grounds, the right to privacy
rationale lingered in the background.

Douglas' contempt for

government regulation in matters fundamentally intimate
would finally surface in the very controversial decision of
Griswold v. Connecticut.10
A Connecticut statute made it a criminal offense to
8Justice Douglas proposed that 'strict scrutiny' be applied
because of the severity of sterilization laws lest "invidious
discriminations are made against groups or types of individuals in
violation of the constitutional guaranty of just and equal laws."
Id. at 541.
9Ibid.
10Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479

(1963)
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either use birth control devices or to give information or
instructions for their use.

The General Statutes of

Connecticut, sections 53-32 and 54-196, mandated respec
tively :
Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or
instrument for the purpose of preventing contraception
shall be fined no less than $50 or imprisoned not less
than 60 days nor more than one year or both fined and
imprisoned.
Any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires
or commands another to commit any offense may be pros
ecuted and punished as if he were the principle of
fender .
Appellants Estelle Griswold, Executive Director of the
Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, and Charles Lee
Buxton, a licensed physician who served as medical director
for the League at its center in New Haven, were arrested,
convicted and fined $100 each for giving information, in
struction and advice to "married persons" as to the means of
preventing conception.

On appeal to the United States

Supreme Court, Justice Douglas, speaking for five members of
the Court, asserted that the appellants had standing to
raise the constitutional rights issue of the married couples
with whom they had a professional relationship,
Connecticut argued that it was exercising a legitimate
and 'compelling' state interest; that is, by proscribing the
use of birth control devices it was discouraging extra
marital relations and preventing sexually transmitted dis
eases.

Justice Douglas denounced the public interest ra

tionale put forth by the state and maintained that the
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statute egregiously encroached upon the sanctity and privacy
of the marital relation —

a relation, argued Justice

Douglas, which by its very nature merits a legal fortress
against state interference.
Justice Douglas bypassed the Fourteenth Amendment due
process argument,11 and introduced a 'de facto' constitu
tional existence for the right to privacy.

Like a right

that had always existed and lay in wait only to be discover
ed, Justice Douglas explained that there is a right to
privacy by virtue of "specific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights."

These specific guarantees act as a penumbra for

other related rights.12

Thus, as marriage is the autonomous

association of free individuals, married couples are pro
tected in their association by the First Amendment

(though

the First Amendment may not specifically mention the mar
riage relationship or the activities and beliefs that take
place within it).13 Moreover, as the Connecticut law must
invade the privacies of the marital bedroom to be effective,

u "We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the
wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems,
business affairs, or social conditions."
_Ici. at 482.
12For a detailed discussion of this matter see pp. 7 6-80 above.
13Justice Douglas cited NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288 (1958),
explaining that the Connecticut contraception statute is in
violation of the principle long upheld by the Court, that a
"governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitu
tionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms," jLd. at 307, cited in Griswold. 381 U.S. at
485.
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effective, it violates the Fourth Amendment.14
There could not have been a more representative case,
nor a more activist Court,15 to establish the precedent for
a constitutional right to privacy.

Once the constitutional

justification for autonomy had been made, the walls of
governmental regulation began to tumble down.

Soon, what

the married couple had been given a private right to do in
the sanctity of the marital chambers, unmarried couples had
been given the same private rights to do anywhere

(in

private) .16
In Eisenstadt v. Baird,17 appellee Baird distributed
contraceptives to the audience after delivering a lecture on
14Justice Douglas also cited the Fifth Amendment, as stated in
Boyd v. United States. 116 U.S. 616 (1886), as well as the Fourth
Amendment, protecting "the sanctity of a man's home and the
privacies of life" against all governmental intrusions, and Mapp v.
Ohio. 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which applied the exclusionary rule to
the states and further affirmed the fundamental character of the
right to privacy.
15The [Earl] Warren Court (1953 - 1968) is notable for its
disposition to overturn state statutes and government procedures
and establishing judicially created guidelines for government
procedure. This Court is most often accused of exercising substan
tive due process.
16For an extensive discussion on the reactions of the Griswold
decision, see the "Symposium on the Griswold Case (Griswold v.
Connecticut. 85 S.Ct. 1678) and the Right of Privacy,"
Michigan
Law Review 64 (December 1965) : Includes, Robert Dixon, "The
Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charter for an Expanded Law of
Privacy?", 197-218, Thomas Emerson, "Nine Justices in Search of a
Doctrine," 219-234, Paul Kauper, "Penumbras, Peripheries, Emana
tions, Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case,"
235-258, Robert McKay, "The Right of Privacy: Emanations and
Intimations," 259-282, and Arthur Sutherland, "Privacy in Connecti
cut, " 283-288.
17Eisenstadt v. Baird. 405 U.S. 438

(1972).
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overpopulation and contraception.

A package of contracep

tive foam was given to a single young woman.

Baird was

convicted in a Massachusetts state court for violating a
Massachusetts statute which made it a crime to sell, ylend,
or give away any contraceptive "drug, medicine, instrument
or article."18

According to the law, only physicians were

permitted to administer or prescribe contraceptive drugs or
articles for married persons, and pharmacists were permitted
to fill prescriptions for contraceptive drugs or articles
only for married persons.

The state's rationale for contra

ceptive regulation, moreover, was to prevent the spread of
'disease' and depravity, not to prevent pregnancy.19
Baird's conviction was upheld by the Massachusetts Supreme
Court.

He petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus which was

subsequently dismissed by the United States District Court
for the District of Massachusetts.

The United States Court

of Appeals, however, vacated the District Court's order and

^Massachusetts General Laws Ann., c. 272, section 21 provides
a maximum five-year prison term for "whoever . . . gives away . .
any drug, medicine, instrument or article whatever for the
prevention of conception . . . " except those authorized by section
21A, including registered physicians who "may administer to or
prescribe for any married person drugs and articles intended for
the prevention of pregnancy or conception," and registered
pharmacists who "may furnish such drugs or articles to any married
person presenting a prescription from a registered physician."
Cited in Eisenstadt v. Baird. 405 U.S. at 440-441.
19The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court maintained that the
purpose of the law was "to protect purity, to preserve chastity, to
encourage continuance and self-restraint, to defend the sanctity of
the home, and thus to engender in the State and nation a virile and
virtuous race of men and women." Id. at 448.
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remanded the case with instructions to grant the writ dis
charging the appellee.

The United States Supreme Court

affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which held
that the prohibition on contraception conflicted with "fun
damental human rights" under Griswold v. Connecticut.
Justice Brennan wrote the opinion for four members of
the Court (Powell and Rehnquist did not participate).
Brennan based his decision, in part, on the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause since,
[i]f under Griswold the distribution of contracep
tives to married persons cannot be prohibited, a ban on
distribution to unmarried persons would equally be
impermissible. It is true that in Griswold the right to
privacy in question inhered in the marital relation
ship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent
entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an as
sociation of two individuals each with a separate
intellectual and emotional make-up.
If the right of
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individ
ual , married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child.20
Moreover, the Court dismissed the compelling state
interest argument put forth by Massachusetts: first, it held
that the "deterrent to fornication"

(or extramarital and

premarital sex) rationale was not the purpose of the state
statute since "[i]t would be plainly unreasonable to assume
that Massachusetts has prescribed pregnancy and birth of an
20Id. at 453. Reportedly,
Justice Brennan used this opinion
as a persuasive prelude to help Justice Blackmun with the constitu
tional issue of an abortion decision rRoe v. Wadel which was
pending (particularly the last sentence of the quote) . See, Bob
Woodward and Scott Armstrong, The Brethren (New York: Avon Books,
1979), 193ff.
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unwanted child as punishment for fornication"21/ and sec
ond, the prohibition of contraception to unmarried individu
als would have only a "marginal" effect towards its stated
objective.

Furthermore, if the intent of the law was to

protect the health of its citizens, would it not include all
citizens both married and single?

The statute, it was

concluded, was both overbroad and discriminatory.
When, then, may a state regulate the health, safety,
welfare, and morals of its citizens?

Granting that consent

ing married and unmarried adults have a fundamental right to
be sexually active without state interference, does this
apply as well to minors?

Moreover, may the state attempt to

insure the safety of contraceptives as a legitimate public
health measure?
In Carev v. Population Services International.22 the
Court answers these questions —

in part[s].

That is, seven

members of the Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan,
agreed that a New York statute prohibiting the distribution
of non-prescription contraceptives to adults, except through
a licensed physician, was unconstitutional under the right
to privacy protections afforded by the Fourteenth Amend21Eisenstadt v. Baird, 4 95 U.S. at 44 8.
22Carev v. Population Services International. 431 U.S. 67 8
(1977) . Section 6811 (8) of the New York Education Law made it a
crime (1) for any person to sell or distribute any contraceptive of
any kind to a minor under 16; (2) for anyone other than a licensed
pharmacist to distribute contraceptives to persons 16 or over; and
(3) for anyone, including licensed pharmacists, to advertise or
display contraceptives.
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ment's Due Process Clause.

However, there was no majority

opinion by the Court invalidating the New York law as it
applied to the distribution of non-prescription contracep
tives to individuals under sixteen years of age.
The opinion of the Court was divided into five
parts.23

Justice Brennan joined by Justices Stewart, Mar

shall and Blackmun argued that minors have a constitutional
right to privacy unless restrictions serve a significant
state interest.24

In this instance, he maintained, the

state failed to justify such an imposing statute.

Justice

Lewis Powell objected to "subjecting restrictions on the
sexual activity of the young to heightened judicial re
view, 1125 but he conceded that the states should have a
broader reach in regulating the activities of adolescents.
He would also allow the state to encourage minors to seek
the advice of their parents before engaging in sexual inter
course.

Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the statute

violated due process by forcing minors who are sexually
23Parts I, II, III, and V, comprised the opinion of the Court.
Parts II and III dealt with the issue of whether the state had a
sufficient compelling interest in restricting distribution of
contraceptives to persons over sixteen years. Part IV considered
the ban on contraceptives to minors under sixteen years of age.
24Because of the ruling in Planned Parenthood of Central
Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), Brennan held that "since
the State may not impose a blanket prohibition or even a blanket
requirement of parental consent on the choice of a minor to
terminate her pregnancy, the constitutionality of a blanket
prohibition of the distribution of contraceptives to minors is
a fortiori foreclosed." Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S at 694.
25Id. at 705.
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active to bear children.26

Justice White concurred with

Stevens, asserting that the state had not demonstrated that
the prohibition contributed to the deterrent purposes ad
vanced by the state as justification for the restrictions.
Both Justices Stevens and White rejected the argument "that
a minor has the constitutional right to put contraceptives
to their intended use, notwithstanding the combined objec
tions of both parents and the state."27

Chief Justice

Warren Burger and Justice Rehnquist dissented from the
judgment of the Court, maintaining that the state does have
a compelling interest in both regulating the distribution of
contraceptives, and prohibiting the distribution of contra
ceptives to minors under the age of sixteen years.
Carev extended Griswold and Baird by invalidating a
state ban on commercial distribution of nonmedical contra
ceptives, while still recognizing that the right to privacy
is not absolute.

A compelling state interest lurks behind

all legislation, and is particularly forceful when fighting
legal precedents with controversial constitutional support.
Nevertheless, in the section that follows, it will be shown
that a constitutional right to privacy fared surprisingly
well in an area more intimate than any other, for a woman,
26"It is though a State decided to dramatize its disapproval
of motorcycles by forbidding the use of safety helmets," argues
Stevens.
"One need not posit a constitutional right to ride a
motorcycle to characterize such a restriction as irrational and
perverse."
Ici. at 715.
27Id. at 703.

yet seemingly more compelling than the contraception issue
—

the right to choose an abortion.
Privacy, Autonomy and Abortion
The landmark case extending the right to privacy in

decisions concerning whether or not to terminate a pregnancy
is Roe v. Wade.28

The plaintiff, an unmarried pregnant

woman, sought injunctive and declaratory relief against the
enforcement of a Texas

statute making ita crime to procure

an abortion except for

the purpose of saving the life of the

mother.

The District Court held that the right to choose

whether to have children was protected by the Ninth Amend
ment and applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amend
ment .
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment of the District Court.

In a very technical opin

ion, legally, philosophically, and medically, Justice Harry
Blackmun expressed the views of seven members of the Court,
including the Chief Justice.

The Court held that a con

stitutional right to privacy, founded
_ Amendment's concept ofpersonal liberty,

in the Fourteenth
was broad enough to

encompass a woman's decision whether to terminate a preg
nancy.29

Hence, Texas' statute criminalizing abortion was

28Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
29Justice Blackmun cited precedents which recognized a right
of privacy or zones of privacy, including: Union Pacific Railway
Co. V. Botsford. 141 U.S. 250 (18 91)(mandatory surgical examina
tions violated personal privacy); Stanley v. Georgia. 394 U.S. 557
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found to be in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
However, Justice Blackmun qualified this pronouncement:
the state has a right to regulate abortions insofar as to
assure that abortions are performed under circumstances that
insure the maximum safety of the patient.

To clarify this

position, Justice Blackmun laid out guidelines indicating
when a state's interest in regulating abortions becomes
compelling.
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of
the first trimester, the abortion decision and its
effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of
the pregnant woman's attending physician.30
(2)
For the stage subsequent to approximately the end
of the first trimester, the State, in promoting its in
terest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses,
regulate the abortion procedure in ways reasonably re-

(1964) (First Amendment protects the right to privately possess
obscene material); Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (expectations
of privacy are dependent on context and circumstance of individual
activity); Boyd v. United States. 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (government
cannot mandate the production of private shipping invoices);
Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479 (1963) (proscription of a
married couple's use of contraceptives violates zones of privacy);
Id. at 486, (Goldberg, J., concurring) (Ninth Amendment protects
privacy as a right reserved to the people) ; Mever v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923) (statute prohibiting teaching of foreign languages
violates parents'
and guardians'
rights to oversee child's
education); Loving v. Virginia. 388 U.S. 1 (1967)(privacy in
choosing a spouse); Skinner v. Oklahoma. 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreative privacy); Eisenstadt v. Baird. 405 U.S. 438 (1972)(contra
ceptive privacy); Prince v. Massachusetts. 321 U.S. 158 (1944)(pri
vacy inherent in family relationships); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters. 268 U.S. 510 (1925)(privacy inherent in child rearing and
education).
See Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. at 152-153.
30At this stage of pregnancy, it was determined, the mortality
rate in abortion is less than the mortality rate in normal
childbirth.
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lated to maternal health.31
(3)
For the stage subsequent to viability, the State
in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human
life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe,
abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life and
health of the mother.32
The two dissenters in this case, and in all subsequent
abortion cases, were Justices White and Rehnquist.

White,

joined by Rehnquist, asserted that "nothing in the language
or history of the Constitution" supported the Court's judg
ment that women have the constitutional right to abortion.
The Court, argued the dissenters, constructed a constitu
tional right where none had previously existed, and thus
indulged in "an improvident and extravagant exercise of the
power of judicial review."33

Moreover, Justice White indi

cated his doubts as to whether abortion is a fundamental
right, depicting it as a frivolous feminine alternative.
At the heart of the controversy in these cases are
those recurring pregnancies that pose no danger whatso
ever to the life or health of the mother but are never
theless unwanted for any one or more of a variety of
reasons — convenience, family planning, economics,
dislike of children, the embarrassment of illegitimacy,
etc.34

31For example, the state could regulate the qualifications of
the doctor performing the abortion, the facility in which the
abortion is to take place, etc.
However, the state may not
proscribe abortion at this stage.
32Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. at 164-165.
33Id. at 221-222 (White, J., dissenting). The dissents in Roe
apply also to Doe v. Bolton. 410 U.S. 179 (1973), discussed below.
34Id. at 221

(White, J., dissenting).
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Justice Rehnquist further marked his disagreement with
the Roe decision maintaining that, since a majority of the
states have had statutes restricting abortion for at least a
century, then, evidently, abortion is not "so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
fundamental."35

His strict constructionist view of the

Constitution was clear in his criticism of the Roe Court's
willingness to use substantive due process.

The concept of

liberty as used in the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to
cases which deprive an individual of his or her liberty
without due process of law; Justice Rehnquist did not ad
judge a woman's proscription from terminating a pregnancy to
be compelling enough to warrant such a restriction to be a
35Quoting from Snyder v. Massachusetts. 291 U.S. 97 (1934), in
Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
This
particular statement in his dissenting opinion seems to contradict
hundreds of years of common law precedent which permitted abor
tions.
Abortion prior to quickening was generally allowable by
law; abortions performed after quickening were punished as a
misdemeanor.
See, Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in Roe,
where he relates the common-law and American law history of
abortion laws.
He concludes that "at common-law, at the time of
the adoption of our Constitution, and throughout a major portion of
the 19th century, abortion was viewed with less disfavor than under
most American statutes currently in effect." See id. text at 133141. See also, an article by Cyril Means, which asserted that
abortion became a misdemeanor after quickening in the Seventeenth
Century because of the religious zeal of jurist Sir Edward Coke who
wrote a common law treatise used in law schools throughout the
United States.
Abortion laws in America gradually became more
restrictive in the mid-Eighteenth Century as a measure designed to
protect the health of women who died or were maimed because of the
unsafe medical procedures of the day.
See, Means "The Phoenix of
Abortional Freedoms: Is a Penumbral or Ninth Amendment Right About
to Arise from the Nineteenth-Century Legislative Ashes of a
Fourteenth-Century Common Law Liberty?" New York Law Forum 14 (Fall
1968), quoted in Marian Faux, Roe v. Wade (New York: New American
Library, 1988), 300-302.
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deprivation of due process.36
The companion case of Roe was Doe v. Bolton.31

The

plaintiffs, an indigent pregnant woman and nine physicians
licensed in Georgia, challenged a Georgia law which pro
scribed abortion except as performed by a duly licensed
Georgia physician when necessary in "his best clinical
judgment" because continued pregnancy would endanger the
pregnant woman's life or injure her health; the fetus would
likely be born with a serious defect; or, the pregnancy
resulted from rape.38
In an opinion by Justice Blackmun, the Court held that
this provision of the law was not unconstitutionally vague
since the physician may exercise his judgment in light of
all the attendant circumstances (physical, emotional,
psychological, familial, and the woman's age).

However, the

Court invalidated three procedural demands of the Georgia
law:

(1) a provision which required that all abortions be

performed in hospitals accredited by the Joint Commission on
36Justice Rehnquist argued that "liberty [in the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment] is not always guaranteed absolutely against
deprivation without due process of law.
The test traditionally
applied in the area of social and economic legislation is whether
or not a law such as that challenged has a rational relation to a
valid state objective."
In this case, Rehnquist thinks that a
woman's choice to abort a pregnancy should not fall within the
meaning of liberty protected by due process, unless her life or
health is threatened. Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. at 173.
37Poe v. Bolton. 410 U.S. 179 (1973) .
38Criminal Code of Georgia, sections 26-1201 and 26-1202. See
appendix A to opinion of the Court, Doe v. Bolton. 410 U.S. at 202203.
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Accreditation of Hospitals was held unconstitutional since
the state did not show that only J.C.A.H. hospitals could
meet its interest in protecting the patient, and because it
required abortions in the first trimester to be performed in
hospitals;

(2) that the procedure be approved by the hos

pital staff abortion committee was unconstitutional since it
was unduly restrictive of the patient's rights already
safeguarded by the physician; and (3) the requirement of
concurrence by two other physicians was unconstitutional
since it had no rational connection with a patient's need,
and it infringed

upon the physician's right to practice.

The landmark decision handed down in Roe created a
landslide of anti-abortion emotion throughout the country so
intense that state legislatures attempted to allay the full
effect of Roe by enacting restrictions on the right to
abortion.

One such case was Planned Parenthood of Central

Missouri v. Danforth.39

A challenge was made to the valid

ity of a Missouri statute which set forth conditions and
limitations on abortions and established criminal offenses
for noncompliance.
In a unanimous decision written by Justice Blackmun,
the Court upheld:

(1) a viability definition provision

defining "viability," asserting that an abortion may not be
performed unless the fetus has not reached the stage of

39Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth. 428 U.S.
52 (1976).
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viability as certified with reasonable medical certainty by
the attending physician, unless it is necessary to preserve
the life and health of the mother40; (2) a pregnant woman's
consent provision requiring that, prior to submitting to an
abortion during the first twelve weeks, a woman certify her
consent to the procedure to assure that her consent is
informed and freely given; and (3) a recordkeeping and
reporting provision imposing requirements upon health facil
ities and physicians concerned with abortions regardless of
the stage of the pregnancy, since it imposed no legally
significant impact or consequence on the abortion decision
or the patient/physician relationship.41
Speaking for six members of the Court,42 Justice
Blackmun invalidated, as unconstitutional:

(1) a spousal

consent provision, since a state cannot "delegate to a
spouse a veto power which the State itself is . . . prohibi
ted from exercising during the first trimester.

. ."43;

40"Viability, " as defined by the Missouri statute, is "that
stage of fetal development when the life of the unborn child may be
continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or artificial
life-supporting systems." This definition concurs with Justice
Blackmun's definition in Roe, which defined viability as a fetus
"potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with
artificial aid." Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 160.
41Moreover, the recordkeeping provision was guaranteed to be
strictly confidential, and to be for statistical purposes only.
42Justices Blackmun,
Stevens.

Brennan, Marshall, Powell,

Stewart,

and

43Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth. 428 U.S.
at 69.
Justice Blackmun expressed the view that women must,
necessarily, have the final say in incidents of pregnancy since she
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and,

(2) a standard of care procedure which impermissibly

required the physician to preserve the life and health of
the fetus regardless of the stage of pregnancy.44
The majority vote dwindled to five4S when invalidating
the following provisions:

(1) a parental consent provision,

since a state cannot constitutionally impose a blanket
parental consent requirement as a condition for an unmarried
minor's

(under eighteen years) abortion during the first

twelve weeks of pregnancy for the same reasons given in the
spousal consent provision.

As it was emphasized in Roe.

"the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to
the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending
physician"46; and,

(2) a saline amniocentesis prohibition,

a safe and commonly used abortion procedure, since the state
failed to show this to be a reasonable protection of mater
nal health, and was arbitrarily proscribed.47
physically bears the child. "The obvious fact is that when a wife
and husband disagree on this decision, the view of only one of the
marriage partners can prevail." .Id. at 71.
44The Missouri statute further stated that any physician
failing the attempt in preserving the life and health of the fetus,
would be charged with manslaughter if the child's death resulted.
However, since the punishment was not severable from the act (since
the standard of care provision applied before the point in
viability and was, therefore, overbroad) , the penalty was invalid.
Id. at 83-84.
45Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, Stewart, and Powell.
46Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. at 164.
47The Court felt that Missouri enacted this provision to
discourage abortions altogether, even though other methods of
abortion, to be used in place of the outlawed method, were more
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In a later case dealing with a parental consent stat
ute, the Court could not produce a majority opinion.
Bellotti v. Baird48 concerned a Massachusetts statute re
quiring parental consent before an abortion could be per
formed on an unmarried woman under the age of eighteen, but
provided that an abortion could be obtained under a court
order upon a showing of good cause if one or both parents
should refuse consent.

Thus, the statute in this case,

argued Massachusetts, was consistent with the decision in
Danforth in that it offered an alternative means for the
minor woman for obtaining an abortion should her parents
refuse their consent.
In a plurality opinion by Justice Powell, and joined by
Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist,
the law was held invalid.

The Court held that the statute

imposed "an undue burden upon the exercise by minors of the

detrimental to maternal health.
"As so viewed . . . the outright
legislative proscription of saline fails as a reasonable regulation
for the protection of maternal health.
It comes into focus,
instead, as an unreasonable or arbitrary regulation designed to
inhibit, and having the effect of inhibiting, the vast majority of
abortions after the first 12 weeks." Planned Parenthood of Central
Missouri v. Danforth. 428 U.S. at 7 8-7 9.
48Bellotti v. Baird. 443 U.S. 622 (1979). Hunerwadel v. Baird
was also on appeal from the same court. Jane Hunerwadel was given
permission to intervene as a defendant and representative of all
parents with daughters under eighteen, and either pregnant, or
liable thereto. See also, Bellotti v. Baird. 428 U.S. 132 (1976),
(Baird I) which first challenged the Massachusetts statute, but was
vacated by the Supreme Court, which concluded that a U.S. District
Court, which invalidated the parental consent statute, should have
abstained and certified certain constitutional questions of the
statute to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
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right to seek an abortion,"49 since it required the minor
to seek parental approval first before seeking a prompt
court order to secure permission to obtain an abortion.
According to the concept of liberty found in the Fourteenth
Amendment,

"every minor must have the opportunity —

so desires —

if she

to go directly to a court without first con

sulting or notifying her parents."50

The court must grant

consent to the abortion if it is persuaded that the minor is
mature, or if terminating the pregnancy is in her best
interests.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Blackmun concurred in the judgment, but argued that the
Massachusetts statute was unconstitutional on its face based
upon the precedents laid down in Roe and Danforth.

Since

the statute stated that no underage female, no matter how
mature and well-informed, may receive an abortion without
the consent of either both parents or a judge, the minor's
abortion decision was subject in every instance to an ab
solute third-party veto.

49Bellotti v. Baird. 443 U.S. at 646-647.
50Id. at 647. The Court sympathized with the right of parents
to be informed about their children's activities . . .
in most
circumstances.
"The pregnant minor's options are much different
from those facing a minor in other situations. . ." For example,
pregnancy does not wait for a young girl to reach the legal age
without seriously affecting her life.
The consequences of
pregnancy, moreover, "brings with it adult legal responsibility. .
. In sum, there are few situations in which denying a minor the
right to make an important decision will have consequences so grave
and indelible." Id. at 642.
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It is inherent in the right to make the abortion deci
sion that the right may be exercised without public
scrutiny and in defiance of the contrary opinion of the
sovereign or other third parties.51
Justice White dissented, expressing the view that the
Massachusetts statute was not unconstitutional in requiring
parental consent when an unmarried woman under the age of
eighteen seeks an abortion.

Indeed, he approved of an

absolute parental or judicial check in all circumstances.
Justice Rehnquist, as well, indicated he was willing to
reconsider the Danforth decision, but conceded to precedent
until the opportunity to overturn the likes of Roe and
Danforth should arise.
State legislatures became more zealous and more
creative in enacting statutes restricting the choice of
women to independently obtain an abortion, particularly
underaged women, with the passage of time.

Justice Powell,

speaking for six members of the Court, addressed this con
cern in Akron v. Akron Center

for Reproductive Health.52

in his appeal not to stray from established precedent.
These cases come to us a decade after we held in Roe
v. Wade . . . that the right of privacy, grounded in
the concept of personal liberty guaranteed by the
Constitution, encompasses a woman's right to terminate
her pregnancy. Legislative responses to the Court's
decision have required us on several occasions . . . to
define the limits of a State's authority to regulate
the performance of abortions. And arguments continue to
be made . . . that we erred in interpreting the Con51Id. at 655.
52Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 4 62 U.S. 416
(1983) .
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stitution. Nonetheless, the doctrine of stare decisis,
while perhaps never entirely persuasive on a constitu
tional question, is a doctrine that demands respect in
a society governed by the rule of law. We respect it
today, and reaffirm Roe v. Wade.53
The city of Akron imposed a number of restrictions on
the abortion procedure with the enactment of 'Ordinance No.
160-1978, Regulation of Abortions.'

The first condition

required that all abortions performed after the first tri
mester of pregnancy be performed in hospitals accredited by
the J.C.A.H. or the American Osteopathic Association.

The

Court reaffirmed its decision in Doe v. Bolton, asserting
that this provision unnecessarily impeded the abortion
procedure, since it imposed additional costs, travel, and
health risks on the pregnant woman.

Since recent medical

evidence showed that second trimester abortions could be
safely performed on an outpatient basis in appropriate
nonhospital facilities, the grounds on which Akron based
this provision was not considered compelling, but rather a
means to make abortions more difficult to obtain.54
Second, the Court invalidated a parental consent or
dinance which applied to women under the age of fifteen.

In

53Id. at 419-420. Justice Powell's majority opinion was joined
by Mr. Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens.
54Justice Powell thought it was necessary for it to clarify its
position on the trimester distinction established in Roe v . Wade.
States took the cue that at thirteen weeks it was free to more
stringently regulate the abortion procedure, without seriously
considering how the regulation "reasonably relates to the preserva
tion and protection of maternal health." JEd. at 163.
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compliance with Bellotti v. Baird, it was held that the
statute did not establish a procedure by which a minor could
avoid a parental veto of her abortion decision.

In every

case, the Court stated, the pregnant girl must be able to
prove her informed consent, her maturity to make this deci
sion, or that termination of pregnancy would be in her best
interest to an impartial judge, before exposing her plight
to the emotionally-charged response of her parents.
[I]t is clear that Akron may not make a blanket deter
mination that all minors under the age of 15 are too
immature to make this decision or that an abortion
never may be in the minor's best interest without
parental approval.55
The Akron ordinance also required that the woman seek
ing an abortipn give "truly informed consent."

That is, the

attending physician had to explain to her the status of her
pregnancy and the stage of development of the fetus, the
potential date of viability, the physical and emotional
complications that may occur as a result of the abortion,
and a list of the agencies that offer assistance and infor
mation regarding birth control, adoption, and childbirth.
The Court held that this requirement was not enacted as a
measure to protect maternal health, and that it unduly
burdened the woman's abortion decision.
[I]t is fair to say that much of the information re
quired is designed not to inform the woman's consent
but rather to persuade her to withhold it altogether
. . . much of the detailed description of "the anatomi
cal and physiological characteristics of the particular
55Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, at 440.
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unborn child" . . . would involve, at best, speculation
by the physician. And . . . the dubious statement that
"abortion is a major surgical procedure," and proceeds
to describe numerous possible physical and psychologi
cal complications of abortion, is a "parade of hor
ribles" intended to suggest that abortion is a par
ticularly dangerous procedure.56
The Court also invalidated a requirement that the woman
wait twenty-four hours after signing the consent form be
cause there was no evidence that this waiting period would
make abortions safe.

Rather, it would impose additional

costs, travel, and possible health risks upon the pregnant
woman.

Finally, the Court invalidated the provision that

fetal remains be disposed of in a "humane and sanitary
manner," because the word "humane" was "impermissibly vague"
for a statute which mandates criminal liability.57
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, joined by Justices
Rehnquist and White, waged a sharp dissent against the Court
for invalidating legislative regulations that do not unduly
burden the right to abortion.

In fact, Justice O'Connor

found that judicial involvement in an area in which know
ledge and technology is so dynamic, is foolhardy for an
institution which relies substantially upon precedent.
Legislatures, she argues, are better able to react to the
changes in medical technology, and should not, "as a matter
of constitutional law, have to speculate about what con
oid. at 444-445.
57For example, would a humane disposal require "some sort of
'decent burial' of an embryo at the earliest stages of formation?"
Id. at 451.
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stitutes "acceptable medical practice" at any given
time.1158
An example of how the Court may have undermined a right
deemed fundamental based on stare decisis is its trimester
formulation.

As medical technology progresses, the trimest

er framework for regulating abortions becomes obsolete
because the point at which a fetus can survive outside the
mother's womb is moved back towards conception, while the
point at which a state's interest in maternal health becomes
compelling is moved forward towards childbirth.

Demanding

that a state follow the precedent set down in Roe is there
fore futile.
The Roe framework, then, is clearly on a collision
course with itself. . . Moreover, it is clear that the
trimester approach violates the fundamental aspiration
of neutral principles "sufficiently absolute to give
them roots throughout the community and continuity over
significant periods of time."59
Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City.
Missouri, Inc. v. Ashcroft,60 was decided the same term as
58Id. at 458 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
59Quoting Archibald Cox, Ibid.
One hundred sixty-seven
scientists and physicians, including eleven Nobel laureates, filed
a brief in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. 109 S.Ct. 3040
(1989) (discussed below) attacking O'Connor's "collision course"
rationale. "The earliest point of viability [outside the womb] has
remained virtually unchanged at approximately 24 weeks," wrote the
scientists. "Progress in science, therefore, has not made obsolete
the trimester framework based on viability." See, George Hackett
and Ann McDaniel, "All Eyes on Justice O'Connor," Newsweek. 1 May
1989, 34-35.
60Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Missouri. Inc.
v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983). See also, Simopoulos v. Virginia,
462 U.S. 506 (1983), the Court upheld a Virginia statute requiring
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Akron.

Four issues were decided in a judgment rendered by

Justice Powell.

First, following its decision in Doe and

Akron, the Court held a provision requiring abortions be
performed in a hospital after twelve weeks of pregnancy to
be an unconstitutional obstacle for the pregnant woman.
Second, the requirement that minors seek either parental
consent or consent from the juvenile court before being able
to obtain an abortion, was upheld as constitutional and
consistent with their rulings in Bellotti and Akron.

Third,

a provision requiring a pathology report for each abortion
performed was upheld by the Court as reasonably relating to
a health-related state concern.61 And fourth, the condi
tion that there be two physicians present during a post
viability abortion was also upheld as rationally relating to
a valid state objective.

Since the first physician's prima

ry concern is the life and health of the mother, a second

that all second-trimester abortions be performed in hospitals,
since Virginia included "outpatient hospitials." Justice Powell,
speaking for the Court, found that the state was reasonably
exercising a legitimate interest in protecting the woman's health.
61The appellants argued that a pathology requirement involved
additional expense. Missouri and several health professionals
argued that a pathology examination is not only the norm for all
surgically removed tissue to test for abnormalities that could
indicate more serious problems, but also insures that clinics
conform to ethical and/or accepted medical standards. Thus, Justice
Powell stated, "[i]n weighing the balance between protection of a
woman's health and the comparatively small additional cost of a
pathologist's examination, we cannot say that the Constitution
requires that a State subordinate its interest in health to
minimize to this extent the cost of abortions." Planned Parenthood
Association of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 4 62 U.S. at 489.
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physician is necessary to provide for the life and well
being of the fetus.62
The final case in which the Supreme Court invalidated a
state statute for unconstitutionally infringing upon a
woman's right to terminate her pregnancy, demonstrated the
allegiance of the Court to stare decisis.

Thornburgh v.

American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists63
involved the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982;64 a
sweeping list of restrictions which challenged some of the
precedents laid down by the Court in prior decisions.
Appellees, an organization of obstetricians and gyne
cologists and various individuals, challenged the statute
alleging that the law violated the United States Consti
tution, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief.

The

United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania denied the plaintiffs' preliminary injunctive
relief, concluding that a likelihood of success on the
merits had not been established.

On appeal, the United

“According to Roe v. Wade, supra, the state has a compelling
interest in a third-trimester fetus. Appellants argue that this
second-phvsician requirement interferes in the doctor-patient
relationship.
However, privacy is afforded, according to prece
dent, during the first two trimesters of pregnancy: " [T]he State in
promoting its interest in the potentiality of life may, if it
chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is
necessary . . . for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother." .Id. at 164-165.
“ Thornburgh
v.
American
College
Gynecologists. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).

of

Obstetricians

and

“Abortion Control Act, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. section 3201 et seg.
(1982).

112

States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ordered a
remand as to a provision of parental consent, and directly
held several other provisions of the Abortion Control Act
unconstitutional.65

Treating the resulting appeal as a

petition for certiorari, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed the opinion of the lower court.
Justice Blackmun,

joined by Justices Marshall, Powell,

and Stevens, indignantly reproved the intent of the Penn
sylvania statute:
In the years since this Court's decision in Roe. States
and municipalities have adopted a number of measures
seemingly designed to prevent a woman, with the advice
of her physician, from exercising her freedom of
choice.66
Blackmun accused these states and municipalities of
finding any and every excuse, "under the guise of maternal
health," to hinder a woman's abortion decision.

The Court,

65The Court of Appeals held the following sections of the
Pennsylvania statute unconstitutional: a portion of sec. 3205,
relating to "informed consent." That is, the woman was to be in
formed of a "parade of horribles," including the potential physical
and psychological risks of her decision; sec. 3208, concerning
"printed information" regarding the agencies that could assist her
should she decide to carry the fetus to term; sec(s). 3210 (b) and
(c) concerning postviability abortions, including a "standard of
care" requirement and a second-physician requirement; and, sec.
3211 (a) mandating a physician to report his basis for a finding of
nonviability, and sec(s). 3214 (a) and (h) regarding the reporting
of anonymous statistical information about the women obtaining
abortions.

“ Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gyne
cologists. 476 U.S. at 759.
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thus, proceeded to invalidate the following provisions of
the statute:
(1)

Section 3205.

An informed consent provision, the

kind which was held unconstitutional in Akron, requiring
that the physician relate a "litany of information" and a
"parade of horribles."67

The information that was to be

relayed to the pregnant woman included,

(a) the name of the

physician who would perform the abortion,

(b) the possible

detrimental psychological and physical effects resulting
from an abortion,

(c) the medical risks involved in the

abortion procedure,
fetus,

(d) the assumed gestational age of the

(e) the medical risks associated with carrying the

fetus to term,

(f) the available medical assistance benefits

for prenatal care, childbirth, and neonatal care, and (g)
the fact that the father would be liable to assist in the
child's financial support, "even in instances where the
father has offered to pay for the abortion."68;
(2)

Section 3211

(a).

A viability definition provi

sion that required the physician to report the basis for his

“Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health. 4 62 U.S. at
444-445. The state's purpose for imposing this provision, insisted
the Court, was simply to discourage woman from obtaining an
abortion.
“ Section 3205 of the Abortion Control Act.
Subsection (g)
posed a particular problem in cases of rape or incest — a rather
insensitive requirement for a woman dealing with such a tragic
experience.
"This type of compelled information," concluded the
Court, "is the antithesis of informed consent."
Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 47 6 U.S. at
764.
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determination that a fetus is not viable after the first
trimester, since the state failed to show that it was ad
vancing any legitimate interest;
(3)

Section 3214

(a).

Abortion reporting requirements

which must include,
identification of the performing and referring physi
cians and the facility or agency;information as to the
woman's political subdivision and State of residence,
age, race, marital status, and number of prior pregnan
cies; the date of her last menstrual period and the
probable gestational age; the basis for any judgment
that a medical emergency existed; the basis for any
determination of nonviability; and the method of pay
ment for the abortion.
While Section 3214 (e)(2) of the Act assures that these
reports will not be available for the public record, there
is a catch in that each report would be available for public
inspection and copying for fifteen days after receiving the
report, based on the guarantee that the identity of the
women will not be disclosed.

Moreover, Section 3214

(h)

provides that a report of complications "shall be open to
public inspection and copying."

Such a requirement, de

clared the Court, is only a disingenuous means to violate
the right to privacy.
Pennsylvania's reporting requirements raise the spectre
of public exposure and harassment of women who choose
to exercise their personal, intensely private, right,
with their physician, to end a pregnancy. Thus, they
pose an unacceptable danger of deterring the exercise
of that right, and must be invalidated.69
(4)

Section 3210 (b).

69Id. at 767-768.

A standard of care provision,
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requiring a physician to provide the necessary degree of
care to preserve the life and health of the post-viable
fetus.

The Court held, following the reasoning of the Court

of Appeals, that the provision required a "trade-off" be
tween the woman's health and fetal survival, whereas the
primary consideration should have been with the health of
the mother.70
(5)

Section 3210 (c).

A requirement that a second

physician be present during an abortion when there is a
possibility that the fetus is viable, even though there may
be no medical emergency.

Justice Blackmun held that since

the Pennsylvania statute did not provide a medical emergency
exception, whereby the woman's health would not be endanger
ed by the delay in the arrival of the second physician (as
Justice Powell qualified it in Ashcroft).71 the provision
was invalid.
In invalidating these provisions, Justice Blackmun is
remaining true to the belief that the right to privacy,
which he helped to establish, is a fundamental constitution
al guarantee, regardless of the criticism and controversy
this right has confronted.

His function as- a Supreme Court

justice, as he sees it, is to uphold the law for minorities
and majorities alike, and especially to remain objective in

70Id., at 768-769.
71Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v.
Ashcroft. 462 U.S. at 482-486.
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the face of religious or moral questions.

In conclusion,

Justice Blackmun maintains,
[f]ew decisions are more personal and intimate, more
properly private, or more basic to individual dignity
and autonomy, than a woman's decision — with the
guidance of her physician and within the limits speci- fied in Roe — whether to end her pregnancy. A woman's
right to make that choice freely is fundamental. Any
other result, in our view, would protect inadequately a
central part of the sphere of liberty that our law
guarantees equally to all.72
Justice Stevens wrote a separate concurrence in which
he strongly supported the Court's affirmance of a right to
privacy based on the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.

Numerous precedents have been established by this

very liberal clause, based on liberties recognized as funda
mental by the Court, including liberties which have been
recognized by the great dissenter in abortion cases —
Justice Byron White.73

Mr.

Justice Stevens, baffled by the

sudden change in the definition of liberty by Justice White,
remarked,

"I fail to see how a decision on child-bearing

becomes 'less' important the day after conception than the

72Thornburqh
v.
American
Gynecologists. 476 U.S. at 772.
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73For example, in Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479, White
stated "I find nothing in this record justifying the sweeping scope
of this statute, with its telling effect on the freedom of married
persons, and therefore conclude that it deprives such persons of
liberty without due process of law." .Id. at 507 (White, J.,
concurring).
Likewise, in Eisenstadt v. Baird. 405 U.S. 438, he
concurred with the result: Just as in Griswold ". . . so here to
sanction a medical restriction upon distribution [to married
persons] of a contraceptive not proved hazardous to health would
impair the exercise of the constitutional right." JEd. at 464-465
(White, J., concurring).
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day before."74

If it is because of the moral issues in

volved in the abortion decision which have wreaked the
present political havoc, asserted Justice Stevens, then "the
basic question is whether the "abortion decision" should be
made by the individual or by the majority."75
ing whose value judgments

In consider

(i.e., the Court or the pro-life

advocates) are being applied to whom (pro-life advocates or
pregnant women), Justice Stevens concluded,

"Justice White

is quite wrong in suggesting that the Court is imposing
value preferences on anyone else."76

On the contrary, in

his view, the Court has preserved the freedom of individuals
to determine value preferences for themselves.
The majority remain free to preach the evils of birth
control and abortion and to persuade others to make
correct decisions while the individual faced with the
reality of a difficult choice having serious and per
sonal consequences of major importance to her own
future — perhaps to the salvation of her immortal soul
— remains free to seek and to obtain sympathetic
guidance from those who share her value preferences.77
Justice White, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented,
declaring that it was time that the Court reverse its opin
ion in Roe, embrace the "proper understanding" of the
Constitution, and change its course from the "difficult and

74Thornburgh v.
American
Gynecologists. 476 U.S. at 776.
75Id. at 777.
76Id. at 778.
77Id. at 781.
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continuing venture into substantive due process."78
First, according to the dissenters, the Court is illogically following the rule of stare decisis, since this
principle of law is insubstantial without the rule of law to
sustain it.

Justice White contended that

when governing legal standards are open to revision in
every case, deciding cases becomes the mere exercise of
judicial will, with arbitrary and unpredictable re
sults .79
Second, since the Court has been consistently having to
invalidate state statutes which have been attempting to
place restrictions of abortions, it is clearly undermining
the will of the people.

The Constitution is a document of

the people, and the right to abortion is not a part of the
document.

Since the Court is invalidating legislative acts

which are, presumably, the will of the people, the dissent
ers conjectured, then the Court is sabotaging the American
system of government for an imaginary constitutional right.
Justice White consistently has accused the Court of
imposing its own value preferences.

In doing so, he argued,

the Court is permitting potential life to be vacuumed away.
His dissents do not persuade, however, that he is more
abhorred by the Court exercising substantive due process,
than its authorization of "the evil of abortion."80

It

78Quoting from his dissent in Planned Parenthood of Central
Missouri v. Danforth. id. at 785-786.
79Id. at 787.
80Id. at 797.
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appears that this is an issue where value preferences cannot
help but be imposed, even within the "objective" branch of
the government.

One either sides with Justice Stevens'

point of view that the Court must protect choice at the
grassroots level by constructing constitutional barriers, or
with Justice White's point of view that choice must be
protected at the political level by toppling judicial con
straints.

Both positions are equally ingrained in the

American concept of ordered liberty; both positions equally
incite emotional responses clothed in intellectual polemics.
Up until Thornburgh, we saw Justice Stevens' view reign.
However, in other cases, beginning with Maher v. Roe.81
Justice White's view prevails.

Round two of the right to

privacy match has begun.

81Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), discussed in Chapter Four
below.

CHAPTER FOUR

LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
For today, the women of this nation
still retain the liberty to control
their destinies. But the signs are very
ominous, and a chill wind blows.
Justice Harry A. Blackmun
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services
Dissenting opinion.
Previous chapters have reviewed the steady climb of the
right to privacy as a constitutional protection, but that
progress stops abruptly in the cases that will be discussed
in this chapter.

The conservative majority on the Supreme

Court, given its interpretational prerogative, simply refus
es to go beyond any of the 'substantive' rights to autono
mous choice and/or opportunity, granted by preceding Courts.
Indeed, the present Court has substantially limited the
ability of persons to exercise rights previously recognized
as constitutional.1

Thus, in several states, individuals

are now left with a token right to privacy (particularly in
regards to abortion rights) which hardly meets the prevalent

^hese cases will be discussed in further detail, in
particular, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. 109
S.Ct. 3040 (1989), below.
120
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expectations.2
President Ronald Reagan's goal to direct the political
philosophy of the Supreme Court towards greater judicial and
social conservativism was furnished with three golden oppor
tunities.

First, in the summer of 1981 Justice Potter

Stewart (a member of the Roe v. Wade majority) retired from
the Court.

He was replaced by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor,

the first woman ever appointed to the Supreme Court and a
conservative.

As a former Arizona state court of appeals

judge, she paid a great deal of attention to precedent and
to legislative decisions.
sions of state courts.

She also pays heed to the deci

With this type of 'hands-off' judi

cial philosophy, in addition to her 'personal abhorrence' to
abortion, she was the ideal candidate for President Reagan,
earning him praise for his political savvy in appointing a
woman.3
2A survey on the Supreme Court and the Constitution
reveals that a majority of Americans believe that the right
to privacy is an enumerated constitutional guarantee, and
includes such protections as sexual and reproductive auton
omy, and the right to choose euthanasia. See, "Poll finds
belief in a Constitutional right to privacy," Las Vegas
Review Journal. 19 February 1990, p. 6(A).
3See, on Justice O'Connor's personal history, Jerrold
K. Footlick and David T. Friendly, "A Keen Mind, Fine Judg
ment," Newsweek, 29 July 1981, 18-19, and Joseph Kane and
Evan Thomas, "Brethren's First Sister," Time, 20 July 1981,
8-12.
Some right-wing conservatives and pro-life advocates
disapproved of the appointment of a 'woman' who, they ar
gued, co-sponsored measures making "all medically acceptable
family planning methods and information" available to anyone
who wanted it, when she served as an Arizona senator. They
took this measure to include abortion.
See, "Answers to
Some Accusations," ibid., 11.
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Second, Chief Justice Burger (who also voted with the
majority in Roe v. Wade) vacated his seat on the High Court
in 1986 and arch-conservative Justice William H. Rehnquist
(one of the two dissenters in Roe) was elevated to take his
place.

The position that opened for associate justice was

filled by Antonin Scalia —
Roman Catholic.

a staunch conservative and a

Justice Scalia is a proponent of judicial

self-restraint, stating "I am not comfortable with imposing
my moral views on society."4

Like Chief Justice Rehnquist,

Justice Scalia contended that the right to privacy was
imprudently fabricated by judicial activists devoid of
constitutional authorization.

Justice Scalia, however,

appears to be more ardent in his quest to overrule Roe v.
Wade, proclaiming the cause that Justices Rehnquist and
White once chiefly commanded.5
Finally, Justice Lewis F. Powell

(still yet another

member of the Roe majority) announced his retirement in

4Quoted during the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings.
See, Ted Gest, "Scalia: No extremism spoken here," U.S.
News and World Report. 18 August 1986, 17.
5For example, in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services, Inc.. 109 S.Ct 3040 (1989), he criticized the
opinion of the Court (written by Rehnquist and joined by
White, et al) for not explicitly overruling Roe: "The out
come of today's case will doubtless be heralded as a triumph
of judicial statesmanship.
It is not that, unless it is
statesmanlike needlessly to prolong this Court's self-award
ed sovereignty over a field where it has little proper
business since the answers to most of the cruel questions
posed are political and not juridical..." .Id. at 3064
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg
ment) .
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1987,

After two unsuccessful attempts to nominate a conser

vative Justice to take Powell's position, including Robert
Bork and Douglas Ginsburg, Anthony M. Kennedy was finally
appointed to the bench.

Described as a quiet and scholarly

man, Justice Kennedy has proven to be very conservative in
civil rights cases, supporting state authority over the
rights of individuals in criminal cases.6 Moreover, Kennedy
is Chief Justice Rehnquist's model strict-constructionist,
voting with the Chief Justice consistently (90% of the
time),7 whereas Justice Powell tended to waver on civil
rights, individual liberties, and church/state issues.8
6For example, Justice Kennedy voted with the majority
in the following criminal cases in the 1988-1989 term:
Stanford v. Kentucky. Wilkins v. Missouri, Penrv v. Lvnaugh,
held, in a 5-4 decision, that it is not "cruel and unusual"
punishment to execute juveniles or the mentally retarded;
United States v. Monsanto, Caplin & Drvsdale v. United
States, held, in a 5-4 decision, that the government may
seize assets defendants plan to use to pay attorneys' fees;
and, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association, held,
in a 7-2 decision, that mandatory alcohol and drug testing
of railroad workers, after a major accident and/or safety
violation, are constitutional.
See, Joan Biskupic, "Solid
New Majority Evident As 1988-1989 Term Ends," Congressional
Quarterly Weekly Report 47 (8 July 1989): 1694, 1696-1697.
7Joan Biskupic, "Justice Kennedy: The Fifth Vote,"
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 47 (8 July 1989):
1695.
8Neil Skene writes that Justice O'Connor, who during
her first eight years laid low and generally voted with the
conservatives, is finally coming into her own becoming the
swing vote that Justice Powell once was.
"O'Connor has
become the pivot point for the court on a number of issues.
Her votes with the other conservatives, like Powell's, are
often accompanied by separate opinions that narrow the focus
and the reach of the decision." See, Skene, "O'Connor
Becoming The New Powell, " Congressional Quarterly Weekly
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The conservative Court majority is adjudicating as
though it has some catching-up to do; as though to put the
reins on reckless unenumerated constitutional guarantees
particular the right to privacy).

(in

This was evident even

before the Reagan appointees were seated on the bench.

For

example, the Court refused to extend the right to privacy to
protect homosexuality.

In Bowers v. Hardwick,9 the Court,

in an opinion by Justice White, joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor, upheld
as constitutional a Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy.10
Respondent, Mr. Hardwick, was arrested while in the
process of violating the Georgia statute in the privacy of
his bedroom with an adult consensual partner.

The United

States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed
his conviction holding that the statute in question violated
the constitutional principles of Griswold v. Connecticut,

Report 47 (30 September 1989): 2598.
9Bowers v. Hardwick. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
10Georgia Code Ann. Section 16-6-2 (1984) provides, in
part:
11(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he
performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex
organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another. . .
" (b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall
be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more
than 20 years. . . "
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Eisenstadt v. Baird, Stanley v. Georgia,11 and Roe v. Wade,
as well as the Ninth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Supreme Court reversed the

Court of Appeals' decision for lacking constitutional sup
port of a fundamental right to engage in homosexual
sodomy.12

After all, announced Justice White, how could an

activity be fundamental and be contrary to the longstanding
laws of almost half of the states in America?

Homosexuality

does not rank as a fundamental right when viewing such
rights as being "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition.,l13
Moreover, according to Justice White, while rights

n In Stanley v. Georgja. 394 U.S. 557 (1969), the Court
held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect the
right of individuals to read and/or watch obscenity in the
privacy of their own homes.
Justice Marshall asserted: "If
the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State
has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own
house, what books he may read or what films he may watch.
Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of
giving government the power to control men's minds." Id., at
565-566.
12A couple, John and Mary Doe, were also plaintiffs in
the action, challenging their right as a married, hetero
sexual couple to engage in the actions the Georgia statute
proscribes.
The District Court held that they did not have
standing since they did not sustain, nor were in any danger
of sustaining, direct injury from the enforcement of the
statute. The Court of Appeals affirmed this ruling. Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. note 2, at 188.

13Id. at 192, quoting Justice Powell in Moore v. East
Cleveland. 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). Justice White proceeds
to amass all the archaic anti-sodomy laws which persevered
to the present-day.
See, id. note 5, at 192-194.
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protecting the privacy of marriage and family,14 the priva
cy of procreative and contraceptive choice,15 and even
rights protecting the privacy of choosing whether to termi
nate a pregnancy have been recognized as fundamental,16
contrary to the opinion of the Court of Appeals, these cases
have nothing in common with homosexual intimacy.

"No con

nection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one
hand and homosexual activity on the other has been demon
strated."17

What Justice White's decision demonstrated,

conclusively, was the frugality of strict-constructionism in
recognizing substantive due process rights.
Nor are we inclined to take a more expansive view of
14Lovinq v. Virginia. 388 U.S. 1 (1967), dealing with
marriage; and Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 268 U.S. 510
(1925), and Mever v. Nebraska. 262 U.S. 390 (1923), with
child rearing and education.
15Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535
(1942), dealing with procreation; and Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972), with contraception.
16Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
17Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191. Justice
Blackmun, however, pointed out in his dissent that the Court
has protected the autonomy of family relations not to impose
"a preference for stereotypical households," but rather
because it contributes to the happiness of individuals.
Id.
at 205.
See also, Laurence Tribe, the attorney for the
defendant, who argued that cases which protect contraceptive
freedom, for example, are not merely guaranteeing a right to
indulge in a particular pharmaceutical product, but rather
the right to engage in sexual expression. Because of its
highly personal nature, the government has no business
intentionally imposing sanctions (in one case pregnancy, in
Hardwick's case jail) to dissuade an activity it may find
morally wrong.
See Tribe, American Constitutional Law. 2d
ed., above, 1423.
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our authority to discover new fundamental rights im
bedded in the Due Process Clause. The Court is most
vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it
deals with judge-made constitutional law having little
or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the
Constitution.18
Finally, the respondent argued that the Georgia statute
has no rational basis for its existence except for the fact
that it is thought to be 'morally' objectionable to the
majority of the electorate.

Morality, Justice White con

tested, should not be the hand that motivates the ax in due
process claims.

Prescribing a moral code is a permissible

activity of state law, and morality alone could thus be the
rational basis for state statutes which encroach upon some
individual's rights, that is, if they are not explicitly or
even implicitly protected by the Constitution.19
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall
and Stevens, dissented, arguing that the real issue, the
issue that the majority is evading, is "the right to be let
alone."20

The dissenters charged the majority with focus-

18Bowers v. Hardwick. 478 U.S. at 194.
19Justice Powell concurred, although he stressed that
subsection (b) of the Georgia statute, which provides for
the punishment for engaging in homosexual sodomy, is a
possible violation of the Eighth Amendment protection
against cruel and unusual punishment.
He stated, "[t]he
Georgia statute at issue . . . authorizes a court to im
prison a person for up to 20 years for a single private,
consensual act of sodomy. In my view, a prison sentence for
such conduct - certainly a sentence of long duration - would
create a serious Eighth Amendment issue." .Id. at 197.
20Id. at 199, quoting Justice Brandeis' dissenting
remark in Olmstead v. United States. 277 U.S. 438, 478
(1928).
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ing on the activities, for example homosexual sodomy,21
rather than the principle being challenged: the right to
harmless personal preferences and predilections.

Justice

White is clearly wrong, averred the dissent, when he argued
that the dispute brought on by the respondent and past cases
recognizing privacy are unrelated.

This is undoubtedly a

privacy issue since there is no activity more intimate than
sexuality.
The fact that individuals define themselves in a sig
nificant way through their intimate sexual relation
ships with others suggests, in a Nation as diverse as
ours, that there may be many "right" ways of conducting
those relationships, and that much of the richness of a
relationship will come from the freedom an individual
has to 'choose' the form and nature of these intensely
personal bonds.22
The Court loses sight of its objective when it fails to
see that it is, in large part, a mediator and interpreter of
what the concept of liberty means.

If an activity as per

sonal as sexual intimacy is not a liberty, one could argue
that the whole lot of those rights that have been accepted
as fundamental, are not.

Laurence Tribe thus protests that

[s]ix decades of privacy precedents from Meyer v.
Nebraska and Skinner v. Oklahoma to Griswold v.
Connecticut and Roe v. Wade, were dismissed in two
brisk paragraphs as having no relevance to this issue,
since those cases involved rights relating to "family,

21This emphasis on 'homosexual' sodomy posed the ques
tion of an Equal Protection violation, considering the
general language of the statute.
See, id. Part I and note
2, at 200-203 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
22Id. at 205.
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marriage, or procreation."23
Indeed, that is the whole problem with proponents of
strict constructionism.

They look beyond the principles of

what the concepts of liberty and freedom mean in the hereand-now society, and only see the unknowable intentions of
the Framers of the Constitution.24

Ronald Dworkin main

tains that what the literalists really see is just a mirage.
He finds their intellectual basis, of denying the successional culmination of fundamental principles that increase
in society over time, as greatly wanting.

Our Constitution,

argues Dworkin, is a "charter of principle" and not "a
collection of political settlements."25

Dworkin convinc

ingly asserts:
Since their question-begging rhetoric about "judge-made
law" and "new rights" rests on no reasoned intellectual
basis, it provides even less discipline than the tradi
tional interpretive method, because the latter does
demand coherent and extended argument, not just namecalling.26
Hence, argues Dworkin, strict constructionists con
veniently go about picking and choosing rights

(e.g., the

right to legally integrated education) that then magically

23Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 1422.
“ See, Judith A. Baer, "The Fruitless Search for Origi
nal Intent," Michael McCann and Gerald Houseman, eds.,
Judging the Constitution: Critical Essays on Judicial Law
making (Glenview, 111.: Scott Foreman, 1989), 49-71.
25Ronald Dworkin, "The Great Abortion Case," New York
Review of Books 36 (29 June 1989): 52.
“ Ibid.
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appear to gain constitutional legitimacy.

This is aptly

demonstrated by the Court's acceptance of contraceptive and
procreative privacy as having a constitutional foundation,
but excludes that right to sexual privacy.

The conserva

tives on the Court do not stop here, as the next section
will show.

They also disingenuously placed impassible

constitutional barriers on the right to abortion, while
simultaneously affirming (although reluctantly) the con
stitutionality of abortion.
Limitations on the Right to Abortion
In Maher v. Roe,27 defendants brought suit against
Maher, Commissioner of Social Services in Connecticut, for
denying Medicaid funds for nontherapeutic abortions.

They

contended that Title XIX of the Social Security Act, as well
as the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees of due process and
equal protection, require the state to subsidize nonthera
peutic abortions, since Connecticut's policy effectively
nullifies the right to reproductive privacy established in
Roe v. Wade for indigent women who wish to obtain an abor
tion.

Connecticut's policy subsidizes childbirth, moreover,

and thus violates the principle laid down in Roe that "abor27Maher v. Roe. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
See also Beal v.
Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977), which was decided the same term,
and held that Title XIX of the Social Security Act does not
require the funding of nontherapeutic abortion as a condi
tion of participation in the Medicaid program which was
established by that Act. Justice Powell, writing for the
majority in Beal, based his decision on the language of
Title XIX itself.
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tion and childbirth, when stripped of the sensitive moral
arguments surrounding the abortion controversy, are simply
two alternative methods of pregnancy."28

Indigent women

who wish to obtain an abortion are denied their due process
rights to privacy in addition to equal protection since the
state subsidizes those indigent women who choose to carry
the fetus to term.

The United States District Court for the

District of Connecticut invalidated the Connecticut policy
of distinguishing between abortion and childbirth asserting
that
[t]o sanction such a justification would be to permit
discrimination against those seeking to exercise a
constitutional right on the basis that the state simply
does not approve of the exercise of that right.29
Justice Powell, writing the opinion of the Court, and
joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justices Stewart, White,
Rehnquist, and Stevens, reversed the District Court's
ruling.30

Powell declared that the state need not consti

tutionally subsidize the medical costs of indigents at all,
and they are certainly under no obligation to subsidize
nontherapeutic abortions.

He dismissed the equal protection

challenge advancing the position that indigent women seeking

28This was the interpretation of the District Court for
the District of Connecticut in Roe v. Norton. 408 F. Supp.
660, note 3, at 663.
29Id. at 664.
30The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit read the
Social Security Act to allow, but not to require, state
funding of nontherapeutic abortion. 522 F. 2d. 928 (1975) .
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an abortion do not constitute a suspect class: "this Court
has never held that financial need alone identifies a sus
pect class for purposes of equal protection analysis."31
The central question under the Equal Protection Clause
then becomes whether Connecticut's policy of denying bene
fits for abortion violates a right that has been deemed
constitutionally fundamental.

If it does, then the policy

would be constitutionally invalid unless the state could
show a compelling state interest.

Past state provisions

struck down by the Supreme Court were proven to be unduly
burdensome to the woman seeking to terminate a pregnancy.32
In this instance, wrote Powell, that is not the case.
Connecticut
places no obstacles — absolute or otherwise — in the
pregnant woman's path to an abortion. An indigent
woman who desires an abortion suffers no disadvantage
as a consequence of Connecticut's decision to fund
childbirth; she continues as before to be dependent on
private sources for the service she desires.33
31Maher v. Roe. 432 U.S. at 471.
32For example, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) invali
dated the sweeping Texas prohibition of abortions as being
an impermissible interference with a woman's decision wheth
er to terminate a pregnancy; Planned Parenthood of Central
Missouri v. Danforth. 428 U.S. 52 (1976) invalidated a
spousal consent requirement as an impermissible interference
of a woman's decision; Carev v. Population Services Interna
tional, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) held that a requirement for a
lawful abortion "is not unconstitutional unless it unduly
burdens the right to seek an abortion." Maher v. Roe. 432
U.S. at 472-473.
33Id. at 474. Justice Powell has accepted abortion as
a Hobbesean negative liberty. Abortion, asserts the Court,
is a 'hands-off' issue, available by virtue of the fact that
it is pretermitted by the state.
See text at pp. 33-34
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By resolving that the Connecticut regulation did not
violate a fundamental interest, and that it was not dis
criminating against a suspect class, the Court thus went on
to determine whether the regulation was "rationally related"
to a "constitutionally permissible" purpose.

By subsidizing

childbirth, and not nontherapeutic abortions, the regulation
was explicitly encouraging childbirth.

Even Roe recognized

the state's interest in protecting potential life, declared
the Court, therefore the regulation was held to be constitu
tional .
The dissents were wrathful, particularly the dissent
written by Justice Thurgood Marshall who accused the Court
of insensitivity and ignorance.34

The Court's endeavor to

avoid strict scrutiny, by employing mere rationality in
stead, is an affront to the poverty-stricken women who will
never be able to recover from their plight with additional,
unwanted children.
above.
This conception is the deficiency of labelling
abortion rights as a right to privacy, asserts Rhonda
Copelon.
The right to privacy is a negative right which
confers a right to be let alone (as opposed to a positive
right of self-determination). "Not only does the negative
right of privacy carry no corresponding state obligation to
facilitate choice; the integrity of a woman's decision
making process is not even protected against purposeful
manipulation through the selective provision of state re
sources, in this case, the funding of childbirth." Copelon,
"Beyond the Liberal Idea of Privacy: Toward a Positive Right
of Autonomy," in Michael McCann and Gerald Houseman, eds.,
Judging the Constitution. 302-303.
34The dissents in this case apply to Beal v. Doe. 432
U.S. 438, see note 27 above, and Poelker v. Doe. 432 U.S.
519 (1977), discussed below.
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Absent day-care facilities, she will be forced into
full-time child care for years to come; she will be
unable to work so that her family can break out of the
welfare system or the lowest income brackets.
If she
already has children, another infant to feed and clothe
may well stretch the budget past the breaking point.
All chance to control the direction of her own life
will have been lost.35
All of the dissenters

(Justices Brennan, Marshall and

Blackmun) agreed that a fundamental right has 'de facto'
been denied to a specific class of women without the benefit
of a compelling state interest.

While Connecticut is not

actually putting obstacles in the path of an indigent wo
man's decision to choose abortion, it may just as well put a
shark-infested moat around the abortion clinics and hospi
tals with a sign reading "paying customers only."36
Another case decided that same term, Poelker v. Doe.37
takes the Maher precedent a step further.

The city of St.

Louis, at the directive of its Mayor, Mr. Poelker, prohibit
ed the performance of abortions in city hospitals except
when there was a grave threat to maternal health.

The

35Maher v. Roe. 432 U.S. at 458-459 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
36Justice Brennan quoted Justice Felix Frankfurter
revealing an analogous example to the Connecticut statute:
"To sanction such a ruthless consequence, inevitably
resulting from a money hurdle erected by the State, would
justify a latter-day Anatole France to add one more item in
his ironic comments on the 'majestic equality' of the law.
'The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well
as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets,
and to steal bread'. . . " i n Griffin v. Illinois. 351 U.S.
12, 23 (1956) (concurring opinion) . .Id. at 483.
37Poelker v. D o e . 432 U.S. 519

(1977).

United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled
that the city's policy was an unconstitutional equal protec
tion violation of indigent women's rights, since the hospi
tal publicly financed childbirth.

Furthermore, it was addi

tionally violative in that nonindigent women were able to
obtain abortions in private hospitals.

Following the deci

sion in Maher v. Roe, the Court applied, per curiam, the
same principles and reversed the lower court's ruling.38
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and
Blackmun, likewise objected on the same grounds as in Maher;
the St. Louis regulation denies indigent pregnant women due
process by effectively denying them services they cannot
afford.

However, there is the additional obstacle of pro

hibiting the physicians, who work in public hospitals, from
undertaking a minor operation that they would otherwise
perform.

Thus, in some communities, this would reduce the

number of physicians who may perform abortions in a hospital
setting, which could impose additional risks to the woman.
Moreover, women from small communities, both rich and poor,
would be burdened with additional travel and cost since they

38,lWe agree that the constitutional question presented
here is identical in principle with that presented by a
State's refusal to provide Medicaid benefits for abortions
while providing them for childbirth. . . For the reasons set
forth in our opinion in [Maher.] , we find no constitutional
violation by the city of St. Louis in electing, as a policy
choice, to provide publicly financed hospital services for
childbirth without providing corresponding services for
nontherapeutic abortions." .Id. at 521.
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would be forced to travel elsewhere to obtain an abor
tion.39

The reasoning of the Court is ironic, the dis

senters pointed out, since the majority manipulated the
rationale for governmental regulation of abortions provided
for in Roe to the detriment of its actual purpose —
protect maternal health.

to

Finally, the dissenters accused

the Court of regressing to the point in time when states
could force women to bear children that they did not want.
The dissenters' fears were compounded when in Harris v.
McRae,40 the Court upheld a federal statute which effec
tively permitted states to force women to bear children that
they could not or should not bear.

The federal statute,

known as the 'Hyde Amendment', put stipulations on state
participation in the Medicaid program.

The Amendment for

fiscal year 1980 provided:
[N]one of the funds provided by this joint resolution
shall be used to perform abortions except where the
life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus
were carried to term; or except for such medical proce
dures necessary for the victims of rape or incest when
such rape or incest has been reported promptly to a law
enforcement agency or public health service.41
39This was found to be an unconstitutional burden in
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 4 62 U.S. 416,
which invalidated a 24-hour waiting period before obtaining
an abortion, because the requirement imposed undue costs,
travel and possible health risks upon the pregnant woman.
40Harris v. McRae. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
41Pub. L. 96-123, sec. 109, 93 Stat. 926. The terms of
the Amendment in fiscal year 1977 did not include the rape
or incest exception, Pub. L. 94-439, sec. 209, 90 Stat.
1434. However, for the majority of fiscal year 1978, and
all of fiscal year 1979, the rape and incest exception was
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The Hyde Amendment, so-called after conservative Repre
sentative Henry Hyde, R-Ill., substantially revoked funding
for abortions even when it would be medically prudent to do
so.42

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Stewart, joined

by Chief Justice Burger, Justices White, Powell, and
Rehnquist, upheld the Hyde Amendment after having answered
two questions: statutory43 and constitutional.44
The statutory question asked whether states who partic
ipate in the Medicaid program are required to fund those

included in addition to another exception which provided for
"instances where severe and long-lasting physical health
damage to the mother would result if the pregnancy were
carried to term when so determined by two physicians," Pub.
L. 95-205, sec. 101, 91 Stat. 1460; Pub. L. 95-480, sec.
210, 92 Stat. 1586. The Court made note of the fact that
all fiscal years of the Amendment will be generically refer
red to as the 'Hyde Amendment.' JEd. note 4, at 303.
42For example, young women with diabetes are prone to
blindness during pregnancy, due to a worsening of a diabetic
retinopathy.
In addition, juvenile diabetics have a propen
sity to advance the diabetes faster, and their aggravated
condition increases the risks of kidney problems, and vas
cular problems of the extremities. Other complications of
pregnancy include phlebitiu, varicose veins and thrombo
phlebitis, to name a few. See, .id. note 5, at 353,
(Stevens, J., dissenting), citing affidavits from McRae v.
Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 670.
43The appellees contended that despite the Hyde Amend
ment, a state must pay for medically necessary abortions
since the Amendment is only a limitation on federal reim
bursement for this procedure, and on the basis that Title
XIX provides for states to subsidize the costs of all medic
ally necessary procedures and cannot exclude an operation
simply because abortion is involved.
44Appellees contended that the Hyde Amendment violates
the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection component of
the Fifth Amendment and the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment.

138

medically necessary abortions without federal reimbursement.
The Court held that states are not solely responsible for
funding medically necessary abortions based on the concept
of "cooperative federalism."

Title XIX was created as a

scheme, by federal and state governments, to bilaterally
subsidize the costs of indigent health care.

Since the

federal program was amended, the states were limited accord
ingly, and are thus relieved of the financial responsibility
within the conditions provided for by the Hyde Amendment.
The constitutional question was answered in several
parts.

The first constitutional challenge was whether the

Hyde Amendment violates the right of a woman to terminate
her pregnancy, implicit in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.

Remaining steadfast to its "obstacle"

analysis as professed in Maher, the Court reiterated its
position that due process cannot be violated absent actual
government obstruction of a desired constitutional right.
Disregarding the critical difference between Maher and
Harris, which literally involves life and liberty, Justice
Stewart reasoned that
it simply does not follow that a woman's freedom of
choice carries with it a constitutional entitlement to
the financial resources to avail herself of the full
range of protected choices.45
Indigence, not government, is the culprit in this case.
Thus the Court held that the Hyde Amendment did not violate

45Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 316.
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the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The second constitutional challenge was whether or not
the Hyde Amendment violated the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment.

The appellees charged that the Hyde Amend

ment executes policy that is dangerously close to the tenets
of the Roman Catholic Church: that is, the belief that
ensoulment begins at conception therefore making abortion
murder.46
Justice Stewart maintained that the Hyde Amendment did
not conflict with the Establishment Clause since
. . . it has a secular legislative purpose . . . its
principle primary effect neither advances nor inhibits
religion, and . . . it does not foster an excessive
government entanglement with religion.47
v

Simply because the Hyde Amendment may resemble princi
ples that belong to a particular faith does not indicate
that it has adopted those tenets.

Indeed, this would inval

idate much of our commonplace legislation; "[t]hat the
Judeo-Christian religions oppose stealing does not mean that
a State or the Federal Government may not . . . enact laws

46The Roman Catholic Church has the strictest views on
abortion, says Rabbi Aryeh Spero, prohibiting direct abor
tion of a fetus even in cases where it may be necessary to
save the mother's life. The Church does permit remedial
procedures, e.g. radiation treatments for cancer patients,
which may indirectly kill the fetus.
See, Spero, "Therefore
Choose Life: How the Great Faiths View Abortion," Policy
Review 48 (Spring 1989): 38-44.
47Quoting from Committee for Public Education v. Regan,
444 U.S. 646, 653. Maher v. Roe. 448 U.S. at 319.
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prohibiting larceny."48

The similarities, concluded the

Court, are not sufficiently convincing.
The third constitutional challenge was whether the Hyde
Amendment violates the Equal Protection component of the
Fifth Amendment.49 Arguing that the Hyde Amendment allows
subsidization of medically necessary procedures and not
medically necessary abortions, the appellees charged that
poor women are being discriminated against.

Justice

Stewart, however, once again resurrected the Maher precedent
asserting that "poverty, standing alone, is not a suspect
classification,"50 the differences between the two cases
notwithstanding.
Finally, it was left to the Court to decide what, if
any, was the legitimate governmental objective of the Hyde
Amendment.51

Justice Stewart concluded that it was recog

nized in Roe v. Wade that the state has an "important and
legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human

48Ibid.
49See, Bolling v. Sharp. 347 U.S. 497 (1956). The
Court held that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause
grants equal protection to individuals from discrimination
by the federal government.
S0Harris v. McRae. 44 8 U.S. at 323.
51A legitimate governmental objective is a necessary
component for sustaining statutory classifications in Fifth
Amendment Equal Protection controversies that do not impinge
upon fundamental Constitutional rights or suspect classifi
cations .
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life."52

By subsidizing childbirth and not abortion, the

state is simply and 'rationally' exercising its interest in
potential life.
Justice Stevens, dissenting, found the Court's priori
ties confounding.

First, the state's interest in protecting

potential life, in Roe, was never meant to threaten actual
life.

Second, protecting potential life becomes a realistic

governmental factor in the third trimester only, and when
potential life threatens actual maternal life, the latter's
interest constitutionally prevails.

Third, prior to the

third trimester, the only governmental regulation allowed,
in the context of the Roe decision, is to protect maternal
health.

The present decision, thus, clearly runs askew of

the precedent it has attempted to emulate.53
Furthermore, Justice Stevens argued that the Hyde
Amendment failed to exercise impartiality —

a trait that

all governments should display.
When the sovereign provides a special benefit or a
special protection for a class of persons, it must
define the membership in the class by neutral criteria;
it may not make special exceptions for reasons that are
constitutionally insufficient.54

52Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S., at 162. The Court reiterated
this position in Beal v. Doe. 432 U.S., at 445-446, Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S., at 478-479, and Poelker v. Doe. 432 U.S. 519,
520-521.
53Harris v. McRae. 448 U.S. at 350-354
dissenting).
54Id. at 349.

(Stevens, J.,
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The Court's criterion in Harris was not neutral, and
therefore the majority failed to live up to the objectivity
requirements of the equal protection guarantees of the
Constitution.

There are two objectives that Title XIX was

enacted to satisfy: financial need and medical need.

When

an indigent woman must obtain an abortion out of medical
necessity, therefore, she should be eligible to receive
governmental subsidization.

After all, a medically neces

sary procedure is a medically necessary procedure.

That the

Court refused to see this, in the words of Justice Stevens,
"constitute[s] an unjustifiable, and indeed blatant, viola
tion of the sovereign's duty to govern impartially."55
Justice Brennan, avowing that a due process violation
had taken place, disclosed that just when a constitutional
minority most needed the

intervention of the judicial

branch, they were abandoned.

He charged the sponsors of the

Hyde Amendment of attempting to impose the moral views of
the political majority on individuals.

Worse yet, stated

Brennan, the Amendment targets its puritanical wrath on
those least able to defend their rights to life and liberty
—

the poor and powerless.

The fact is, those people most

in need of the subsidization of Medicaid are arbitrarily
denied it, and are therefore denied a constitutionally
recognized right to privacy.

There need not be governmental

obstacles to achieve this blatant disregard of rights, as
55Id. at 356-357.
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the legislature and the Court have demonstrated.

"It mat

ters not that in this instance the Government has used the
carrot rather than the stick."56 A cunning manipulation of
funds works just as well as prison bars for those that need
the funds.57
Justice Marshall, taking the Equal Protection defen
sive, contended that the Court was acting unconscionably in
replacing strict scrutiny with mere rationality.

Clearly,

there is a definable group, poor, pregnant women, being
denied a constitutional right: access to abortions.

The

fact that medically necessary abortions are being denied
makes the issue one of callous indifference on the part of
the Court, and cruelty on the part of the legislature.
Three years prior to Harris v. McRae. Justice Marshall
made a prediction that appears to have come true.

In Maher

v. Roe, he warned that the decisions in Beal. Maher and
Poelker would
be an invitation to public officials, already under
extraordinary pressure from well-financed and carefully
orchestrated lobbying campaigns, to approve more such
56Id. at 334 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
57Justice Brennan pointed out that the Court has never
failed to invalidate legislation granting or withholding
funds that invariably leads to a violation of constitutional
rights. E.g., in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1968),
the Supreme Court invalidated a state unemployment statute
which would not pay unemployment insurance to a woman who
had refused to work on Saturdays because of her religious
beliefs. The statute required that recipients must accept
any suitable employment. The Court held that the statute
unconstitutionally infringed upon her First Amendment rights
to the Free Exercise of religion. .Id. at 334-335.
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restrictions [on abortion subsidizations].58
The fact that the restrictions disregard the dire
necessity of a simple and possibly life-saving operation, as
in Harris v. McRae, indicates that the Court has gone astray
of the promise of reproductive privacy that was offered in
Roe v. Wade.

While the language of "life and liberty" never

rang clearer, the majority of the Supreme Court did not hear
it, although the pro-life lobbyists did.

Ever in search of

a constitutional challenge to Roe v. Wade, and motivated by
the new turn in the Court, the pro-life forces achieved a
small but certain constitutional victory in the following
Supreme Court decision.
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services59 marks the
first actual obstruction of Roe v. Wade by the Supreme
Court.

Chief Justice Rehnquist found, or rather created,

his first opportunity to sabotage the trimester framework of
Roe which delineated the stages and the extent that a state
may enforce its interest in protecting maternal health and
potential life.

By undermining the trimester framework the

Supreme Court rendered greater latitude to states to regu
late, and perhaps even restrict, abortions prior to viabili
ty.

Chief Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justices White and

Kennedy joined, upheld Missouri Revised Statutes section

58Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 4 62.
3040

59Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S .C t .
(1989).
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188. 029, 60 which provides:
Before a physician performs an abortion on a woman he
has reason to believe is carrying an unborn child of
twenty or more weeks gestational age, the physician
shall first determine if the unborn child is viable by
using and exercising that degree of care, skill, and
proficiency commonly exercised by the ordinarily skill
ful, careful, and prudent physician engaged in similar
practice under the same or similar conditions. In
making this determination of viability, the physician
shall perform or cause to be performed such medical
examinations and tests as are necessary to make a
finding of the gestational age, weight, and lung matur
ity of the unborn child and shall enter such findings
and determination of viability in the medical record of
the mother.
In upholding this provision, the Court reversed rulings
of both the United States District Court for the Western
District of Missouri and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit.
188.029,

The Court of Appeals found section

requiring viability tests be performed when a

physician believes the fetus to be at twenty weeks gesta
tional age, to be an unconstitutional burden, imposing
greater expense and risk to both the pregnant woman and the
fetus.61
60Justice Scalia concurred in the result, but criti
cized the Court for' not overturning Roe v. Wade outright.
Justice O'Connor also concurred in the result, finding that
sec. 188.029 imposed no 'undue burden' on the right to
abortion, and not for the reasons put forth by the plurali
ty.
61851 F. 2d. 1071, at 1075. For example, an 'amniocen
tesis' must be performed to determine lung maturity which
can be dangerous to both the woman and the fetus.
Indeed,
the medical community does not assume that proper lung
maturity occurs until at least the thirty-second week of
pregnancy.
Such tests as Missouri requires, thus, were
ruled to be irrational and therefore unconstitutional.
Though fetal gestational age can be determined accurately by

14 6

Rehnquist, however, criticized the lower courts' inter
pretations for being too literal; that is, both the District
Court and the Court of Appeals mistakenly read section
188.029

as an unwavering mandate which required a viability

test for all women at approximately twenty weeks of pregnan
cy regardless of the physician's better judgment.

Thus,

even though the second sentence of the provision states that
at twenty weeks a physician "shall perform . . . such medi
cal examinations and tests," Rehnquist accused the lower
courts of creating 'constitutional difficulties' since they
did not read the statute in view of the general intent of
the statute.62

By virtue of the first sentence of section

188.029, which provides that the physician use his best
professional judgment and skill, the Chief Justice held that
the second sentence is not an irrational mandate at all, but
rather a provision which simply creates a presumption of
viability.63

Therefore, since the state may 'rationally'

ultrasound, which shows the size and external fetal develop
ment, fetal survivability before twenty-four weeks is un
likely, even with today's most sophisticated technology.
See, Gina Kolata, "Doctors' Tools Limited In Testing Fetal
Viability," The New York Times, 4 July 1989, p. 10(A).
See
also, Joanne Silberner, "When the Law and Medicine Collide, "
U.S. News and World Report, 7 July 1989, 23.
62Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. 109 S .C t . at
3054-3055.
“ Justice Stevens dissented from this part of the plur
ality' s opinion on two legal grounds: first, because it is
settled practice of the Supreme Court to accept "the inter
pretation of state law in which the District Court and the
Court of Appeals have concurred even if an examination of
the state-law issue without such guidance might have justi
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direct the physician to check for viability at twenty
weeks,64 then section 188.029 violates the strict trimester
structure of Roe v. Wade by promoting its interest in pro
tecting potential human life.

Since section 188.029 is

reasonably designed to protect potential human life and
creates the presumption of viability at twenty weeks, the
provision permissibly interferes with second trimester
privacy established in Roe and its progeny.65

In the bal

ance between viable potential life and second trimester

fied a different conclusion." Quoting, Bishop v. Wood, 426
U.S. 341, 346 (1976); and second, because "[t]he fact that a
particular application of the clear terms of a statute might
be unconstitutional does not provide us with a justification
for ignoring the plain meaning of the statute." Quoting,
Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 109 S.Ct. 2558,
2575 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Webster v. Reproduc
tive Health Services. 109 S.Ct. at 3079-3080 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
64William Webster, arguing on behalf of Missouri, main
tained that the purpose of the statute was to protect pos
sible viable fetuses. Physicians agree that there is a
potential four-week margin of error in determining fetal
gestational age when depending on the woman's recollection
of her last menstrual period. However, this rule of error
does not necessarily apply to ultrasound determinations of
gestational age. See, Silberner, "When the Law and Medicine
Collide," 23.
“ Rehnquist cited the precedents established in Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), (the privacy of the pregnant
woman and her physician is protected up until the third
trimester of pregnancy), Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379
(1979), (held that a determination of viability is solely a
matter for the attending physician's judgment), and Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983),
(invalidated a city statute which required that all second
trimester abortions be performed in hospitals), as examples
of section 188.029's inconsistency with the trimester
framework. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S.Ct
at 3955-3056.
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privacy, proclaimed Rehnquist, the former must prevail and,
therefore, the Roe framework cannot stand.66
Rehnquist proceeded to justify his disassemblage of
Roe.

First, he blamed Roe for having created a "Procrustean

bed" in the area of constitutional law dealing with abor
tion.67

A constitution whose language is cast in general

terms is unable to adjudicate on as rigid a framework as
Roe, particularly when dealing with a right not specifically
mentioned in the Constitution.

Moreover, judges should not

be an "'ex officio' medical board."68

These reasons con

tribute to Rehnquist's position that the precedent estab
lished in Roe v. Wade is bad constitutional law and should
66"That is a stunningly bad argument," asserts Ronald
Dworkin.
Roe never implied that the right to seek an abor
tion was absolute and tucked deep within the narrow confines
of the trimester structure in terms of weeks, days or hours.
Roe simply protected a woman's decision to terminate a
pregnancy up until viability.
"Viability is usually placed
at about seven months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, even
at 24 weeks." Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. at 160. Although
Justice Blackmun arranged the regulation of abortions into a
medically supported trimester framework, his opinion did not
imply that the viable fetuses could be aborted at 20 weeks
gestational age. Thus, it would seem that Chief Justice
Rehnquist is committing the 'constitutional difficulty'
here: " . . . Rehnquist offered his bad argument in an effort
not to reconcile his decision with judicial precedent, as
judges often do, but to show that his decision was 'incon
sistent' with precedent, which is extraordinary.
The con
clusion is irresistible that he had determined in advance
somehow to damage Roe v. Wade." Dworkin, "The Future of
Abortion," The New York Review of Books 36 (28 September
1989): 47.
67Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. 109 S.Ct. at
3056.
“ Quoting Justice White, dissenting, in Planned Parent
hood of Central Missouri v. Danforth. 428 U.S. 52, 99. Ibid.

f
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be overturned.69
The Chief Justice also denounced the trimester frame
work since he was unable to rationalize why the state's
interest in potential life is compelling only after viabil
ity and not before.70

As section 188.029 demonstrates,

stated Rehnquist, the state's interest could very well be
compelling during the second trimester of pregnancy.
It is true that the tests in question increase the
expense of abortion, and regulate the discretion of the
physician in determining the viability of the fetus.
Since the tests will undoubtedly show in many cases
that the fetus is not viable, the tests will have been
performed for what were in fact second-trimester abor
tions. But we are satisfied that the requirement of
these tests permissibly furthers the state's interest
in protecting potential human life, and we therefore
“ Justice Blackmun made a significant rebuttal to the
position that the Court should not promote judicial stipula
tions. Rehnquist's disenchantment with judicial regulation
would cause an ivory tower full of constitutional doctrines
to come crashing down. E.g., 'actual malice' standards for
proving libel, 'obscenity' standards, the 'rational-basis'
test, or intermediate and strict scrutiny formulations for
evaluating Equal Protection claims.
"Like the Roe frame
work, " explained Blackmun, "these tests or standards are
not, and do not purport to be, rights protected by the
Constitution.
Rather, they are judge-made methods for
evaluating and measuring the strength and scope of constitu
tional rights of individuals against the competing interests
of government." JEd. at 3073 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). As
for the "web of legal rules" that have been the result of
Roe. Blackmun pointed out that fine legal distinctions run
rampant throughout the Court's constitutional jurisprudence,
e.g., 'release-time' programs which accommodate religious
public-school instruction and the Establishment Clause. Id.
at 3071-3075.
70Justice Blackmun wanted to know why the plurality
feels the state's interest is so compelling during a woman's
entire pregnancy.
In a decision that will have such an
intrusive effect upon pregnant women, Blackmun believes the
Court owes a constitutional explanation on why it takes this
position. JEd. at 3075.

150

believe section 188.029 to be constitutional.71
Justice O'Connor disagreed with the reasoning that the
Chief Justice used in ruling on section 188.029.

She

thought that Rehnquist spoke prematurely and imprudently.
Section 188.029, declared O'Connor, simply does not conflict
with any of the Court's prior decisions, therefore, the
plurality's repudiation of the Roe trimester framework was
unnecessary.72

Thus, she attempted to demonstrate how the

viability testing provision and the previous Court decisions
are compatible:

"No decision of this Court has held that

the State may not directly promote its interest in potential
life when viability is possible."73
For example, in Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists.74 the Court struck down a
statute requiring the presence of a second physician during
a post-viability abortion only because the requirement did

71Id. at 3057.
72"The Court will not 'anticipate a question of consti
tutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.'"
Quoting Ashwander v. TVA. 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring), quoting Liverpool, New York and
Philadelphia S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113
U.S. 33, 39. Nor should the Court "formulate a rule of
constitutional law broader than is required by the precise
facts to which it is to be applied." 297 U.S., at 347.
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S.Ct. at 30603061 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
73Id. at 3062.
74Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
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not provide for exceptions in emergency situations.
Thornburgh does not deny the state's interest in protecting
potential life at viability; it reaffirms regulations al
though it recognizes maternal health to be of greater impor
tance.

Colautti v. Franklin75 is also consistent with and

similar to the intent of section 188.029.

Colautti main

tained that neither the legislature nor the courts may
determine that a single feature (e.g., weeks of gestation,
fetal weight, etc.) ascertains viability, because the point
of viability differs with each pregnancy.

The Court reaf

firmed the state's interest in potential life at viability.
All the Court stressed was that "[v]iability is the critical
point."76

This is consistent with section 188.029 since,

as the plurality interpreted this provision, the second sen
tence requires when not imprudent "those tests that are
useful to making subsidiary findings as to viability."77
The plurality also maintained that Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health78 was inconsistent with section
188.029, since it invalidated a city statute that required
all second trimester abortions to be performed in hospitals.

75Colautti v. Franklin. 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
76Id. at 388-389.
77Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. 109 S .C t . at
3055.
Recited and emphasis added by Justice O'Connor, i d .
at 3062.
78Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health. 4 62
U.S. 416 (1983).
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In Akron, the Court held that the statute imposed an undue
cost burden on women seeking an abortion during their second
trimester of pregnancy.

O'Connor pointed out that the

requirements in section 188.029 and in Akron are not the
same, since the latter provision unconstitutionally inter
fered with a woman's decision to terminate a pregnancy well
before the compelling point of viability.

Thus, Justice

O'Connor concluded
that requiring the performance of examination and tests
useful to determining whether a fetus is viable, when
viability is possible, and when it would not be medi
cally imprudent to do so, does not impose an undue
burden on a woman's abortion decision.
On this ground
alone I would reject the suggestion that section
188.029 as interpreted is unconstitutional.79
O'Connor's judgment remained consistent to the position
that a state maintains broad power to regulate the perfor
mance of abortions, so long as it does not impose an undue
burden on women seeking to terminate nonviable pregnancies.
Accordingly, she did not find section 188.029 to be an undue
burden.

Thus, she did not think the plurality acted wisely

or objectively in its overzealous assault on Roe v. Wade.
"When the constitutional invalidity of a State's abortion
statute actually turns on the constitutional validity of Roe
v. Wade, there will be time enough to reexamine Roe.

And to

do so carefully."80

3063

79Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. 10 9 S.Ct. at
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
80Id. at 3061.
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Not only did Rehnquist seek to invalidate Roe's trimes
ter framework, he also broadened the principles put forth in
Maher v. Roe. Poelker v. Doe and Harris v. McRae.81

Section

188.210 of the Missouri Revised Statutes provides:
It shall be unlawful for any public employee within the
scope of his employment to perform or assist an abor
tion not necessary to save the life of the mother.
And, section 188.215 states that it is
unlawful for any public facility to be used for the
purpose of performing or assisting an abortion not
necessary to save the life of the mother.
Rehnquist found these provisions to be applicable to
the precedents established in Maher. Poelker and McRae, and
upheld the constitutionality of sections 188.210 and 188.215
as further examples of the 'negative' liberty or right to
procure an abortion.82

Thus, the Court affirmed the

state's power to make value judgments in favor of child
birth, provided that a state does not unduly abridge a
woman's right to choose an abortion.

Rehnquist wrote that

Missouri's refusal to allow public employees to perform
abortions in public hospitals leaves a pregnant woman
with the same choices as if the State had chosen not to
operate any public hospitals at all.83
This assessment is untrue, contests Ronald Dworkin.

81The Chief Justice was joined by Justices White,
O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy on this part of his opinion.
82See Copelon, "Beyond the Liberal Idea of Privacy:
Toward a Positive Right of Autonomy," text at note 33
above.
33Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. 109 S.Ct. at

3052.

"Public facilities," as defined by the Missouri statute,
"includes any public institution, public facility, public
equipment, or any physical asset owned, leased, or control
led by this state or any agency or political subdivision
thereof."84
vate,

Therefore, if a medical institution is pri

(for example the Truman Medical Center in Kansas

City), and staffed by private doctors, and administered by
private corporations, and if it is on public land (the
Truman Medical Center is leased from a political subdivision
of the state), then the Missouri statute would prohibit the
performance of abortions at this facility.85

There is a

drastic dissimilarity between Maher's indifference to the
financial obstacles of indigent pregnant women, and the
utilization of every political, social and economic power in
the community to abridge the performance of abortions.

In

the former case, the state did not erect barriers opposing
abortions by refusing to fund nontherapeutic abortions.
However, the attempt to stretch the Maher principle to cases
whereby all women's right to choose an abortion is severely
restricted in a particular community is a desperate attempt
to constitutionally undermine the performance of abortions

“Missouri Revised Statutes, section 188.200.
See
also, Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion, id. note 1, at
3068, and Dworkin, "The Great Abortion Case," 53.
85In 1985, 97% of all hospital abortions in Missouri,
performed at sixteen weeks or later, were performed at the
Truman Medical Center. Dworkin, ibid.
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altogether.86

It is clear, charged Justice Blackmun, that

sections 188.210 and 188.215 do not leave pregnant women
with the same range of choices than if the state chose not
to operate public hospitals at all.87
The final provision of the Missouri Revised Statutes
upheld by the Supreme Court is section 1.205, which provides
in full:
1. The general assembly of this state finds that:
(1) The life of each human being begins at conception;
(2) Unborn children have protectable interests in
life, health and well-being;
(3) The natural parents of unborn children have pro
tectable interests in the life, health, and well-being
of their unborn child.
2. Effective January 1, 1988, the laws of this state
shall be interpreted and construed to acknowledge on
behalf of the unborn child at every stage of develop
ment, all the rights, privileges, and immunities avail
able to other persons, citizens, and residents of this
state, subject only to the Constitution of the United
States, and decisional interpretations thereof by the
United States Supreme Court and specific provisions to
the contrary in the statutes and constitution of this
state.
86For example, Dworkin explains, "[a] city cannot force
newsstands in shopping centers built on public land to sell
only papers it approves.
It cannot force theaters it sup
plies with water and power and police protection to perform
only plays it likes." Ibid.
87,lThe difference is critical," according to Blackmun.
"Even if the State may decline to subsidize or participate
in the exercise of a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy,
and even if a State may pursue its own abortion policies in
distributing public benefits, it may not affirmatively
constrict the availability of abortions by defining as
'public' that which in all meaningful respects is private.
With the certain knowledge that a substantial percentage of
private health-care providers will fall under the public
facility ban . . . [this] leaves the pregnant women with far
fewer choices, or, for those too sick or too poor to travel,
perhaps no choice at all." Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services. 109 S.Ct at 3068-3069 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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3. As used in this section, the term 'unborn children'
or 'unborn child' shall include all unborn child or
[sic.] children or the offspring of human beings from
the moment of conception until birth at every stage of
biological development.
4. Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as
creating a cause of action against a woman for indi
rectly harming her unborn child by failing to properly
care for herself or by failing to follow any particular
program of prenatal care.
This section was invalidated by the Court of Appeals
for going against the dictum of the Supreme Court that "a
State may not adopt one theory of when life begins to jus
tify its regulation of abortions."88

However, Rehnquist

reversed the interpretation of the lower court, and instead
accepted the state's defense of its intention to remain
'abortion neutral'.89

Missouri argued that section 1.205

imposed no substantive restrictions on the performance of
abortions.

Thus, Rehnquist read the preamble as merely a

value judgment, the kind of which was found to be constitu
tionally permissible in Maher v. Roe.90

In any case, at

88851 F.2d., at 1075-1076, quoting Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health. Inc.. 4 62 U.S. 416, 444
(1983), citing Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S., at 159-162.
The lower
federal court maintained that "the state intended its abor
tion regulations to be understood against the backdrop of
its theory of life." Ibid. See also, Brief for Appellees,
19-23, contending that section 1.205 is intended to direct
the interpretation for other provisions of the Missouri Act,
e.g., to prohibit doctors in public hospitals from prescrib
ing IUDs or some forms of the Pill, both of which dispel
impregnated ova.
Ibid.
89Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy joined
this part of the Chief Justice's opinion.
90,1 [T]he right [to an abortion] protects the woman from
unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide
whether to terminate her pregnancy.
It implies no limita
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tested the Chief Justice, the preamble, declaring that life
begins at conception, may be read to indicate that the
unborn are legally protected in tort and probate law.
Rehnquist thus stipulated that until it can be shown that
section 1.205 actually restricts abortions, it is too ab
stract for the Court to pass on its constitutionality.91
Justice Stevens dissented from this part of the Court's
opinion on several constitutional grounds.

First, he

claimed that the preamble in section 1.205 of the MRS vio
lates the constitutional right of contraceptive privacy
established in Griswold v. Connecticut. Eisenstadt v. Baird
and Carey v. Population Services International.92

This is

so because Missouri defines conception as "the fertilization
of the ovum of the female by the sperm of the male regard
less of whether implantation has occurred.93

Thus, section

tion on the authority of a State to make a value judgment
favoring childbirth over abortion . . . "
Maher v. Roe. 432
U.S. at 473-474.
91It is ironic, given Rehnquist's handling of section
188.029, that he quotes Tyler v. Judges of Court of
Registration, stating that the Court "is not empowered to .
. . abstract propositions, or to declare, for the government
of future cases, principles or rules of law which cannot
affect the result as to the thing in issue in the cases
before it." 179 U.S. 405, 409 (1900), in Webster v. Repro
ductive Health Services. 109 S.Ct at 3050.
92Id. at 3081. These contraceptive privacy precedents
were derived from a long list of cases supporting personal
choice in matters of marriage and family, see text at Chap
ter Three above.
93Medical texts regard conception as the point when
implantation actually occurs, approximately six days after
fertilization.
Id. at 3080-3081.
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1.205 is a potential threat to certain types of contracep
tives that prevent implantation of fertilized ova, such as
the Pill and the IUD, and which can, thus, interfere with a
woman's contraceptive choices —

particularly if she is

under the care of a physician working in a public hospital.
Second, Stevens challenged Missouri to explain the
secular interest in enacting the preamble.

The contention

that life begins at the moment of conception is a religious
conviction which thus violates the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment.94

Since Missouri has made a "legisla

tive finding without operative effect,1,95 that

is, for not

furthering a secular social objective, except

for the impo

sition of Christian religious morality, then the preamble is
unconstitutional.
As a secular matter, there is an obvious difference
between the state interest in protecting the freshly
fertilized egg and the state interest in protecting a
9-month-gestated, fully sentient fetus on the eve of
birth.
There can be no interest in protecting the
newly fertilized egg from physical pain or mental
anguish, because the capacity for such suffering does
not yet exist; respecting a developed fetus, however,
that interest is valid.96
94Indeed, a Missouri woman seeking contraceptive auton
omy would fare better under legislation authored by St.
Thomas Aquinas who believed that ensoulment did not occur
until 40 days after fertilization for males and 80 days for
females. Early abortions and abortifacients would, thus, be
seen as merely the destruction of seed and not of man.
See,
Brief for Americans United for Separation of Church and
State as amicus curiae. 13a, 17a, cited by Justice Stevens,
id. at 3083.
"Stevens citing Brief for Appellants 22, .id. at 3085.
96Id. at 3084

(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The Webster ruling, however, made it clear that fetal
developmental distinctions no longer matter as they were
elucidated in Roe v. Wade.

Webster v. Reproductive Health

Services has substantially weakened the right and ability of
a woman to terminate an unwanted pregnancy, even in the
earlier stages of pregnancy.

In so doing, the Supreme Court

has dispossessed many women in crisis situations of the full
capacity to deal with their dire circumstances.

For at

least half of the population in many parts of the United
States, self-determination —
and American right —

a decidedly fundamental human

has become a ward of the state; all

those intimate decisions denied, in the Court's mind, for
the sake of democracy.97
However, now that the abortion issue is back in the
political arena, it is difficult to see how democracy has
been vindicated by such an emotional issue as abortion.

If

anything, the abortion battle has thwarted the democratic
process.

Single-issue politics, on both sides of the abor

tion controversy, have taken over other important social and
economic issues.

Politicians are being courted by intense

lobbying groups for their votes on more or less restrictive
97Rehnquist asserted: " . . . [T]he goal of constitu
tional adjudication is surely not to remove inexorably
'politically divisive' issues from the ambit of the legisla
tive process, whereby the people, through their elected
representatives deal with matters of concern to them.
The
goal of constitutional adjudication is to hold true the
balance between that which the Constitution puts beyond the
reach of the democratic process and that which it does not."
Id. at 3058.
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abortion legislation.

Longstanding political careers are

now threatened by one's abortion position alone!
. . . American democracy will be made poorer by the
corruption of single-issue politics. Political deci
sions will be less sensitive to the complexities of the
popular will, because ordinary voters are in a worse,
not better, position to express their convictions and
preferences across the range of political issues when
politicians are forced to treat one issue as the only
one that counts.98
Moral issues, such as religion or abortion, are very
often the cause of violent factions within a community or
country.

While one half of the society is attempting to

enforce its morality on the community, the other half be
comes indignant at the former's intrusive evangelicalism
and/or unwavering fanaticism.
with abortion.

This is certainly the case

However, the Founding Fathers sought ways to

insure that no member or group in a society would be com
pelled, through governmental coercion, mob rule, or other
wise, to abide by foreign or conflicting beliefs.

Thus,

they entrusted the judiciary to be the final arbiters on
controversies where a political compromise would be impos
sible or unfair.

Alexander Hamilton sagaciously observed

that
. . . it is not with a view to infractions of the
Constitution only that the independence of the judges
may be an essential safeguard against the effects of
98Dworkin, "The Future of Abortion," 51. See also, Ted
Gest, "The Abortion Furor," U.S. News and World Report. 17
July 1989, 18-22, and, E.J. Dionne Jr., "On Both Sides,
Advocates Predict a 50-State Battle, " The New York Times. 4
July 1989, 1 (A) & 1 1 (L).
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occasional ill humors in the society.
These sometimes
extend no farther than to the injury of the private
rights of particular classes of citizens, by unjust and
partial laws. Here also the firmness of the judicial
magistracy is of vast importance in mitigating the
severity and confining the operation of such laws. . .
Considerate men of every description ought to prize
whatever will tend to beget or fortify that temper in
the courts; as no man can be sure that he may not be
tomorrow the victim of a spirit of injustice, by which
he may be a gainer today. . .99
It is the opinion

of many that Roe v. Wade was an

attempt to mitigate the interests of both personal privacy
and governmental regulation in the formation of the trimes
ter structure, thereby
tion

living up to the goals of accommoda

and moderation in a democratic society.100

However,

the Supreme Court in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services
has failed to uphold this uniquely American ideal.

"Alexander Hamilton,
Papers, above.

"Essay # 78, " The Federalist

100See, Frances Olsen, "Unraveling Compromise," Harvard
Law Review 103 (November 1989): 105- 135.

CONCLUSION

As of this writing, two abortion cases are pending
before the Supreme Court.1 Both cases involve parental
consent statutes.

Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive

Health,2 concerns the right of teen-age girls to obtain an
abortion without involving their parents.

A 1985 Ohio law,

House Bill 319 of the Amended Ohio Revised Code Section
2919.12, requires that physicians notify at least one parent
before performing an abortion on a minor, unless a juvenile
court has issued an order giving the minor permission to
obtain an abortion.

The United States Court of Appeals for

the Sixth Circuit, in Cleveland, declared the law unconsti-

1Another case, Turnock v. Ragsdale, No. 88-790, was
settled out of Court.
Turnock involved and Illinois stat
ute, Medical Practice Act 111 111. Rev. Stat., Sec. 16 (1),
which required services performing abortions during the
first three-months of pregnancy to meet standards similar to
those required in full-care hospitals.
Under the out-ofcourt agreement, however, a physician may perform an abor
tion in his office, but must have similar surgical privileg
es at a licensed state hospital in order to perform the
procedure at an abortion clinic. Furthermore, the settle
ment restricts licensed abortion clinics to using only local
anesthesia when performing abortions. After the eighteenth
week of pregnancy, abortions can only be performed in a
hospital or general surgery clinic.
See, Isabelle
Wilkerson, "Illinois Case on Abortion Settled Prior to
Supreme Court Hearing," New York Times, 23 November 1989, p.
A1(N), A1(L).
2No. 88-805.
162
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tutional, citing Supreme Court precedents which have limited
states' ability to impose undue burdens on teen-agers seek
ing abortions.3
Hodgson v. Minnesota. Minnesota v. Hodgson.4 imposes a
parental consent requirement which is much more restrictive
and, many argue, punitive than the Ohio statute.
sota statute, Minn. Stat. Ann. Sections 144.343

A Minne
(2)-(7),

mandates that both parents be notified before a teen-age
girl may obtain an abortion, unless she can prove to a court
"in an expedited confidential proceeding either that she is
'mature and capable of giving informed consent' or that the
performance of an abortion would be in her best interest."5
The parental consent requirement applies to situations of
divorce or parental desertion without exception.

The United

States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in St. Paul,
upheld the law in most respects.6

In a brief to the United

3854 F.2d. 852 (6th Cir. 1988). For example, Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth. 428 U.S. 52
(1976).Bellotti v. Baird 443 U.S. 622 (1979), and Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
See, "Battlegrounds for the Next Term," New York Times. 4
July 1989, p. 10 (L) .
4Twin appeals cases, No. 88-1125 and No. 88-1309,
respectively.
5853 F .2d. 1452 (8th Cir. 1988), at 1453.
6The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the ruling
of the United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota, which held that the notice/bypass statute was
unconstitutional, with directions that the District Court
enter judgment that the notice/bypass statute is constitu
tional.
The District Court held that the two parent notifi
cation statute failed to demonstrate that the state's inter
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States Supreme Court, Minnesota's Solicitor General, Kenneth
W. Starr, indicated not his concern for parental guidance in
a delicate issue such as abortion, but rather the consti
tutional legitimacy of abortion.

"There is simply no credi

ble foundation for the proposition that abortion is a funda
mental right," asserted Starr.7 Affirming the fears of the
Webster dissenters,8 Minnesota and other abortion-restric
tive states intend to annihilate Roe v. Wade, and are pass
ing legislation to achieve this objective.9

The Minnesota

est was in the best interest of protecting pregnant minors
or for promoting family communication.
Furthermore, the
forty-eight hour waiting period requirement was found to be
an unreasonable burden.
Ibid.
7Linda Greenhouse, "A New Round: Justices to Hear Cases
on Parental Notice, but the Wider Issue Again is Roe v.
Wade," New York Times. 24 November 1989, pp. 1(A), 24(A).
8"It is impossible to read the plurality opinion . . .
without recognizing its implicit invitation to every State
to enact more and more restrictive abortion laws, and to
assert their interest in potential life as of the moment of
conception. All these laws will satisfy the plurality's non
scrutiny, until sometime, a new regime of old dissenters and
new appointees will declare what the plurality intends: that
Roe is no longer good law." Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services. 109 S.Ct. at 3077-3078 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
9For example, the Idaho legislature passed the most
restrictive abortion law of any state, making the procedure
illegal except in cases of non-statutory rape reported in
seven days, incest if the victim is younger than 18, severe
fetal deformity or a threat to the mother's life or physical
health. "Idaho Senate OKs stiff abortion law," Las Vegas
Review Journal. 23 March 1990, p. 4(A). However, Governor
Cecil Andrus vetoed the legislation.
Likewise, Maryland
legislators attempted to enact strict abortion measures in
order to challenge Roe v. Wade, but it was killed in commit
tee hearings.
The United States territory of Guam was next
to challenge the historic abortion case with the nation's
strictest abortion law, but a federal judge temporarily
blocked it after a class-action suit. "Maryland abortion
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brief targeted Justice O'Connor's "undue burden" analysis
for measuring state restrictions on abortion, arguing that
"the undue burden analysis begs the question at issue," that
is, whether there is a fundamental constitutional right to
abortion.10
Justice O'Connor, however, held her ground during oral
arguments on the Minnesota law, questioning the state's
unwillingness to provide for exceptions to the rule: "To get
right to the heart of it," O'Connor said, addressing Minne
sota's Chief Deputy Attorney General, John Tunheim, "the
statute just doesn't provide any exceptions, although clear
ly there are some circumstances where notice is not in the
child's best interest."

Pressing the issue, she asked, "how

do you defend the state's interest?"11
Tunheim replied that "[t]here is no evidence that a
noncustodial parent is not fit to be a parent," whereupon
Justice Scalia, indirectly confronting O'Connor, injected
his position that parents have a right to know about their
bill killed," Las Vegas Review Journal. 25 March 1990, p.
10(A). Currently, a Louisiana bill, having passed the House
of Representatives, is up in the Senate. The measure would
provide up to ten years hard labor and/or fines up to
$100,000 for those who perform abortions. "Harsh anti-abor
tion bill OK'd," Las Vegas Review Journal. 15 June 1990, p.
10 (A) .
10Greenhouse, "A New Round: Justices to Hear Cases on
Parental Notice, but the Wider Issue again is Roe v. Wade."
p. 2 4 (A).
n Linda Greenhouse, "Oblique Clash Between 2 Justices
Mirrors Tensions About Abortion," New York Times. 30 Novem
ber 1989, pp. 1 (A) , 16 (B) .
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children's activities: "I had assumed that there is a paren
tal interest as well as a filial interest."

Tunheim agreed,

contending that the state presumes both parents have their
child's interest at heart.12
Justice O'Connor, in turn, rebutted, arguing "[t]hat
may be true in general . . . but probably you would concede
there might be circumstances where it is not in the best
interests of the child to tell both parents of her problem
and intention.1,13

Concessions is what Justice O'Connor's

abortion position is all about, and what makes her the
target justice in this no-win controversy.

As her opinion

in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services demonstrates, she
supports the states' rights to firmly regulate abortions
while maintaining that women have a constitutional right to
reproductive privacy.

However, does O'Connor believe that

all women share this right to reproductive privacy?14
12Ibid.
13Ibid. (Emphasis added) .
14Justice O'Connor is expected to uphold Roe v. Wade,
the decision granting reproductive privacy to women. "Care
ful observers have thought that in her concurring opinion in
[Webster] she seemed less opposed to guaranteeing women
substantive rights to an abortion than she has on other
occasions." Dworkin, "The Future of Abortion," above, note
3, at 47. See also, Donald Baer, "Now, the Court of less
resort," U.S. News and World Report, 17 July 1989, 26-29.
Moreover, considering her indirect clash with Justice Scalia
during oral arguments on the Minnesota statute and her
position on according concessions in those circumstances
when notifying both parents would not be feasible, she will
probably rule that "two-parent notification" is an undue
burden, while perhaps not "single-parent notification."
Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens will most
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Compromise was what Roe v. Wade was all about —
balanced moral and political composite: thesis
of potential life) + antithesis
freedom of choice) = synthesis

a

(protection

(privacy and reproductive
(Blackmun's trimester frame

work rendering reasonable protection to both).

A moral code

is indeed a necessary and honorable characteristic for any
society, but American society must also accommodate the
interests of the individual.

The entire political and

philosophical structure of American society was based on the
theories of men like Thomas Hobbes and John Locke who recog
nized that the individual is antecedent to the state, and
all political power, therefore, must emanate from the indi
vidual in order for the social alliance to work.

Thus, the

free and rational individual must be free to determine his
own moral code and religious beliefs and likewise tolerate
the beliefs of all others lest there be a moral battle of
each against all.
This thesis attempted to show how privacy and all the
protections surrounding such a liberty are harmonious, and
fulfill and enhance the American ideal of individual free
dom.

Individuals live in society, but the principles of the

United States Constitution guard against encroachments by
that society, and all the divergent passions and beliefs
that enflame the spirit at the risk of consuming individual
certainly uphold Roe v. Wade and grant teen-agers reproduc
tive privacy in the cases presently pending before the
Supreme Court.
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autonomy.

Hence, freedom of choice and self-determination

fulfill Thomas Jefferson's promise of "life, liberty and
happiness."

Attaining those high ideals is a continual

process of compromise and commitment to constitutional
principles.

By heeding the lessons of history and the

dictates of reason over passion, one realizes that the right
to privacy does indeed help to realize the promise of in
dependence, of happiness, and of freedom.
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